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Abstract 
This research contributes to the debate on the effects of diversification in the banking 
industry, and provides a comprehensive analysis of how the diversification-
performance, diversification-risk and diversification-efficiency nexus are affected 
when banks move into non-traditional businesses.  
The research first examines to what extent income diversification can affect 
performance in the Chinese banking industry in terms of profitability. Results showing 
that in the Chinese banking sector as a whole there exists a diversification discount, 
suggesting that a shift from traditional banking business to mixed business lines 
negatively affects bank performance.  
Following the discussion of profitability, we move the focus to the issue of stability. 
By adopting the first-differenced GMM estimator for the dynamic threshold panel data 
model, we get results showing that there exists an inverse U-shaped relation between 
diversification level and risk in the Chinese banking industry. Income diversification 
will reduce bank risk only after the bank has passed a certain threshold of income 
diversification. This pattern of relationship seems to be driven mainly by the learn-by-
doing effect and the mitigation of agency problems, which result from the expansion 
of non-interest activities.  
Finally, this thesis analyses the efficiency implications of the trend towards greater 
income diversification. We use a two-step approach by adopting within maximum 
likelihood estimation (WMLE) and dynamic Tobit model to estimate banks’ efficiency 
scores and regresses those scores with banks’ diversification indicators. We find that 
for the overall Chinese banking sector, income diversification has an efficiency-
destroying effect.  
This thesis provides a good reference for bank managers and policy makers to better 
understand and treat non-interest income in China’s banking market. Our results also 
have fundamental and useful implications for bank managers and policy authorities 
seeking to enhance the performance and efficiency of Chinese banks under the 
condition of maintaining financial stability in Chinese financial system. 
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Chapter 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
This chapter begins by giving an overview 
of the classification and channels of income 
diversification in the Chinese banking market. 
Then, it outlines the main motivations of the 
thesis, and the research questions to be 
addressed. After briefly noting the principal 
findings and potential contributions of this 
research, the chapter concludes by giving an 
outline of the composition and organisation of 
the whole thesis. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
Banks traditionally derive their income through providing deposit and loan services. 
In the recent three decades, however, the global banking industry has experienced a 
profound change in their business modes. Banks in both mature and developing 
markets have shifted from their traditional deposit and loan businesses towards non-
traditional and fee-based businesses. As a result, the shares of non-interest income in 
their total revenue have steadily increased. The main factors driving the change are 
regulatory changes and the changing environment for the banking markets (Allen and 
Santomero, 2001). Other contributing factors include financial liberalization, demand 
from savers for varied services and advances in technology (Meslier et al., 2014; 
Williams, 2016). 
 
Changes in the business modes of global banking industry have been on a scale 
experienced by few industries and its consequences have been wide ranging. With 
banks shifting away from their traditional income sources to expand into new financial 
service lines, it is now commonplace for banks to increase the proportion of non-
interest income through, for example, underwriting securities, insurance agency and 
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foreign exchange trading services with high leverage and fewer capital restrictions 
(Mercieca et al., 2007; Sawada, 2013; Lee et al., 2014). The resulting implications are 
huge and the situation calls for greater research efforts to understand the bank 
diversification process and its consequences. 
 
While some investigations have emerged with regard to mature and developing market, 
research on China that is currently the largest banking market of the world has been 
scarce (Zhou, 2014). This thesis aims to provide a novel perspective on the 
development of income diversification in the Chinese banking sector. The research is 
to focus on the effects of diversification on profitability, risk exposure and efficiency 
of Chinese banks. 
 
1.1  Motivation and Research Questions 
 
In an environment of increasingly tight capital regulation and fierce competition, 
diversification has become an important avenue for banks to develop new income in 
the mature market (Amidu and Wolfe, 2013). With the adoption of the diversification 
strategy, these banks have vigorously engaged in a wide range of financial products 
other than traditional ones. These include securities, insurance, trusts, and other 
financial categories. Over time, their non-traditional business has developed to become 
an important source of bank revenue, even in some cases exceeding traditional interest 
income.  
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The process of income diversification has blurred the boundaries between banking and 
other financial institutions. It has provided banks with the incentive to allocate 
resources to more profitable activities, which consume less capital but involve high 
levels of leverage, thus leading to the increase in banks’ exposure to specific and 
systemic risks and causing inefficiency in resource allocation (Elsas et al., 2010; Brighi 
and Venturelli, 2013). In detail, Wagner (2010) claims that limited liability 
incentivizes both bank managers and shareholders to allocate and diversify their 
portfolio towards correlated assets, and to ignore the risk of joint failures in the 
banking system brought about by raising bank exposure to common sources of risks. 
However, such an incentive to managers to over-diversify will in turn harm the 
stability and allocation efficiency of the wider financial system, because 
diversification makes institutions more similar to each other, thus exposing them to 
the same risks, and increasing the probability of joint failure (Acharya et al., 2006). 
Therefore, following the global financial crisis of 2008, the international banking 
industry has taken steps to implement more prudent management of diversified 
businesses, and regulators have introduced regulatory changes to improve banking 
supervision (Delimatsis, 2012; Zhu and Chen, 2016).  
 
China's banking industry has also experienced the significant rise and development of 
non-traditional business (Zhou, 2014).  This has taken place against a background of 
acceleration of financial reforms such as interest rate liberalization, banking system 
reform, and internationalization of the Chinese currency. Increasingly strict capital 
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supervision and financial disintermediation driven by the rapid development of the 
capital market are forcing Chinese banks to look beyond traditional commercial 
banking services and to search out new income sources; hence banks are gradually 
moving away from a single income structure that relies largely on interest income, to 
a more diversified income structure (Xiongbing and Wei, 2016). In the circumstances, 
Chinese banks have also shifted their focus away from on-balance sheet business to 
off-balance sheet business, and to allocate their portfolios more highly leveraged and 
high-yield assets with fewer regulatory capital requirements and activity restrictions 
(Qu et al., 2017).  
 
Chinese banks’ shift to income diversification is still ongoing.  While they continue 
to rely on net interest income, their non-interest income from non-traditional 
businesses has start to emerge and is growing. The incipient proportion of non-interest 
income in their total income is relatively small and they have less professional 
expertise in dealing with the uncertainties inherent in high-leverage activities 
(Iskandar-Datta and McLaughlin, 2007 Barth et al., 2013; Alhassan and Tetteh, 2017). 
Given the transitional nature of China's financial reform and deregulation of non-
interest activities, it is inevitable that the process of diversification and its effects on 
Chinese banks would have unique characteristics compared to that of banks in other 
markets. Consequently, it is necessary to investigate the effects generated from income 
diversification of banks in China, including their profitability, risk exposure and 
efficiency when pursuing the diversification strategy.   
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In this thesis, Chinese banks are divided into three sub-groups, according to their level 
of systemic importance. They are global systemically important banks, national 
systematically important banks and other banks. Our investigation is focused on the 
effects of income diversification in three aspects, namely the effects on banks' 
profitability, risk level, and efficiency. By employing a range of empirical techniques 
across different sub-samples, we attempt to answer the following research questions: 
 
1. What are the driving forces behind the transformation of income structure in 
China's banking industry? Specifically, under the conditions of financial reform 
and changes in the macroeconomic environment, why do banks have raised their 
investing in non-interest income? 
 
2. Whether or not the diversification of income structure improves the performance 
of banks in China? 
 
3. To what extent income diversification increases banks’ exposure to risk, with 
regard to bank-specific risks and financial distress? In particular, does there exist 
a non-linear relationship between Chinese banks’ risk exposure and their 
diversification levels, and if so what is the threshold and optimal level of non-
interest activities for diversified banks to minimize their risk?  
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4. Several studies have considered banks’ profitability and efficiency together, thus 
leading to confusion and to a range of inconsistent and contradictory empirical 
results. This thesis considers these two aspects separately, asking: Does 
diversification have the same effect on both profitability and efficiency? Could the 
process of income diversification increase bank profits, while at the same time 
causing a reduction in internal efficiency?  
 
1.2  Main Findings and Contributions of the Thesis 
 
In order to explore these questions, this thesis first provides an in-depth analysis of the 
background to and causes of the changes in the income structure of China's banks.  
The driving forces behind Chinese banks’ shift to non-traditional business include 
development of financial reforms, the changing macroeconomic environment, 
maturing of financial regulations and increasing competition in the banking market 
(Amidu and Wolfe, 2013; Luo, 2017; Borio et al., 2017; Okazaki, 2017).    
 
Having provided the background, the thesis then moves to focus on empirical evidence 
of the effects of diversification on Chinese banks. In the empirical exercises 
throughout the thesis, major Chinese banks are categorized into three groups, namely 
global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), domestic systemically important banks 
(D-SIBs) and other banks (N-SIBs). The first empirical chapter investigates whether 
income diversification is beneficial to the returns and overall performance of the banks. 
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Dynamic panel data models are employed for the empirical investigation. Evidence 
shows that for the Chinese banking sector as a whole, income diversification has a 
negative effect on the overall performance; however, the effects of diversification vary 
among banking groups. While Chinese G-SIBs gain significant benefits from 
diversification, but such benefits are non-significant for D-SIBs, and diversification 
has a negative effect for N-SIBs.  
 
The differentials of the diversification effects on banks’ performance are attributable 
to bank-specific characteristics. In general, large-sized and more diversified banks are 
better able to benefit from income diversification, which is consistent with the results 
of Gurbuz et al. (2013), Köhler (2014) and Chen and Zeng (2014). Performance 
improvements are more likely when banks operate with good institutional governance 
and under sound regulation. It is plausible that such an environment prompts banks to 
maintain a high level of the capital adequacy ratio and so could encourage managers 
to invest their limited funds in more profitable business, thus improves the banks’ 
performance (Xia and Huang, 2017).  
 
Next, the thesis investigates into the relationship between bank diversification and risk 
in China.  The focus is on the changes to banks’ idiosyncratic risks and financial 
distress at different levels of diversification.  Evidence is found that for the overall 
Chinese banking sector, results reveal the existence of an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between bank risk and income diversification in terms of both banks’ 
idiosyncratic risk and their financial distress. This is driven mainly by the learn-by-
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doing effect and by the elimination of agency and moral hazard problems with the 
banks’ expansion of non-interest activities (Barry et al., 2011). Furthermore, the same 
methodology is also applied to three sub-groups, For Chinese G-SIBs, diversification 
has a significantly negative effect on banks’ both idiosyncratic risk and financial 
distress. For D-SIBs and N-SIBs, the effects again exhibit an inverse U-shape. The 
results may be explained by different income structures and risk preferences among 
the banks. Significant results are also obtained when decomposing the non-interest 
activities into three components, namely fee-based, trading and other income activities 
(Valverde and Fernández, 2007; Köhler, 2014), and by utilizing three different 
measures of risk, i.e. credit, liquidity and interest rate risk. 
 
Finally, we consider the effect of diversification on bank efficiency in China. First, 
bank efficiency scores, in terms of both cost and profit. Second, the investigation 
employs the dynamic Tobit model to examine unobserved, time-invariant bank 
heterogeneity. For the overall Chinese banking sector, income diversification has an 
efficiency-destroying effect. This outcome is consistent with Cheng (2015); however, 
the effects vary among the banking groups. For Chinese G-SIBs, diversification has a 
significantly harmful effect on both cost and profit efficiency. For D-SIBs, the effects 
are similar, but the discount magnitude is smaller. For N-SIBs, diversification however 
has a positive effect on the efficiency level. When decomposing the non-interest 
activities into three components, fee-based and other activities impose a discount on 
banks’ efficiency, whereas trading activity results in efficiency improvements for all 
three sub-groups.  
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The existing literature is limited in its research scope, and this thesis extends the 
literature in an important way. Most existing studies focus on mature markets, for 
example Lepetit et al. (2008), Elsas et al. (2010), Boot and Ratnovski (2012), Nguyen 
et al. (2016), and Maudos (2017). Only a small, albeit expanding, body of the literature 
explores the emerging markets, China in particular. However, compared with the 
markets in mature and other emerging countries, the Chinese banking industry and 
regulatory system exhibit a number of unique features. It is these differences that 
provide the motivation for this study to investigate the income diversification effects 
in China. In doing so, this thesis makes several original contributions to the literature.  
 
Compared with the mature market, the scale and business scope of the Chinese banking 
industry is very concentrated and uneven; more specifically, the Chinese big-four 
banks control 67.9% of the overall assets of the entire Chinese banking industry 
(CBRC, 2016). Therefore, the Chinese banking sector can be characterized as an 
oligopolistic market (Edirisuriya et al., 2015). This characteristic has had a major 
impact on the form of business expansion in China's banking industry, and has also 
formed a different diversification motivation compared with mature and other 
emerging markets, where the main motivation for diversification is considered to be 
profitability.  
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First of all, currently, interest income occupies a large proportion of the income stream 
of Chinese banks. However, given continual shrinking of the interest margin, 
combined with the Chinese financial reform and regulatory restriction, in this 
oligopolistic market banks are driven to find alternative ways to use their market power 
to make up the loss by binding together their lending and non-interest activities, such 
as fee and commissions. Therefore, in the Chinese banking market the motivation for 
income diversification is pretty different from that in other markets. Consequently, it 
is worthwhile to investigate whether or not the composition of the market and the 
motivation for diversification could lead to different diversification effects on banks’ 
performance and risks. In the Chinese case in particular, these questions merit a 
separate and dedicated study.  
 
Secondly, the liberalization reform of the Chinese banking system, in particular the 
relaxation of the access mechanism for capital injection from both foreign and private 
capital, has created a competitive market atmosphere. Such capital injection supplies 
technological spillover to the Chinese banking sector and increases the incentive for 
banks to provide more financial services and to seek the potential benefits from 
product innovation and diversification. Against this background of changing market 
ownership structure and the increasing complexity of banking products, it is necessary 
to investigate the Chinese banking market and to find out how these changes will 
impact on banks’ performance and risk indicators.  
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Thirdly, compared with other markets, the Chinese banks suffered less negative impact 
during the global financial crisis. This could be attributed to the Chinese government’s 
special policy schemes for the banking industry, for example the provision of potential 
non-performing asset protection, whereby the state-owned asset management 
companies can help banks to divest non-performing assets; and ‘disguised’ funding 
through the Huijin Investment Company, which is undertaken by the Ministry of 
Finance. However, such potential government guarantees not only protect banks from 
financial crisis, but can also increase agency costs and the too-big-to-fail problem. 
Consequently, the expansion of banks’ business lines, especially the extension of non-
interest business combined with high leverage carries much higher risk than the same 
activities in other markets. Therefore, this thesis makes a comprehensive analysis of 
the development of income diversification in the Chinese banking market in the 
context of extensive financial reform and regulatory and macroeconomic changes.  
 
Furthermore, the channels through which banks can expand their non-interest activities 
are different in China than that in other countries. In the US banking market, a system 
of bank holding companies has been constructed to facilitate income diversification, 
while Germany has adopted a universal bank system. However, in the Chinese banking 
sector these two systems co-exist; that is, state-owned banks and national joint stock 
banks apply the bank holding companies mechanism, where banks establish or merge 
with financial intermediates to develop their non-interest activities, while other 
medium and small non-systemically important banks adopt the universal banks 
mechanism whereby they establish multiple departments within the bank to develop 
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cross-selling business strategies. This mixed development model is a new path that 
China has chosen in the early stages of diversification. It involves different risk 
management strategies and the corresponding affordability across different types of 
banks, hence requires different diversification direction and strategies.  
 
In addition, most of the studies conducted about the emerging markets have focused 
on cross-country datasets (e.g. Gamra and Plihon, 2011; Sanya and Wolfe, 2011). 
However, the Chinese banking market has unique features, and should therefore be 
investigated separately from the emerging market set. Most notably, the scale of the 
Chinese banking market is now among the largest worldwide: according to the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission and the World Bank, in 2018 the total assets of 
China’s banking institutions were 260 trillion CNY (around USD 38 trillion), while 
the corresponding amount for the Eurozone was USD 31 trillion, and for the USA USD 
16 trillion. Clearly, therefore, it is inappropriate to investigate the Chinese market 
alongside other emerging countries, such as Mexico, Philippines or Thailand, where 
the magnitude of the market is considerably lower. 
 
Finally, unlike banks in other emerging countries, Chinese banks maintain more 
interconnectedness with the global banking sector. Here, the label of systemically 
important banks describes the scale and degree of influences those banks hold in global 
and domestic financial markets. Currently there are 29 global systemically important 
banks, of which 13 are in Europe, eight in the US, three in Japan and one in Canada. 
For the emerging markets, there are only four globally systemically important banks, 
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all of them in China. Therefore, the stability of the Chinese banking sector is of critical 
importance to the global market. Any credit default in China would likely start a chain 
reaction and cause systemic risk in the global market. It is therefore highly relevant 
that in recent decades the Chinese banking market has seen an ever increasing growth 
rate in the expansion of non-interest income; indeed, in 2011, the growth rate of non-
interest income reached a high point of 61.9% (CBRC). This rapid growth rate is rare 
in other markets, and brings with it greater uncertainty and other potential factors that 
could affect the stability of the Chinese market. This makes it particularly important 
to study the impact of changes in non-interest income in the Chinese market from 
multiple perspectives, namely those of the banks’ managers, of regulators, and of the 
stability of the international financial market.  
 
More importantly, in order to avoid the replication of techniques employed in the 
research of developed markets, this thesis also applies several improved 
methodologies to address bank diversification in the specific context created by 
China’s unique institutional background and data characteristics.  
 
First, in the mature banking market, banks have accumulated sufficient information, 
techniques and risk management ability to deal with the specific risks generated by the 
non-interest activities. However, based on the learn-by-doing effect theory, given that 
Chinese banks only received permission to embrace non-interest activities in 2005, 
and that the development of non-interest income in the Chinese banking market is very 
uneven across different banks, it is likely that the relationship between diversification 
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and risk in China is non-linear and follows a dynamic process (Gamra and Plihon, 
2011), rather than being static in nature as in mature and other emerging markets.  
 
This implies that static and linear methods could be inadequate to capture the risk 
implications of diversification in the Chinese banking market and to estimate the 
diversification effect on banks’ risk level. Rather, an improved methodology, namely 
a dynamic threshold model, would be more appropriate to give a clear estimation of 
the non-linear relation between income diversification and risk, which evolves with 
the development of banks’ engagement in diversification. As such, a GMM-type 
threshold model is what is required. Therefore, this thesis adopts the first-differenced 
GMM estimator for dynamic threshold panel data model.  
 
This research is the first to adopt the above approach to test the learn-by-doing effect 
in the Chinese banking market. The improved method could help to estimate the 
potential inverse-U shaped correlation during the diversification process. Compared 
with traditional static threshold estimation, it has the advantage of giving a dynamic 
view of the diversification effects on bank risk while avoiding the bias from the 
quadratic terms used in some previous studies on non-linearity in the banking markets 
(Bun and Windmeijer , 2010; Hsiao and Zhang, 2015).  The model also overcomes 
the problems associated with previous GMM-type threshold models (such as Ramírez-
Rondán, 2015), whereby both regressions and threshold variables have to be 
exogenous. More importantly, this dynamic threshold estimation could address the 
endogeneity problem that has been associated with Chinese banking market research, 
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as noted by several previous studies (Acharya et al., 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; 
Baele et al., 2007).  
 
Another important methodology improvement relates to stochastic frontier analysis 
(SFA), which is usually considered an appropriate tool to investigate the efficiency 
implications of diversification (Rezitis, 2008; Beccalli and Frantz, 2009; Cheng, 2015). 
In this thesis, two issues have been identified and resolved to improve upon the SFA 
used in the mature market research. First, since the efficiency score generated from 
SFA falls in the interval [0, 1], it is necessary to model the SFA response properly. 
Related studies in the mature market generally adopt a static panel data model using 
the OLS method. However, as the explanatory variable in the regression equation 
cannot be expected to have a normal distribution, neither can we expect the regression 
error term to meet the assumption of normal distribution. Consequently, the OLS 
method often leads to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates (Souza and Gomes, 
2015). To address these problems, we use a Tobit estimation. In adopting the doubly 
censored Tobit model developed by Elsas and Florysiak (2015), this study is the first 
in the field to employ the dynamic estimation of such a model. This estimator 
addresses the inconsistencies generated from unobserved heterogeneity; furthermore, 
it allows the addition of a lagged dependent variable, thus providing a dynamic view. 
Unlike the similar estimation introduced by Loudermilk (2007), it is also applicable 
for unbalanced panel data, which is particularly important for this research given the 
restrictions on data collection in the Chinese case.  
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The second issue with regard to SFA is that, given the limited data available for 
Chinese banking studies, most of the research in this field faces a short panel problem.  
This leads to an incidental parameters problem, where the variance parameters for 
short panel data are more likely to be affected under traditional SFA and the fixed-
effect SFA model proposed by Greene (2005) and commonly used in the previous 
literature. Therefore, following Chen et al. (2014), this thesis solves the problem by 
adopting within maximum likelihood estimation (WMLE), which relies on the within 
transformed model using the standard maximum likelihood method.  This thesis 
represents the first use of WMLE in studying the Chinese case. 
 
Finally, the existing literature in this field suffers from a lack of rich analysis. To enrich 
the analysis and hence ensure the robustness of the research, this thesis utilizes a large 
set of banks’ indicators to describe banks’ characteristics. Previous studies, especially 
those focusing on the Chinese banking industry, utilize only accounting-based 
measures to assess the diversification effects (e.g. Lepetit et al., 2008; Hsieh et al., 
2013). Consequently, the results obtained are not particularly sound or robust. In 
contrast, this thesis divides non-interest income into three sub-categories, and 
investigates efficiency from two perspectives, namely cost and profit efficiency, 
separately. In addition, this thesis considers not only accounting data but also employs 
measures based on economic conceptualization, such as, in the case of risk analysis, 
both idiosyncratic risk and financial distress. Further, to assess the diversification 
implications for the management of different types of risk, the research takes into 
account different risk aspects, such as credit risk, liquidity risk and interest rate risk. 
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Consequently, this thesis is able to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of diverse 
aspects of the effects of income diversification on banks than has been possible in 
previous research. 
 
1.3  Income Diversification in the Chinese Banking 
Industry: An overview 
 
1.3.1  Classification of Diversification 
 
For a commercial bank, a diversification strategy means a broadening of income 
sources, expansion of business scopes, and extension of operating activities. Generally 
speaking, diversification can be classified into three types, namely assets 
diversification, geographic diversification and income diversification, all of which 
have developed in line with technological advances, policy changes and customer 
demand (DeYoung et al., 2004).  
 
Diversification of assets refers to different types of loans within the loan portfolio.  
Geographic diversification refers to expansion in terms of operational area, where 
banks set up branches in different regions or countries through establishment or 
acquisition, and provide financial products and services in local or wider regions to 
achieve cross-regional or multinational operations (Meslier et al., 2014). Finally, 
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income diversification refers to those activities of banks that are beyond the scope or 
range of a single financial service product. This type of diversification is manifested 
by banks’ ability to cross the boundaries of traditional commercial banks in product 
services and to provide customers with several or all of banking intermediation, 
securities, insurance, and trusts services (Schmid and Walter, 2009). Banks may also 
update and refine their credit business through financial innovation and may expand 
into intermediary businesses, securitization and various types of segmentation within 
each traditional service. With income diversification, banks no longer rely on a single 
source of income, such as traditional net interest income. Instead, they increase new 
income through diversified business lines, and diversify the income streams of 
different businesses through increased non-interest activities. This thesis focuses 
mainly on income diversification, and seeks to analyse its effects on Chinese banks.  
 
1.3.2  Channels of Income Diversification 
 
At present, there are two channels or business modes of diversification for banks in 
China. First, large-scale banks tend to adopt the bank holding group mode, which 
allows them to exploit their advantages in scale, outlets and customers to build a cross-
market and diversified financial services platform (Peng and Hu, 2005). Banks build 
up platforms for non-traditional activities through acquisitions, holdings, or the 
establishment of financial leasing companies, trust companies, fund management 
companies, insurance companies, and other non-bank financial institutions in both the 
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domestic and overseas markets. Meanwhile, financial companies can enter the banking 
market and establish financial holding groups. Currently, among the main players in 
the Chinese banking market the Everbright Group, CITIC Group, Ping An Group, and 
Shanghai International Group hold a full license to have access to all financial services 
in China, and are the owners of, or majority shareholders in, the China Everbright 
Bank, China CITIC Bank, Ping An Bank, and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, 
respectively.  
 
Second, in an environment of strict financial restrictions, many medium and small-
sized commercial banks are turning their attention to cooperation with trust, security, 
fund insurance and other non-banking financial institutions (Hachem and Song, 2015). 
Under the widely adopted pattern of bank-trust cooperation, the bank sells the issued 
wealth management products to investors, and the funds raised are passed to the trust 
company. Then the trust company invests the funds in a company designated by the 
bank. As regulations concerning such cooperation were tightened since 2009, banks 
have started to look for cooperation with other financial institutions. First of all, bank-
security cooperation is aimed at transferring credit assets (mainly bill assets) to off-
balance sheets (Lu et al., 2015; Xu, 2017). Here, banks use wealth management funds 
to purchase securities companies' asset management plans, and use the latter to put 
funds into designated projects to avoid the constraints of the loan-to-deposit ratio 
control and credit scale imposed by the Chinese regulator. Bank-insurance cooperation 
in China follows an agency sales model, where commercial banks sell insurance 
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products on behalf of insurance companies, and in return receive commission income 
(Haifeng, 2011).  
 
1.3.3  Income Diversification Activities  
 
For banks, income sources can be divided into interest business and non-interest 
business (Mamun and Hassan, 2014). Interest business is business related to the bank’s 
net interest income and includes traditional deposits and loans businesses. Non-interest 
income refers to all income other than that from loans and securities business.  
 
According to Chinese regulations, the non-interest income of banks consists of five 
parts: net fee and commission income, investment income, fair value exchange income, 
exchange gains, and other business income.  A large proportion of non-interest 
income is generated from fee-based activities; that is, it is revenue obtained by 
charging customers for certain financial services. This includes, among others, 
monthly service fees for trading accounts, commissions for insurance coverage for 
homes and businesses, membership fees for the acceptance and use of certain types of 
credit cards, and income from financial consulting services for individuals and 
companies. Fee income can be further classified into two main categories: that 
originating from the traditional business and services of commercial banks, such as 
cheque and savings account fees, machine usage fees, and fees and commissions for 
providing loans to customers; and that originating from, and expanding with, non-
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traditional businesses, such as fees and commissions for investment banking services, 
trading products, investment products such as stocks, bonds and mutual funds for 
clients, and service fees for providing wealth management services for the customers 
through affiliated trust company departments.  
 
In short, bank diversification in China means banks diversify their income sources and 
continually expand their scope of financial services, increase the proportion of non-
interest income in the total revenue through, for example, underwriting securities, 
securitization and foreign exchange trading services with financial innovation and 
higher financial leverage (Laeven and Levine, 2007; Doumpos et al., 2016).  
 
1.4  Theories on Income Diversification: An overview 
 
Several theories have been proposed to explain the effect of bank diversification, and 
whether this brings benefits or discount to banks’ performance, risk and efficiency. 
According to Boot (2003) and Meng et al. (2017) diversification can be treated as a 
strategic response to business uncertainty. Hence, most studies in this field are based 
on the modern portfolio theory and suggest a risk separation effect, thus giving a 
positive view of the diversification effect on banks’ efficiency. Further, several 
scholars highlight that diversification can help banks to gain benefits through 
improved informational advantages (Akhigbe and Stevenson, 2010), increased the 
market power (Palich et al., 2000), the construction of an internal capital market 
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(Pitelis, 2007), and economies of scale (Drucker and Puri, 2008). However, other 
researchers claim that there is a diversification discount, whereby the benefits pointed 
out by portfolio theory might be eliminated by the presence of asymmetric information 
(Shen and Lee, 2006), moral hazard and agency problems (Freixas et al., 2007), rent-
seeking behaviours (Datta et al., 2009), high-intensity market competition, and joint 
failure under the condition of business homogenization (Acharya et al., 2006). Finally, 
owing to the learn-by-doing effect (Lou, 2008), diversification might exhibit a non-
linear relationship with banks’ performance. 
 
1.4.1  Modern Portfolio Theory 
 
Portfolio theory, the most widely used theory to explain banks’ diversification 
activities, suggests that increasing the proportion of non-interest income can provide a 
potential risk reduction. Modern portfolio theory indicates that concentrated revenue 
streams adversely impact banks’ revenue volatility, and that a strategy of income 
diversification could generate a coinsurance effect (Lewellen, 1971; Tong, 2012). As 
suggested by Mooney and Shim (2015), the coinsurance effect would decrease the 
volatility of future cash flows for the diversified bank, and make conglomerates less 
sensitive to the risk taking by a single division. Therefore, banks should improve their 
stability and disperse idiosyncratic risk through portfolio diversification.  
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Moreover, as argued by Ibragimov et al. (2011), the portfolio theory also suggests that 
each bank could form a joint mutual market portfolio, whereby each bank would 
contribute its risky portfolio to the total and receive back its proportional share. In the 
situation where there was sufficient variety of risk classes, various idiosyncratic risks 
under individual portfolios would be eliminated. This would result in a more resilient, 
and more effective, banking system. 
 
More importantly, in addition to risk reduction, previous research indicates that in a 
portfolio, non-interest and interest incomes can be mutually beneficial (Pennathur et 
al., 2012). As suggested by Stiroh (2004), the lending business provides a channel for 
banks to attract clients to their non-interest activities, as people are more likely to seek 
fee-based services in the same bank. Wagner (2010) shows that banks are keen to adopt 
a strategy that uses attractive lending and deposit rates to improve customer stickiness 
and to make themselves more profitable through high-return non-interest income. 
Therefore, traditional activities could provide the high-quality and essential clients for 
high-return non-interest activities, while the non-interest activities could stimulate 
banks’ innovation and satisfy customers’ financing demand in order to further 
establish customer stickiness (Acharya et al., 2006; Lepetit et al., 2008).   
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1.4.2  Informational Advantages 
 
Diversified banks can obtain superior information from their mixed business lines. 
According to the theory of financial intermediation, such information advantages 
represent a further benefit of diversification.  More specifically, information is 
considered an important input factor to impact banks’ efficiency and reduce banks’ 
specific risk with regard to credit screening and customer relationship (Diamond, 1984; 
Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; Saunders and Walter, 1994; Elyasiani and Wang, 2012).  
 
First, with the increase in informationally intensive assets and financial services, banks 
gain comparative advantages whereby they can capitalize on client information 
obtained when they process loans, thus offsetting the excessive credit risks generated 
from non-interest income, and improving their operational efficiency (Elsas et al., 
2010). Where there is integration of lending and non-traditional activities, multiple 
financial products are sold to similar customers.  In this situation each business line 
could reap benefits from the access to private information and thus reduce the 
uncertainty associated with the lending relationship (Mercieca et al., 2007).  
 
Further, lending business can offer benefits to securities underwriting, as it can 
contribute to reducing uncertainty; thus the fee-based activities may compensate for 
pricing risks (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Similarly, the underwriting business can feed 
back credit and liquidity information to the lending business, as banks often hold 
26 
 
equity from borrowing companies and sit on the supervisory boards of those firms 
(Dietrich and Vollmer, 2012). Such advantages in relation to non-public information 
can smooth the financing channel between banks and enterprises. There will also be a 
reduction in the potential risk through repeated interactions over time, and through the 
banks’ intense monitoring of the companies’ expansion strategies (Elsas, 2005). 
 
Second, improved information from income diversification within intermediary 
business could also reduce financial frictions between borrowers and lenders, thus 
helping banks to overcome asymmetric information (Akhigbe and Stevenson, 2010) 
and gain improved capital financing (Klein and Saidenberg, 2010).  Pyle (1971) 
suggested the important interaction between companies’ assets and liabilities, in which 
asymmetry of information between borrowers and lenders would largely impact on 
banks’ efficiency characteristics. Diamond (1984) developed a model in which banks 
could overcome the problem of asymmetric information and improve overall 
efficiency through mergering with other financial intermediaries; as a result, mature 
financial intermediation is more likely to minimize the cost of monitoring, which will 
prove useful to reduce incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. 
 
1.4.3  Market Power Theory 
 
Market power theory, introduced by Porter (1981), proposes a set of strategies to 
access market power and release market competition. One important strategy is 
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diversification across different markets (Barney, 2002). Diversified business can help 
banks gain competitive advantages in other financial markets, and access market 
power due to cheap capital funding. Firms entering a new market can use their 
resources in other markets to support and strengthen the new business. Thus, according 
to Shin and Stulz (1998) and Barney (2002), business expansion to non-interest 
activities could increase banks’ market power and enhance competitive advantages by 
providing better investment opportunities, and offer lower financing cost supported by 
their business in other markets. Diversified banks could concentrate funds and invest 
in less competitive markets in order to control the market prices, prevent potential 
competitors from entering the industry, and maintain a better performance level (Palich 
et al., 2000). 
 
1.4.4  Resource Based View Theory 
 
Based on the transaction cost theory established by Coase (1937) and Williamson 
(1975), several studies have argued that expansion of the number of types of financial 
services through the construction of financial conglomerates will help firms to 
overcome a number of financial problems (e.g. Leff, 1978; Hitt et al., 2006). In 
particular, conglomeration may help member firms to construct an internal capital 
market and to overcome market imperfections that are prevalent in emerging 
economies (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Kogut et al., 2002; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003; 
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Wan, 2005). Therefore, resources integration is an important consideration for banks 
embarking upon a strategy of diversification.  
 
With regard to resources integration, the resource based view (RBV) (Penrose, 1959), 
emphasizes the importance of oligopolistic interaction and interfirm competition 
(Pitelis, 2007). In addition, as argued by Weston (1970), while focused-business 
companies can configure resources only through external capital markets, diversified 
companies are able to increase their effectiveness through access to an internal capital 
market and by transferring resources to higher profitability objectives, so-called 
‘winner-picking’ (Lamont, 1997; Stein, 1997). Such a winner-picking effect could 
help banks to reallocate internal resources from less profitable sectors to more effective 
sectors (Stein, 1997).   
 
1.4.5  Economies of Scale and Synergistic Effect 
 
According to the economies of scale-based theory proposed by Sirri and Tufano (1995), 
the expansion of non-interest income can help banks to achieve operational synergies 
(Rezitis, 2008). The attainment of these synergies relies on scale economies (Stiroh, 
2000; Akhigbe and Stevenson, 2010; Sanya and Wolfe, 2011). As argued by Drucker 
and Puri (2008), the expansion of non-interest business is largely based on banks’ 
infrastructure, hence a mixed business line strategy could help banks to spread fixed 
costs and managerial overheads over an expanded product mix. Klein and Saidenberg 
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(2010) also suggest that, as several financial intermediaries under diversified banks 
can separate their contracts to share facilities and production technology, the average 
cost can be reduced and banks’ profitability and performance can be increased.  
 
In addition, scale economies may result in operational benefits, because cross-selling 
strategy companies that engage in merger and acquisition with mature financial 
intermediaries could share monitoring, advertising and account maintenance, thus 
further reducing operational cost and financial friction, and improving banks’ 
production efficiency (Elyasiani and Wang, 2012).  
 
1.4.6  Asymmetric Information 
 
Because income diversification carries with it the potential problem of asymmetric 
information between a bank and its pool of borrowers, some scholars have argued that 
there is likely to be a diversification discount (Sanya and Wolfe, 2011). Krishnaswami 
and Subramaniam (1999) claim that the diversification process greatly increases the 
asymmetry of information. In addition, Liu and Qi (2003) suggest that diversified firms 
have insufficient and inadequate channels of information production and transmission 
to managers, thus reducing the quality of banks’ investment decisions and causing 
inefficiency and value loss.  
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According to Drucker and Puri (2005), asymmetric information gained through 
combining lending and underwriting could mean that banks obtain an abnormal return 
from the securities industry; consequently, banks would have an incentive to 
underwrite securities of unsound companies and to place them on the financial market 
without disclosing their private information about the firms (Santos, 1998). In addition, 
due to the very large numbers of customers, banks may not be able to collect sufficient 
information. As a result, banks may fail to screen out potential bad borrowers, which 
could compromise banks’ risk prediction and operational strategies, leading to an 
increase in financial instability (Abdelaziz et al., 2012).  
 
1.4.7  Too-Big-to-Fail and Moral Hazard Problem 
 
The expansion of business scale is also associated with the too-big-to-fail status, which 
offers a further explanation for the increased risk (Williams, 2016). That is, when 
banks become large enough to be deemed too big to fail, managers have incentives to 
accentuate the moral hazard, and therefore they may operate the banks in inefficient 
ways. According to Lin et al. (2012), banks with such moral hazard problems tend to 
keep large chunks of their resources in less profitable projects, thus causing inefficient 
allocation of their resources and increased risk. Furthermore, Rezitis (2008) argues 
that, once a company has achieved a certain scale, it faces inefficient monitoring and 
supervision across different banking sectors. Especially in emerging countries, banks 
enjoy invisible guarantees from central banks and governments. Consequently, during 
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financial distresses, banks have incentives to expand high-risk but more profitable 
projects, which would lead to the accumulation of both specific and systemic risks 
within the banking system (Hellmann et al., 2000; Kaufman, 2014). 
 
1.4.8  Agency Theory 
 
The agency problem is raised by the conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders (Martín-Reyna et al., 2012; Reyna et al., 2012; Kazemian and Sanusi, 
2015). As argued by Jensen (1986) and Vogt (1994), compared with single-business 
companies, complicated business lines lead financial groups to over-investing in 
negative net present value projects, especially in the case where managers have 
excessive management power and large free cash flows. That is, managers tend to 
invest excess cash flow to increase income, rather than raise the cash payment to 
shareholders, and this behaviour tends to impair banks’ performance and destroy value 
for shareholders. This is particularly so in the case of under-regulated economies such 
as China’s, which also maintain a highly centralized management system. Under the 
circumstance, Freixas et al. (2007) suggest that managers might also abuse deposit 
insurance in order to refinance investment banking and other high-risk activities, 
which could lead to an excessive increase in the risk for the whole banking system.  
 
With regard to the diversification-risk effect, the shareholders’ value can be treated as 
the call option on the value of the firm exercised in circumstances where the value of 
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the assets is greater than the debt claim (Van Lelyveld and Knot, 2009). Under the 
condition of risk reduction, shareholders’ value would decrease. In addition, according 
to the managerial risk reduction theory introduced by Amihud and Lev (1981), 
although a company may reduce its investment risk through the construction of home-
made portfolios, managers cannot diversify away their employment risk, for example 
in terms of professional reputation and job losses. Therefore, managers will naturally 
choose to employ cross-selling strategies, which would enhance their job security but 
at the cost of endangering the benefits of shareholders and the efficiency of the 
company.  
 
Moreover, according to managerial entrenchment theory, managers who wish to 
increase the company’s reliance upon them, and thus strengthen their own positions, 
are more likely to employ cross-selling strategies and make investments beyond the 
firm’s value-maximization level (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). This is because it is 
difficult for external investors to supervise a complicated mix of business lines, and in 
such a situation there will be few candidates who would be able to take over the 
manager’s place (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). Once those managers have too much 
controlling powers in the running of the bank, the interests of external investors will 
be further compromised due to the higher bonuses paid out to the managers along with 
the expansion of more profitable non-interest activities (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). 
Such over-diversification can lead to inefficient portfolio construction and confusion 
within the bank operating system (Deng and Elyasiani, 2008). 
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1.4.9  Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Paradigm 
 
The structure-conduct-performance paradigm is an important theory to explain how 
the market structure determines the conduct of companies in the market, and then the 
feedback effects occur such that the company conduct also affects the market structure 
(Hannan, 1991; McWilliams and Smart, 1993; Panagiotou, 2006; Athanasoglou et al., 
2008; Alhassan et al., 2016). In the Chinese banking market, the narrowing spread 
caused by interest rate liberalization, combined with the ongoing financial 
disintermediation, increases banks' willingness to diversify their business in order to 
broaden their sources of income. In turn, mergers and acquisitions among banks and 
financial intermediaries, and the consequent departure of banks from traditional 
business lines, serve to increase business similarities within the financial system and 
cause income convergence (Ibragimov et al., 2011). Consequently, the diversification 
process creates competitive pressures amongst financial conglomerates across a wide 
range of market segments. With regard to the intensely competitive Chinese banking 
sector, there are two main perspectives, namely the competition-stability view and the 
competition-fragility view. 
 
According to the competition-stability view, a more intensely competitive 
environment could increase overall innovation and enhance operational management 
in the provision of services within the banking sector (Berger and Hannan, 1989; 
Acharya et al., 2006; Lepetit et al., 2008; Schaeck and Cihak, 2010; Turk-Ariss, 2010; 
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Beck et al., 2013). In addition, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) suggest that a more fiercely 
competitive banking sector could lower market lending rates, thus reducing borrowing 
costs for entrepreneurs and the default rate of entrepreneurs’ investments. 
Consequently, in the competitive environment brought about by diversification, banks 
will bear a lower level of credit risk on their traditional loan portfolio, and this will 
contribute to increaseing stability of the banking sector. Furthermore, as suggested by 
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), Schaeck et al. (2009) and Allen et al. (2011), a fiercely 
competitive environment could help banks to achieve more efficient operation and 
risks management, which in turn would contribute to the construction of a steady 
banking system. 
 
However, from the competition-fragility perspective, the more intense competition 
generated from diversification within the banking industry could make banks less 
sound. Vives (2011) claims that such a relationship can be explained by the effects 
through two channels. First, increased interbank competition could increase banks’ 
frangibility by exacerbating the coordination problem between depositors and the bank. 
Second, increased competition would change the risk-taking behaviour of the banks. 
In a more competitive environment with more pressures on profits, there would be 
increased incentive for the bank to take on more excessive risk on either side of the 
bank’s balance sheet, resulting in greater fragility. As suggested by Amidu and Wolfe 
(2013), this can be assumed as an inverse response; that is, the increased competition 
generated from a diversification strategy could then stimulate a higher level of 
diversification, further increasing competition within the banking sector, while at the 
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same time causing the banks to adopt more radical strategies to diversify. Individual 
banks would thus bear on more insolvency risks, and there would be an increased 
likelihood of failure.  
 
1.4.10  Business Homogenization and Joint Failure 
 
Barry et al. (2011) suggest that bank managers are likely to choose to diversify the 
banks’ income sources in the expectation that this will separate risk, in order to limit 
idiosyncratic risk. Hence, managers have incentives to diversify the company beyond 
the optimal level. However, in doing so they cause harm to the wider financial system, 
because diversification leads to business homogenization, making institutions more 
similar to each other and exposing them to same risks, which can lead to joint failure 
and so are more exposed to the systemic risk (Acharya et al., 2006).  
 
Wagner (2010) proposes a contagion model, which detects the conflicts between bank 
managers’ individual insolvency risk and the systemic risk. The study claims that 
limited liability incentivizes both bank managers and shareholders to allocate and 
diversify their portfolio towards correlated assets, and to ignore the risk of joint failures 
in the banking system brought about by raising bank exposure to common sources of 
risk. However, such an incentive to managers to over-diversify will in turn harm the 
wider financial system, because diversification makes institutions more similar to each 
other, thus exposing them to the same risks and increasing the probability of joint 
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failure (Acharya et al., 2006). Consequently, it creates a fragile financial system, where 
once a shock or bankruptcy hits an individual bank, the effects would immediately 
spread and ultimately bring down the whole financial system (Ibragimov et al., 2011). 
For this reason, diversification might not be conducive to resilience of the banking 
system, and from a social perspective it might be suboptimal and inefficient (Freixas 
et al., 2007).  
 
To summarize, there has been extensive research into consolidations in the banking 
industry. The results suggest that efficient financial institutions should exhibit greater 
safety and soundness, thus contributing to the stability of the whole financial system. 
Traditional portfolio theory suggests a specific risk separation effect for banks’ income 
portfolio, and recommends increasing the proportion of non-interest activities. 
However, from the social perspective, the broadening of financial activities can create 
systemic crises, as diversification makes institutions more similar to each other, thus 
exposing them to the same risks, and causing instability in the whole financial market. 
 
1.4.11  Learn-by-Doing Effects 
 
Lee (1996) constructed a learn-by-doing model to investigate the investment and 
lending decision.  According to the model, banks’ behaviour and investment portfolio 
should be improved through the accumulation of information and employee 
proficiency. That is, in the early stages, poor information could exist in equilibrium 
37 
 
with low investment, leading to an underdevelopment trap; however, this trap would 
be overcome once the banks had accumulated sufficient learning through experience; 
that is, ‘learning-by-doing’.  
 
Nowadays, the learn-by-doing effects are hardly considered relevant for mature 
markets, as banks in those markets have already acquired sufficient information and 
ability to overcome the potential risks and instabilities inherent in non-interest 
activities. However, given that Chinese banks have only recently received permission 
to embrace non-interest activities, and are just beginning their diversification process, 
the learn-by-doing theory still have value for research in the Chinese banking sector.  
As suggested by Lou (2008), the learn-by-doing effect plays a big role in that market, 
and leads to the possibility of an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
diversification and banks’ risk level. By international standards, most Chinese banks 
are in the early stages of income diversification, where without enough information 
and professionalism the accumulation of high-leveraged non-interest activities will 
make those banks less stable. At the same time, some banks may have crossed the 
diversification threshold and already be enjoying the benefits from diversity. That is, 
in the early stages of expansion of non-interest activities banks suffer risk-
enhancement, but if they continue with the process and pass a certain threshold level, 
then, assuming that they have gained rich experience and professionalism, and that a 
sound regulatory system is in place, they can reap a risk discount. 
 
38 
 
1.5  Endogeneity Problem 
 
More recent studies on the diversification effect in the banking industry place strong 
emphasis on the two-way relationship between income diversification and banks’ 
other specific characteristics. Such a mutual causality will lead to deterioration of the 
econometric model, due to the endogeneity bias (Sanya and Wolfe, 2011; Köhler, 
2014).  
 
A number of studies have found that high-risk banks are more likely to enter into 
riskier and high-leveraged non-interest activities, and to propose a more radical 
diversification strategy (e.g. Lang and Stulz, 1994; Acharya et al., 2006). Similarly, 
Stiroh (2004) and Agnihotri (2013) state that when facing high volatility of earnings, 
banks are more likely to expand their businesses scale and to implement merger and 
acquisition with high-leveraged financial sectors, behaviour that is driven by a risk-
taking preference. In addition, with regard to the relationship between performance 
and diversification, those companies that face constraints upon their business growth 
and profitability, especially within a highly competitive market, will tend to choose a 
diversified strategy in order to look for new drivers of profitable growth (Christensen 
and Montgomery, 1981).  
 
Furthermore, some market-based factors, such as market competition, or government 
policy, will have influences on banks’ diversification level and performance and, 
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simultaneously, on risk indicators. For example, intensive market competition narrows 
banks’ net interest margin, hence greatly shrinks the profitability and performance of 
the bank's core business, while at the same time it pushes banks to accelerate the 
process of diversification.  
 
All of the factors mentioned above will lead to a potential endogeneity problem, as 
will the omitted management strategy variables (Gurbuz et al., 2013) and the 
sensitivity of bank risk level to macroeconomic shocks (Berger et al., 2000). Therefore, 
prior studies on the diversification effect in the banking industry have placed important 
emphasis on this issue (Sanya and Wolfe, 2011; Köhler, 2014). Therefore, in the 
empirical sections in Chapters 3 and 4, this thesis adopts the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) model, which is particularly well-suited to overcoming the 
inconsistency caused by endogeneity.  
 
In detail, in Chapter 3, this thesis employs the system GMM (SYS-GMM) approach 
introduced by Blundell and Bond (1998). This approach has been widely used in 
numerous studies to evaluate the diversification-performance relation and to eliminate 
the endogeneity bias (e.g. Sanya and Wolfe, 2011; Gurbuz et al., 2013; Lee et al., 
2014).  
 
In Chapter 4, we argue that, due to the learn-by-doing effect, there could exist a non-
linear relationship between bank insolvency risk and the diversification level. 
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Therefore, we implement the first-differenced GMM threshold dynamic panel 
estimator approach proposed by Seo and Shin (2016), which addresses the 
inconsistencies generated by the endogeneity problem.  The model provides a non-
linear view of dynamic GMM (Bun and Windmeijer, 2010; Hsiao and Zhang, 2015) 
and allows endogeneity of both regressors and transition variables, which is unlikely 
to be achieved by employing the standard least squares approach (Seo and Linton, 
2007). 
 
1.6  Hypothesis Development  
 
This thesis focuses on the diversification effects on banks’ performance, risk and 
efficiency in the Chinese banking sector. Based on the existing theoretical literature, 
the thesis tests and explores the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: A shift toward non-interest income will impact profitability and risk-adjusted 
profitability positively.  
 
Chapter 3 investigates the diversification-performance nexus with a particular 
reference to profitability and risk-adjusted profitability. Based on the modern portfolio 
theory and on the resource based view, this study suggests a positive correlation 
between diversification and performance.  
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H2: The relationship between income diversification and risk will be positive where 
there is a low level of diversification, and will become negative where there is a high 
level of diversification.  
 
Chapter 4 assesses the effect of income diversification on risk. Both empirical and 
theoretical studies have indicated the existence of a non-linear relationship between 
diversification and the level of risk. In particular, with the expansion of non-interest 
activities, accumulated professionalism and a mature supervision system could support 
the learn-by-doing effects and contribute to eliminating agency and moral hazard 
problems, thus helping banks gain diversification benefits from risk reduction after 
they have achieved a certain level of diversification. That is, income diversification 
makes banks less stable in the early stages of mixed business lines, but they become 
more stable with the expansion of non-interest income. In this situation, the 
relationship between diversification and risk can be described by an inverse U-shape.  
 
H3: Diversification levels have a negative correlation with liquidity risk at both low 
and high levels of diversification, while credit and interest rate risk will be positively 
correlated with income diversification where there is a lower proportion of non-interest 
income, and become negatively correlated once the threshold point has been passed.  
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Given the differences in income structure and in the risk generated from various 
activities in the Chinese market compared to mature markets, this study also divides 
the overall risk into different categories, and aims to discover how the diversification 
level would influence different types of risk. Following Valverde and Fernández 
(2007), we separate total risk into three categories, namely liquidity risk (LIQUIDITY), 
credit risk (CREDIT) and interest rate risk (INTEREST). As the off-balance sheet 
activities cannot be influenced by the capital adequacy ratio, such activities would 
supply additional liquidity to banks. Therefore, we assume that there should be a 
negative relationship between liquidity risk and diversification for both low and high 
levels of diversification. With regard to the credit and interest rate risks, we assume 
that the relationship between diversification and both risk share the same direction for 
both low levels of diversification. However, high income diversification can always 
make banks riskier in terms of credit risk, but less risky for interest risk.  
   
H4: The relationship between income diversification and banks’ profit efficiency level 
will be positive.  
 
In Chapter 5, we investigate the effects of income diversification on both profit and 
cost efficiency level. According to Rossi et al. (2009), there may exist different and 
conflicting diversification effects on cost and profit efficiency. With regard to profit 
efficiency, income diversification could bring about an efficiency premium. As the 
Chinese banking market is considered to be an oligopolistic mechanism, according to 
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market power theory and the resources based view, diversified business could help 
banks to access and gain competitive advantages in other financial markets, where they 
can use their existing resources to support and strengthen the new business.  
 
Moreover, in the Chinese banking sector there is a strong spillover effect between 
banking and other financial institutions (Luo et al., 2017). Based on the informational 
advantages theory, business concentration would inevitably lead to information 
concentration, thereby largely improving banks’ overall efficiency level through the 
construction of an internal capital market and the referral of high-quality customers 
from the traditional business to more profitable non-interest income business.  
 
H5: The relationship between banks’ income diversification and cost efficiency level 
will be negative, as diversification dampens cost efficiency.  
 
This hypothesis is based on the fact that, in China, banks are subject to strict 
government intervention and regulatory supervision. Cumbersome government 
procedures would increase operating costs and the period for the approval of projects, 
while also serving to alter managers’ risk preference from risk neutral to risk averse. 
The necessity to collect additional high quality loan portfolios to reduce portfolio risks 
would increase costs, and generally have a negative impact on banks’ cost efficiency. 
Furthermore, the fact that individuals can move between government and bank 
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executive positions increases the agency problem, which in turn can increase banks’ 
monitoring costs and reduce cost efficiency.  
 
H6: Diversification has different effects on banks’ performance, risk and efficiency 
level.  
 
The three sub-groups in the Chinese banking sector, namely G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-
SIBs, differ greatly in terms of scale and business capability. In addition, as mentioned, 
there exist huge gaps between them in terms of capital restriction, ownership and 
diversification motivation. These factors create differences in the relationships 
between income diversification and banks’ performance, risk and efficiency level.  
 
1.7  Categorization of the Chinese Banking Market  
 
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, bank capital requirements have been tightened 
and new resolution regimes enabling the orderly failure of banks are being 
implemented. Particular attention has been given to systemically important banks. In 
November 2011, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) finalized its 
methodology to identify such systemically important banks and the regulatory 
approach to reduce the economic impact of their default (BCBS, 2011). To identify 
the global systemically important banks, the BCBS determined five categories 
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according to the many dimensions of systemic importance: size, interconnectedness, 
substitutability, complexity and the cross-jurisdictional activity of a bank. This led to 
the identification of 29 large banks as global systemically important banks (G-SIBs); 
among these, four are Chinese commercial banks.  
 
Based on the BCBS categorization, in 2014 the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) announced three categories of banks in China, and implemented 
different levels of financial restrictions over them. According to the Guidelines for the 
Disclosure of Global Systemic Importance Indicators of Commercial Banks, 
commercial banks with total assets below 1.6 trillion Yuan are defined as non-
systemically important (N-SIBs), and should have to satisfy only the basic capital 
requirement ratios, where the tier1 capital ratio and capital adequacy ratio 
requirements are 5% and 8%, respectively. According these guidelines, there are 27 
banks falling into the category of non-systemically important banks.  
 
Commercial banks with total assets over 1.6 trillion Yuan should be defined as 
systemically important.  According to the Guidelines and the list published as a result 
of Basel III, these can be categorized further as global systemically important banks 
(G-SIBs) and domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs). A total of 13 Chinese 
commercial banks are classified as systemically important.  
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Furthermore, four of the 13 banks deemed as systemically importance, known as the 
‘big four’, are G-SIBs. These G-SIBs, namely the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BOC) and China 
Construction Bank (CCB), must possess additional capital that meets or exceeds the 
uniform requirement of the Basel Committee. According to a China Banking 
Regulatory Commission Annual Report (2016), owing to the high concentration of the 
Chinese banking industry, the total assets of these four banks have reached seventy-
five billion CNY, accounting for 67.9% of the total assets of the banking industry.  
 
In order to maintain the stability of the domestic banking industry, in January 2014 the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) issued the Guideline for the 
Disclosure of the Evaluation Index for D-SIBs.  This gave a list of D-SIBs and 
required qualifying commercial banks to disclose their evaluation index. According to 
the CBRC, nine national banks fall into the category of D-SIBs. Overall, the capital 
requirement for systemically important banks is stricter than for N-SIBs. More 
specifically, D-SIBs must maintain a minimum 8% core tier one capital and 11.5% 
capital adequacy ratio. For G-SIBs, the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
further extended the restrictions to require an additional 1% of risk-weighted assets, 
which should be satisfied by core tier one capital ratio.  
 
In order to test the diversification effect on banks' specific characteristics and stability 
this thesis adopts all thirteen systemically important banks, both global and domestic, 
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along with twenty-seven non-systemically important banks. Together these forty 
banks account for 79% of the total assets of the Chinese banking industry.  
 
As explained above, it is necessary to divide the Chinese banking sector according to 
the categories G-, D-, and N-SIBs. However, the number of banks in each group is 
relatively small, especially in the G-SIB category, which includes only four 
institutions. This could lead to bias, and undermine the validity of the estimation 
results (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Blundell et al., 2001).  
 
The main concern with regard to small sample bias is that the group of G-SIBs, which 
is which is particularly important for the understanding of Chinese banks' specific 
characteristics and stability, includes only four banks, and the data for regression 
covers only 12 years. However, it is useful and valuable to consider this group as an 
independent category, as reflected in other studies investigating the Chinese banking 
market, such as Berger et al. (2010a), Chang et al. (2012) and Yin et al. (2013). This 
is because there exist large differences between G-SIBs and other types of bank in 
terms of the business scale, total assets and other characteristics. For instance, the Bank 
of China (BOC), which ranks fourth among the G-SIBs and in the Chinese banking 
market as a whole, possesses total assets of 3,213 billion USD, and has 311,133 
employees. In stark contrast, the Bank of Communications (BOCOM), which ranks 
first among D-SIBs and fifth in the Chinese banking market, holds total assets of only 
1,407 billion USD, less than half that of the BOC, and the number of employees 
(88,605) is only around a quarter of the numbers employed by the BOC (Bank scope, 
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2018). Similar differences exist between D- and N-SIBs. For example, all D-SIBs 
operate nationwide, while all N-SIBs are regional banks. These factors lead to 
significant differences in the scale of operations, profitability, and the degree of 
diversity among the three bank groups.   
 
A further point that should be mentioned with regard to the small sample size is that, 
in the Chinese banking sector, the vast majority of banks are unlisted city and rural 
banks. The data for these banks are often opaque and undisclosed, while only a small 
number of banks make available the information required by a study such as this one. 
As a result, the small sample size problem is prevalent in research in the Chinese 
banking sector: for example, Zhou and Wang (2008) use 12 commercial banks, while 
Shen et al. (2010) include 14 banks in their sample. 
 
In the situation of small sample size, the most popular method, OLS, can lead to bias. 
According to Soto (2009), in this case GMM is more reliable and efficient than OLS, 
as the GMM estimator is not hindered even when the small sample size means that it 
is not possible to completely exploit the linear moment conditions. Therefore, in the 
empirical part of this thesis in Chapters 3 and 4, we adopt GMM estimation in order 
to strengthen the reliability and efficiency of estimation.  
 
In addition, under the traditional stochastic frontier analysis proposed by Greene 
(2005) to evaluate banks’ efficiency level, the short panel in the Chinese banking 
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market could lead to an incidental parameters problem and affect the accuracy of 
estimation. Therefore, in the analysis in Chapter 5, we investigate the efficiency 
implications of banks’ income diversification by implementing the stochastic frontier 
analysis with the within maximum likelihood estimation (WMLE) proposed by Chen 
et al. (2014), in which the first-difference data transformation eliminates nuisance 
parameters, thus solving the incidental parameters problem and making the estimation 
of the efficiency scores unbiased. 
 
Moreover, in order to verify the potential effect generated from the small sample size, 
rather than separating the sample into three sub-groups and regressing each of them 
separately, we conduct the robustness tests for the main empirical results by applying 
dummy variables to the three groups, as shown in the Appendix for Chapters 3 and 5. 
This alternative analysis allows the retention of more samples and information in the 
estimation, thus avoiding the small sample size problem. However, in Chapter 4, the 
threshold model does not allow the addition of an interaction term in both the lower 
and higher regimes, and it is not possible to get more than one threshold value at the 
same time. Consequently, there is no robustness test in that chapter. 
 
1.8  Organization of the Thesis 
 
This thesis comprises six chapters. Following this introductory chapter, the rest of the 
thesis is structured as follows: 
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Chapter 2 provides a general introduction to the Chinese banking sector and the rise 
and development of income diversification of Chinese banks. In the chapter, we start 
off with an introduction of financial reforms and regulatory changes in China, It is then 
go on to explore the driving forces behind these banks’ engagement in non-interest 
activities and provides an overview of mixed business lines and the incomes thereof 
by Chinese banks. This is the starting point for analysing business diversification in 
Chinese banking sector.  
 
Chapter 3 analyses the relation between income diversification and banks’ 
performance. Three sub-groups are investigated with regard to return and profitability 
to estimate the diversification effects on the performance of different bank groups.  
 
Chapter 4 then explores the diversification-risk nexus in Chinese banks. It tests to 
uncover the existence of a non-linear relation between banks’ idiosyncratic risk, 
financial distress and diversification level. This chapter also documents that the 
diversification effect differs among different non-interest activities. 
 
In Chapter 5, we employ advanced stochastic frontier analysis to estimate efficiency 
score, and dynamic Tobit model with DPF estimator to provide new evidence on 
whether bank diversification is beneficial to the efficiency score of Chinese 
systemically and non-systemically important banks.  
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Chapter 6 provides an overall summary of the thesis. In this final chapter, research 
findings scattered in earlier chapters are brought together to give an integral picture of 
the effects of income diversification on Chinese banks. Limitations of the present 
research and possible avenues for future research are suggested.  
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Chapter 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 The Rise and Development 
of Non-traditional Banking Business in 
China  
 
This chapter provides the overall picture of 
the historical process and current status of 
income diversification in the Chinese banking 
sector. It begins by outlining the major stages 
of banking reforms in China. Then, it 
describes the development of the non-
traditional business by Chinese banks. Finally, 
the driving forces behind Chinese banks’ shift 
to income diversification are discussed.  
 
 
2 
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Chapter 2  
The Rise and Development of Non-traditional 
Banking Business in China  
 
The steady growth of non-traditional business has been an important development of 
China's banking industry in the recent decades. This takes place amid gradual 
unfolding of financial reforms in the country including interest rate liberalization, 
marketization of banking business, and RMB internationalization. Improved banking 
supervision and financial disintermediation have strengthened the banks’ shift to non-
traditional activities. In consequence, Chinese commercial banks increasingly look 
beyond traditional services and to search out new income sources, leading to a shift 
from a single income structure that relies largely on interest income, to a more 
diversified income structure. The first chapter has briefly introduced the channels and 
main composition of income diversification, and given an overall picture of the 
organization of this thesis. Chapter 2 will describe in detail the major stages of reform 
of the Chinese banking system, provide an overview of both the historical development 
and current status of non-interest income, and explain the main causes thereof. 
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2.1  Introduction 
 
In the recent decades, the Chinese financial sector has experienced rapid growth. By 
the end of 2017, the country’s banking system had become the world’s biggest in terms 
of bank assets. According to China Banking Regulatory Commission, by 2017, the 
total assets of China’s banking institutions reached USD 37 trillion, while the 
corresponding amount for the Eurozone was USD 31 trillion, and USD 16 trillion for 
the USA. On top of the rapid growth of bank size, great changes have also taken place 
in banks’ functions, banks’ management, and the regulatory system (Laeven and 
Levine, 2007).  
 
Internationally, it is an established trend that commercial banks, especially large-sized 
ones, are actively seeking new income streams and no longer depend on interest 
income alone (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). In the mature banking markets, the 
proportion of non-interest income has steadily increased, causing banks to shift their 
focus away from traditional intermediary functions such as taking deposits, issuing 
loans, and providing intermediary services, and instead to take on a diversified income 
structure by providing an extensive range of services.  
 
For China, while the general economy has continued to develop, financial reforms are 
also well under way, which include interest rate liberalization, RMB 
internationalization and exchange rate system reform (Deng and Luo, 2014; Liao and 
55 
 
Tapsoba, 2014). Such reforming moves have been accelerating, and placing pressure 
on banks to pursue a strategy to diversify their income sources. Moreover, improved 
capital regulation and the financial disintermediation due to rapid development of the 
stock market in the country have further induced commercial banks to end their 
reliance on the expansion of loan business as the sole source of their profit growth, 
cementing the trend for shifting to a more diversified income structure.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Previous studies lack a comprehensive coverage of the development of income 
diversification in the Chinese banking market. This chapter intends to fill that gap, by 
providing an overview of the growth of non-traditional banking business in China 
including a summary of the special nature of the Chinese regulatory framework and 
explanations for the internal and external reasons that motivate banks to expand their 
non-interest income.  
 
The Chinese banking industry has undergone profound changes over the past two 
decades, in terms of changes to the regulatory system, ownership type, market 
competition and the admission of foreign and private capital. In order to ensure a better 
understanding of the following chapters it is necessary to have a comprehensive 
knowledge of this background and development path. Most importantly, during the 
process of China's banking reform and policy changes, there have been several 
significant shifts in the income structure of the banking industry. These changes are 
very helpful to understand the motivations for Chinese banks’ diversification, and will 
be referred to frequently in the subsequent chapters. 
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The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces stages of 
banking system reforms in China. Section 2.3 analyses the changes to income structure 
in the mature and Chinese banking markets. Section 2.4 lists several motivations that 
push banks to adopt a diversification strategy for business expansion, and offers a 
comprehensive analysis of why they decide to pursue this path. Conclusion is 
presented in Section 2.5. 
 
2.2  Banking System Reforms in China 
 
Before 1978, China operated an economic and financial system based on central 
planning principles. The configuration of the economy followed the Soviet command 
economy model, whereby economic development was regulated by a strict central 
planning system, including a centralized state banking system (Yao and Wu, 2010). 
From 1978, the Chinese regulatory authorities implemented several waves of financial 
reform in the banking sector, with the aim of transforming a policy-driven and 
monopolistic banking system into a modern and market-oriented one (García-Herrero 
et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2013).  
 
The Chinese central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), established in 1949, 
was the only substantial bank in the Chinese banking system to serve the nation’s 
centrally planned economy (Berger et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2013). It functioned both 
as a governmental department implementing decisions made by the State Council, with 
responsibility for issuing currency and allocating government investment funds, and 
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as a financial institution offering financial services including savings, loans, and the 
settling of accounts. With over 15000 sub-branches, the PBOC controlled currency in 
circulation, managed foreign exchange reserves, set the interest rate and took all 
deposits from, and extended loans to, the public and commercial businesses. 
 
2.2.1  First Stage of Reform: Establishment of a “two-tier” banking 
system 
 
In 1979 China launched the programme of “reform and opening-up”, aiming to satisfy 
the demand emanating from the more market economic activities emerging from the 
transition from the centrally planned economy to a market oriented one (Boyreau-
Debray and Wei, 2005). As part of the transition, the first reforms in the Chinese 
banking market were aimed at establishing a “two-tier” banking system (Bonin, 1999). 
From 1979 to 1984, three specialized banks, i.e. the Bank of China (BOC), 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and China Construction Bank (CCB) were spanned 
off from the PBOC or the Ministry of Finance. In addition, another substantial bank, 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), was established. They are to 
carry out the general functions of commercial banks though still under state controls.  
 
By 1984, these four state-owned banks were well established as commercial banks for 
different specialities. On top of this, the PBOC was made the central bank of China, 
performing as the authorities of credit control, currency issuance and monetary policy 
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(Cai et al., 2019).  This separation of the commercial banks and monetary authorities 
resulted in a “two-tier” banking system which designated the status of PBOC as the 
central bank and specified the operating rules for other banks under which expansion 
of credit was constrained by their deposits (Lin and Zhang, 2009). It also established 
an institutional framework that bestows the central bank a leading role and the big-
four state banks form the backbone of the Chinese banking system (He et al., 2017).  
 
To further promote competition and improve the scope of financial services, by 1992, 
eight small- and medium-sized shareholding commercial banks were allowed to set up. 
Of them, six are nationwide banks and two are provincial commercial banks and they 
offer universal bank services to households and firms, mainly in the cities. At the same 
time, in addition to a variety of trust and investment companies, many city credit 
cooperatives were established at both the central and local level. By the end of 1992, 
4800 city credit cooperatives with assets of 187.8 billion RMB emerged. These 
developments were accompanied by a corresponding increase in the total banking 
assets, from 151.6 billion RMB to 1140.1 billion RMB for the bank sector as a whole, 
where the share of non-banks in the total bank assets rose from 9.34 to 14.03 percent 
(Almanac of China's Banking and Finance, 1993).  
 
2.2.2  Second Stage of Reform: Instituting the regulatory 
framework of “one bank and two commissions” 
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The second stage of Chinese financial reforms was featured by the intensity of bank 
supervision. The main aims of the new reforms were to improve banks’ ability to 
manage financial risk, and to create a competitive and modern banking market. The 
central bank’s regulatory roles are re-focused to concentrate on bank supervision, and 
the two newly established commissions would take over the other regulatory functions. 
 
In 1993, the government started to change the regulatory focuses of the central bank. 
Between 1993 and 1997 the newly established China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC) and China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) gradually 
took over some of the PBOC’s regulatory functions with regard to the insurance and 
securities businesses. In 2003, the banking regulatory function was transferred from 
the central bank to the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), thereby 
streamlining and transforming the PBOC into a typical central bank charged with 
formulating and implementing monetary policy and maintaining the price stability 
(Zhang et al., 2016).  
 
While the new system has helped reduce excessive concentration of regulatory powers, 
the rise of non-interest activities in the Chinese banking sector poses new challenges. 
The expansion of the non-traditional business makes the boundaries among insurance, 
banking, securities and financing leasing companies gradually blurred. Because 
commercial banks and their businesses are regulated by both the CIRC and CBRC, the 
overlapping led to regulatory confusions and inefficiency. In order to improve the 
regulatory efficacy and reduce costs for, in 2018 the CBRC and CIRC were combined 
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into the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), a single 
commission overseeing both sectors, under the direct control of the State Council. The 
function of drafting relevant laws and regulations for the banking and insurance 
industries, which was the responsibility assumed by the CIRC and CBRC, has been 
taken over by the central bank, the PBOC (Wang, 2018). In consequence, these 
changes led to the emergence of a regulatory framework in China known as “one bank 
and two commissions”, which is graphed in Figure 2.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation 
Figure 2.1 Financial regulatory framework in China 
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2.2.3  Third Stage of Reform: Towards a market-oriented economy 
 
Reform after the Asian financial crisis 
 
Alerted by the Asian financial crisis, the Chinese government has taken measures to 
address the financial risks to the Chinese financial system since the late 1990s and 
injected substantial amount of capital to stabilise banking market (Jiang et al, 2013). 
In 1998, the government issued government bonds to the value of 270 billion RMB to 
provide a capital injection to increase the capital adequacy ratio of state-owned banks. 
In addition, four financial asset management companies (AMCs) were established, 
namely China Cinda Asset Management (CCAM), China Orient Asset Management 
(COAM), China Great Wall Asset Management (CGWAM) and China HuaRong 
Asset Management corporate (CHAM), each of which belongs to one of the big-four 
banks. These AMCs are tasked to taking over distressed bank assets, and employing 
modern techniques in the recovery of those assets. In the year from 1999 to 2000, the 
AMCs acquired over 1.4 trillion RMB non-performing loans from the big-four banks, 
while in the year from 2003 to 2004 they acquired another 1 trillion (Wang, 2003). 
Between 1999 and 2004, the four AMCs also signed debt-to-equity swap agreements 
with over 1100 state-owned enterprises. In detail, the four asset management 
companies used funds borrowed from the central bank to buy companies’ debt, and 
then helped the companies to transfer debt to company shares. The funds raised from 
the sale of those companies’ shares to the public could then be used to repay the debt 
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owed to the central bank. These actions alleviated the potential default risk of state-
owned banks and stabilized the Chinese financial system to some extent.  
 
Similar to state-owned banks, city credit cooperatives have also accumulated a lot of 
bad debt and non-performing loans (Hsiao, et al., 2015). As credit cooperatives are 
under direct control of local governments, the central bank could not effectively 
influence their assets management and loan decisions. Therefore, in 1995, the State 
Council issued the Notice Concerning the Creation of City Cooperative Banks, under 
the terms of which the urban credit cooperatives would be merged into new urban 
commercial banks, and thus brought into the banking regulatory framework. By the 
end of 2002, over 2000 urban cooperatives were transformed into 111 city commercial 
banks (Hamid and Tenev, 2008).  They provide financial services to local citizens, 
while operating under strict financial supervisions by the central bank.  
 
Shareholding system reform 
 
In 2003, the Chinese government started the Shareholding System Reform, which 
would transform Chinese commercial banks into shareholding corporations (Bin, 
2007). This reform was aimed at optimizing banks’ ownership structure to improve 
financial transparency and operational efficiency (Lin and Zhang, 2009; Yao et al., 
2008). In early 2004, the State Council utilized foreign exchange reserves to the value 
of 45 billion USD to inject capital into the COB and CBC for use in financial 
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reorganization and supplementary financing. In 2005, the state-owned Huijin 
Investment Company injected 15 billion USD into the ICBC. Following further assets 
restructuring conducted with the assistance of the Minister of Finance, in 2005 the 
CBC was listed for the first time on the Hong Kong stock exchange (Berger et al., 
2009). The following year, the ICBC and BOC were listed on the Shanghai and Hong 
Kong stock exchanges. Through IPO, state-owned banks could gather funds, increase 
liquidity and also diversify their ownership (Jia, 2009). To date, a total of 38 Chinese 
banks have been listed on either the overseas or domestic stock exchanges. 
 
The change to banks’ ownership structure brought about by IPO means that banks must 
be responsible to, and ensure they have enough profit and be better at monitoring the 
risks management for, their shareholders (Boubakri et al., 2005; Clarke et al., 2005). 
Thus, it stimulates banks to balance their income structure and increase their income 
stream. At the same time, income diversification could also diversify banks’ portfolios, 
which could stabilize the income stream and guarantee payments for shareholders.  
 
More importantly, under the shareholding system reform, banks also opened up to 
strategic investors and foreign capital (Tsai et al., 2014). Several banks, such as the 
Bank of Beijing, have been officially authorised as foreign capital holding banks. The 
entry of foreign capital has made the business model and income structure of Chinese 
commercial banks closer to those of foreign banks, as they become more and more 
efficient and diversified (Berger et al., 2009; Luo and Yao, 2010; Luo et al., 2017).  
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In summary, after more than 30 years of gradual financial and banking reforms, 
China's banking industry has undergone profound development and significantly 
improved financial stability, efficiency improvement and economic growth (Hasan et 
al., 2009; Fang and Jiang, 2014; Peng et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2015), 
where assets have increased from 304.8 billion RMB in 1978 to 232.25 trillion RMB 
in 2016. The Chinese banking sector has been transformed from a centrally planned 
system with one bank that functioned as both policy maker and commercial bank, into 
a complex two-tier banking system under a regulatory framework with “one bank and 
two commissions” and with a variety of financial agencies including state-owned 
banks, private banks, policy banks and other non-bank financial institutions  
 
According to a CBRC annual report, at the end of 2016, China’s banking sector 
consisted of 3 policy banks, 5 large commercial banks, 12 joint stock commercial 
banks, 134 city commercial banks, 8 private banks, 1114 rural commercial banks, 40 
rural cooperative banks, 1,1125 rural credit cooperatives and 1 postal savings bank. 
As a result of these developments, combined with the divestiture of policy business 
from the PBOC and the restructuring of banks’ ownership, the Chinese banking market 
has been gradually changed from political-oriented to market-oriented, with associated 
improvements in competitiveness, profitability and diversification level.  
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2.3  Changes in the Income Structure of China's Banks 
 
2.3.1  Structural Changes in the Mature Banking Market 
 
Diversification is an important trend in the development of the mature banking market. 
As such, most banks in the mature market can provide customers with a wide range of 
financial products and services, including banking, securities, insurance, trusts, and 
other financial categories. Banks in that market have vigorously pursued a mixed 
businesses strategy and their non-interest business has developed rapidly, becoming a 
major source of bank revenue, even exceeding traditional interest income. This fast-
moving process of diversification has been driven by several factors.  
 
In 1984, the French Banking Act was promulgated, allowing France’s commercial 
banks to engage in all banking-related financial business and to begin to transition to 
universal banks. In 1986, the UK authorities announced the Financial Services Act, 
allowing commercial banks to provide comprehensive financial services including 
securities and other businesses. The diversification process in the US market began 
with the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, which allowed financial 
holding companies to operate a variety of financial businesses through the 
establishment of subsidiaries. The banking markets in Germany and Switzerland have 
consistently implemented a mixed operation system. The universal banks in those 
countries operate without any business scope restrictions among financial sectors, and 
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can offer a range of financial services such as commercial and investment banking. 
The gradual relaxation of financial and businesses regulation in a mixed operation or 
universal banking system has provided sufficient space for commercial banks to 
develop their non-interest business and diversify their income streams. 
 
Furthermore, the Basel Accord requirements for capital adequacy has forced 
commercial banks to increase their liquidity, and at the same time to pay attention to 
the ratio of assets with different risk-weights. In order to meet the capital adequacy 
ratio requirements, banks shift from on-balance sheet business to off-balance sheet 
ones and to allocate to their portfolios more high-yield assets, such as investments, 
venture capital, securitized products and guarantees (Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 
2014). Therefore, the international strengthening of bank capital requirements tends to 
induce commercial banks to shift in the income structure from interest-based to non-
interest-based income.  
 
The rapid development of electronic information technology has also provided 
favourable technical conditions and a platform for integration of banking and other 
financial services (Siregar et al., 2017).  Technology innovations such as Big Data 
and Blockchain have made it possible for commercial banks to innovate in financial 
products and tools, thus facilitating the provision of a more extensive range of financial 
products and services, the development of e-banking and other online financial 
platforms, and a consequent expansion of income sources. 
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2.3.2  Income Diversification in the Chinese Banking Market 
 
The development of non-interest income in the Chinese banking sector has evolved 
through three stages:  
 
From 1980 to 1992: chaotic development of business diversification 
 
Non-interest income includes revenues from commercial banking, investment banking, 
insurance, asset management, and financial infrastructure services (clearance, 
settlement, payments, custody, etc.). In the late 1960s, banks in mature economies 
started the transition from focusing on traditional lending business to a ‘cross-selling’ 
operational pattern. In 1979, trust and leasing business launched in the Bank of China, 
and become the first type of non-interest business in Chinese market. During the next 
few years, commissions for stock issuance and consulting businesses also launched. 
With the further deregulation of the industry, and in particular the United States’ 
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, commercial banks are allowed to 
engage in securities underwriting/brokerage, insurance, and other high-leverage areas 
such as venture capital. Table 2.1 shows the non-interest activities expansion in the 
early stage of Chinese banking market.  
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Table 2.1 Types of non-interest activities in early stage 
Non-interest product Issuance date Financial institution 
Trust business 1979 Bank of China  
Business guarantee  1980 China Construction Bank 
Agency for foreign currency trading 1982 Bank of China  
Forward exchange transaction 1985 Bank of China  
Investment advisory services 1987 China Construction Bank 
Interest rates and currency swaps 1988 China CITIC Bank 
Revolving underwriting facility 1988 Bank of China  
Note issuance facility 1988 Bank of China  
Forward rate agreement 1988 Bank of China  
Source: Author’s creation according to China Statistical Yearbook 
 
In 1980, the State Council issued the Interim Rules on Promoting Economic Coalition, 
which allowed the commercial banks to engage in trust business. Subsequently, 
Chinese commercial banks also obtained permission to enter the securities and 
insurance businesses. In 1987, the Bank of Communications became the first bank to 
engage in the comprehensive management of banking, securities and insurance 
businesses. During the 1980s, banks were keen to develop universal and multi-
functional banks, such that the boundaries between banks and other financial 
institutions became blurred (Lo et al., 2016). With the rapid expansion of non-interest 
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activities and insufficient regulation, management of non-interest business in China's 
banking industry were chaotic and the risk management thereof was inadequate. 
 
From 1992 to 2000: restricting diversification  
 
Partly to address the problems occurred in the banks’ shift to non-interest business, the 
State Council in 1993 promulgated the Decision on Reform of the Financial System.  
The document stipulated that commercial banks should be decoupled from the 
insurance, trust and securities businesses and keep only interest activities in their 
portfolios. In 1995, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks 
further forbade merger activities between banks and financial institutions, thus 
restricting the expansion of non-interest and brokerage business. With increasingly 
strict restrictions on mixing banks’ business lines, the proportion of non-interest 
income shrank accordingly. 
 
From 2000: gradual reviving of income diversification  
 
With the gradual establishment of a comprehensive regulatory system, in 2001 the 
Chinese authorities turned their attention to income diversification in the banking 
sector. In that year, the PBOC introduced the Provisional Regulations Governing 
Commercial Banks' Intermediary Business, which expanded the business scope for 
commercial banks and relaxed restrictions on financial derivatives and agency 
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business, including trading in securities, insurance and government bonds. With this 
groundwork in place, in 2005 the Chinese financial authorities started a pilot program 
allowing cooperation among financial institutions, thus increasing the complexity and 
diversification of banks’ income streams. In 2008, the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) issued the Guidance for Cooperation between the Operations of 
Banks and Trust Companies, which provided the legal basis to reduce restrictions on 
bank activity and opened the way for cooperation between non-traditional banking 
businesses and commercial bank operations. Subsequently, the Securities Regulatory 
Commission and Insurance Regulatory Commission issued several notices to grant 
permission for commercial banks to engage in securities and insurance business.  
 
Owing to this expansion of non-interest activities, the total volume of non-interest 
income of the Chinese banking sector grew from 3.57 trillion CNY in 2006 to 25.40 
trillion CNY in 2016, a more than six-fold increase over one decade. However, interest 
income remains the main source of banks’ total income, and non-interest activities 
occupy only a moderate proportion of overall revenue. More specifically, according to 
the CBRC, non-interest income accounts for 23.8% of total operating income of the 
Chinese banking industry (CBRC Annual Report, 2016). Figures 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate 
the volume and proportion of interest and non-interest income over operating income 
for the 'Big-Five' state-owned banks, and 12 national joint-stock banks, respectively.  
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Sources: Author’s creation according to annual reports of the Big-Five banks  
Figure 2.2 Volume changes of interest and non-interest income and the growth rate 
of non-interest income for the Big-Five banks from 2008 to 2017 
 
 
Sources: Author’s creation according to annual reports of 12 joint-stock banks 
Figure 2.3 Volume changes of interest and non-interest income and the growth rate 
of non-interest income for joint-stock banks from 2008 to 2017 
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We see that, for both banking groups, which together constitute the main body of the 
Chinese banking sector, the proportion of non-interest income has been rising steadily 
year by year. In the case of the joint-stock banks, during the early period the amount 
of non-interest income was relatively small in terms of both volume and proportion. 
However, over the past decade, joint-stock banks have paid increasing attention to the 
development of non-interest income. This has led to rapid growth in the average share 
of non-interest income, which now exceeds that of the Big-Five state-owned banks. 
 
However, to date, the composition of non-interest income is relatively simple, with 
fees and commissions representing the main sources of non-interest business. As 
shown in Figure 2.4, according to the CBRC (2016) fee-based income occupies 17.6% 
of all income in the Chinese banking sector, followed by investment income (6%), 
exchange income (1.9%) and other income (1.1%).  
 
Source: Author’s creation according to China Banking Regulatory Commission 
Figure 2.4 The income structure of China's banking industry in 2016 
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From the above, it can be seen that fees and commissions are the main sources of the 
non-interest income in the Chinese banking sector. This fee-based income can be 
roughly divided into six components: bank card fees; personal wealth management 
fees; custodian and other fiduciary service fees; settlement, clearing business and cash 
management fees; investment banking and consultancy fees; and other fee-based 
income. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the growth of fee-based income and the volume of 
each business under fee-based activities, according to figures published in the annual 
reports of the Big-Five state-owned banks and 12 joint-stock banks, respectively. 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation according to annual reports of Big-Five banks 
Figure 2.5 Changes in the growth rate of fee-based income and its components for 
the Big-Five banks from 2008 to 2017 
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Source: Author’s creation according to annual reports of 12 joint-stock banks 
Figure 2.6 Changes in the growth rate of fee-based income and its components for 
joint-stock banks from 2008 to 2017 
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negative growth. This indicates that in China's banking industry, the growth of non-
interest income is no longer driven solely by the expansion of fee-based activities. 
Indeed, especially with the liberalization of the foreign exchange market, in future 
there will be more and more space for the development of exchange trading and 
investment.  
 
In addition, from Figures 5 and 6 we can observe the similarities and differences in the 
composition of fee income for different bank types. First, unlike banks in mature 
markets, Chinese banks do not value the development of consulting and settlement 
business; consequently, these two businesses do not occupy a high proportion of the 
fee-based business in either of the banking groups. In contrast, bank card and personal 
wealth management account for relatively high proportions of the fee-based business. 
Further, while the Big-Five banks maintain a relatively balanced mix of business 
components, the joint-stock banks prefer to earn additional fees and income through 
the development of bank card business.  
 
From the above it can be seen that there has been a rapid increase in non-interest 
banking activities, and the proportion of non-interest income in overall operating 
income is also increasing steadily. Nevertheless, by comparing the figures for the 
Chinese banking sector with those for mature banking markets, it can be seen that the 
income diversification process in the Chinese banking sector still lags behind, and 
there is room for future growth. For example, in 2016 the proportion of non-interest 
76 
 
income in the United States banking sector was 32.73%, while the corresponding 
figure for the European zone was 43.12% (World Bank, 2016).  
 
In next section, we highlight the reasons why income diversification has become the 
subject of much positive attention from bank managers, and why the expansion of non-
interest income will be the inevitable choice for the Chinese banking market. 
 
2.4  Motivations for Chinese Banks’ Diversification  
 
2.4.1  Constraint-induced Diversification 
 
Market-oriented interest rate reform 
 
For a long time, interest spread in the Chinese banking sector was rather big which 
contributed to Chinese banks’ over-reliant on lending business to earn their revenue 
and interest income in turn constituted the main avenue for their income stream (Ding 
et al., 2017). As can be seen from Figure 2.7, the average one-, three-, and five-year 
benchmark interest spreads over the period from 1990 to 1998 were 1.38%, 1.40%, 
and 1.34%, respectively. The benchmark interest rate reached its highest level in 1999, 
and has remained at a relatively high level since then. In order to increase the 
willingness of the banks to diversify their income stream and promote competitiveness 
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in the banking market, in 2005 the government initiated the market-oriented interest 
rate reform. The reform was introduced gradually. In 2012, the PBOC allowed Chinese 
financial institutions the freedom to decide on their own deposit interest rates if it was 
no greater than 10%. The following year, the PBOC opened up the loan interest rate 
for financial institutions, which further cut the net interest margin for commercial 
banks. In 2015 the PBOC removed the ceiling it had imposed on deposit rates and 
abolished the floor for lending rates (Tan et al., 2016).  
 
 
Notes: Interest spread = Benchmark loan rate - Benchmark deposit rate 
Source: Author’s creation according to the People’s Bank of China 
Figure 2.7 Benchmark interest spreads in China from 1991 to 2015 
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with each other on deposit and loan pricing, which squeezes the net interest margin, or 
the difference between what lenders pay for deposits and what they collect on loans 
(Nguyen, 2012; Genay and Podjasek, 2014; Alessandri and Nelson, 2015). As the main 
source of profit for Chinese commercial banks, the net interest margin falls to record 
low (Zuo et al., 2014). According to the Bankscope database, the net interest margin 
for the Chinese banking sector in 2007 was 3.5%, while by the end of 2017 it had 
decreased to 2.10%. Such a sizable decrease of net interest margin causes significant 
shrinkage of banks’ earnings from lending-based activities and of overall profitability 
ability (Okazaki, 2017).  
 
The interest rate liberalization has had a large impact on Chinese banks’ profitability 
(Ding, 2017). Figure 2.8 presents the main profitability indexes for banks, namely 
return on equity (ROE) and the growth rate of profit after tax. Both indicators show a 
similar trend, where following the fluctuation during the subprime mortgage crisis of 
2008 to 2010 in the USA, the profitability of China's banking industry has been in 
constant decline. In 2017, the level of ROE reached a low of 12.56, and the growth 
rate of profitability became negative. Therefore, the Chinese banking sector is faced 
with a significant challenge posed by declining profitability which also claimed by 
several researches (such as Bikker and Vervliet, 2018). As some non-interest related 
businesses, such as financial derivatives, securitized products, guarantees and venture 
capital, can yield high returns, this motivates banks’ management to shift to such 
business leading to adopting the diversification strategies (Elsas et al., 2010; Dietrich 
and Wanzenried, 2011). 
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Source: Author’s creation according to China Banking Regulatory Commission  
Figure 2.8 ROE and profit after tax in the Chinese banking sector from 2007 to 2017 
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to stimulate economic growth by injecting liquidity to the financial market (Yang et 
al., 2017). This however led to excess liquidity in the financial system and rapid 
growth of banks’ lending. According to CBRC, the total lending volume increased 
from 27.8 trillion yuan to 42.6 trillion yuan from 2007 to the end of 2009. From 2010, 
in order to strengthen macro-economic controls, prevent systemic financial risks and 
avoid increased pace of inflation, the Chinese monetary authorities started to change 
their monetary policy towards a neutral stance (Xiong, 2012). A gradual raising of the 
deposit reserve ratio and the interest rate restrained the excessive growth of bank loans 
and led to a decline in the total amount of bank credit. In 2010, in the wake of the 
European debt crisis, instability in China’s financial market intensified, and the central 
bank tried to recover excess liquidity in the market by adjusting the excess reserve 
ratios and open market operations (Jian et al., 2011). In 2012, China's economic growth 
slowed down, and the PBOC adopted a “prudent and neutral” monetary policy (Zhang 
and Sun, 2017), thus slowing the expansion of on-balance sheet business and inducing 
the banks to expand off-balance sheet business.  
 
Coupled with this prudent and neutral monetary policy, the Chinese authorities 
published a series of regulatory rules and notices, aimed at strengthening bank capital 
requirements and decreasing banks’ overall leverage (Zepeda, 2013). In 2012 the 
CBRC published the Administrative Measures on the Capital of Commercial Banks 
(Trial), which set a new minimum level of capital indicators, requiring each bank’s 
core tier one capital ratio, the tier one capital ratio and the capital adequacy ratio to be 
no lower than 5%, 6% and 8%, respectively. Additionally, commercial banks were 
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required to build up a corresponding capital buffer above their minimum capital 
requirements and reserve capital requirements, including retained capital and 
countercyclical capital requirements. For the systemically important banks, they were 
subject to an additional 1% capital requirement.  
 
In short, regulatory changes in China have resulted in banks seeking other revenue 
opportunities beyond those from traditional business. New regulations, particularly the 
capital requirements, affect banks’ capital availability as well as its cost.  New and 
stricter capital adequacy regulations mean that banks have to raise more capital to meet 
the capital adequacy requirements (Zhang et al., 2008). This in turn would force banks 
to seek new capital or to refrain from expanding their traditional banking business. In 
addition, new regulatory changes would also increase banks’ funding cost, since fewer 
insider loans would now be available. The risk adjusted capital requirements would 
also create an incentive for banks to reduce their risk-weighted assets and seek income 
through non-traditional business (Cohen and Scatigna, 2016). Hence, the capital 
adequacy rules induce banks to seek income from other sources, mainly from non-
interest business, which has lower reserves requirements and hence lower capital cost 
than are associated with traditional lending. Consequently, banks shift to off-balance 
activities that can generate non-interest income. 
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The internationalization of the renminbi 
 
Following the US subprime mortgage crisis, the Chinese authorities accelerated the 
process of internationalization of the renminbi, in order to bring relief to a monetary 
system that was too strongly tied to the US dollar (Dobson and Masson, 2009). On one 
hand, the fluctuation of exchange rates of major international currencies, such as the 
US dollar, euro, and yen, means that Chinese enterprises face significant exposure to 
exchange rate risks in their international operations. With increased use of the 
renminbi in international transaction, the RMB internationalization provides Chinese 
banks with new opportunities for wider engagement in international business and 
improved income structure in terms of currency exposure (Cohen, 2012). Potential 
new RMB businesses such as overseas banking services in RMB deposits and loans, 
overseas RMB cash management, currency exchange, international bank cards, and 
account management will result in large fee income.  
 
Moreover, RMB internationalization has the potential of expanding the scale of 
Chinese banks’ international clearing businesses, which will facilitate trade financing 
and development of financial product chains (Eichengreen and Kawai, 2014). As 
reported by the annual reports of the Bank of China (2015, 2016), its branches at Hong 
Kong, Macau and Taiwan have seen a rapid increase in their non-interest income due 
to the surge in cross-border settlements (see Table 2.2). 
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Table 2.2 Accounting indicators of Bank of China, 2015 and 2016 
    Mainland China   
Hong Kong, 
Macau and 
Taiwan  
  Other countries 
    2015 2016   2015 2016   2015 2016 
Assets   13,053.1 14,341.7  3,010.9 3,256.5  1,819.8 1,812.5 
Liabilities   11,970.9 13,198.4  2,784.0 2,967.6  1,770.8 1,757.5 
Operating 
income 
  382.3 365.9  75.2 101.7  17.8 19.1 
Net interest 
income 
  282.1 263.6  31.7 29.3  14.7 13.0 
Non-interest 
income 
  100.2 102.3  43.5 72.3  3.0 6.1 
Fee and 
commissions 
  75.2 70.7  14.7 14.4  3.3 4.2 
Other non-
interest 
income 
  24.9 31.6  28.7 57.9  -0.2 1.8 
Source: Author’s creation according to yearbooks of Bank of China (2015 and 2016)   
 
Reform and opening up in the Chinese banking sector  
 
1. Opening up to foreign capital 
 
Since 2001, China joint the WTO, China has committed to opening up its banking 
sector to foreign capital and investors. In 2006, in accordance with China’s 
commitment to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), foreign banks was legally 
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granted access to the country’s banking industry (Tsai et al., 2014). Under the 2006 
Regulations on Administration of Foreign-Funded Banks, foreign banks operating in 
China are no longer subject to geographical and business restrictions which causing a 
rapid increase of foreign banks entered into Chinese banking market (Luo et al., 2015).  
 
At the end of 2006, about 30 foreign financial institutions have invested over 19 billion 
USD into 21 Chinese commercial banks and hold their stakes (Okazaki, 2007). 
According to the latest National Bureau of Statistics statistics, except for the decrease 
in total assets of foreign-funded banks in 2015, the total assets of foreign-funded banks 
have generally maintained a significant upward trend, and the average annual 
compound growth rate of assets for the 10 years reached 10.57% (National Bureau of 
Statistics China). By the end of 2016, 37 wholly foreign owned banks had established 
in China; 68 foreign banks had set up 121 branches, and 145 foreign banks had set up 
166 representative offices. The total number of business outlets of foreign banks 
reached 1031 and their total assets reached 2.93 trillion RMB, tripling the amount in 
2007 of 927.9 billion RMB. The entry of foreign banks has promoted competitiveness 
in the Chinese banking sector and exerted a positive effect on domestic banks’ 
efficiency and their motivations for seeking out new income sources (Claessens et al., 
2001; Unite and Sullivan, 2003; Choi and Hasan, 2005). Moreover, the foreign banks 
also holds better assets quality and better capital solvency ability (see Figure 2.9). Thus 
the entry of foreign banks also brings advanced risks-management technology to 
domestic banks and causing positively spillover effect (Lee and Hsieh; 2014). 
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Source: Author’s creation according to China Banking Regulatory Commission and annual report 
of each foreign banks 
Figure 2.9 The NPL ratio and capital adequacy ratio of average Chinese banks and 
foreign banks from 2010 to 2017 
 
2. Opening up to private capital 
 
Compared with the opening up of the banking market to foreign capital, the easing of 
restrictions on private capital came relatively late but also increased competition for 
deposits and putting pressure in Chinese banking market (Hou et al., 2016). In 2005, 
the State Council promulgated the Several Opinions of the State Council on 
Encouraging, Supporting and Guiding the Development of Individual, Private and 
Other Non-public Sectors of the Economy.  This allowed non-publicly-owned capital 
to enter the financial services industry for the first time to stimulate its growth and 
stability (Milana and Wang, 2013). Specifically, it permitted private capital to enter 
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regional joint-stock commercial banks and cooperative financial institutions. In 2012, 
the State Council announced a scheme of Encouraging and Guiding the Entry of 
Private Capitals in the Fields of the Bank Industry. With that, private capital could 
enter the banking market, which represents an important progress easing the 
restrictions on the country's state-controlled banking industry. In 2014, the first five 
private banks gained approval for trial operation (see Table 2.3). These private banks 
offer financing services specifically to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
self-employed individuals, and others in special development projects such as the 
Shanghai and Tianjin Pilot Free Trade Zones. At the end of 2016, the total assets of 
these five private banks had reached 132.9 billion RMB.  
Table 2.3 The first batch of five pilot private banks 
Bank names Main sponsors Regions  Customer direction 
Permission 
received 
Zhejiang E-
Commerce 
Bank 
Alibaba Group 
and Fosun 
Group 
Zhejiang 
Province 
e-bank 26/92014 
Shanghai 
Huarui Bank 
JuneYao 
Group 
Shanghai 
Enterprises in Shanghai 
Pilot Free Trade Zone 
26/9/2014 
WeBank 
Tencent 
Holdings Ltd. 
Shenzhen e-bank 25/72014 
Kincheng 
Bank of 
Tianjin 
Tianjin 
Huabei Group 
Tianjin 
Enterprises in Tianjin 
Pilot Free Trade Zone 
25/72014 
Wenzhou 
Minshang 
Bank 
Chint Group Wenzhou  
small-sized enterprises 
and rural areas  
25/72014 
Source: Author’s creation according to China Banking Regulatory Commission  
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This bodes well for promoting competition in the banking market (Clarke et al., 2005), 
but it also casts a shadow on the profitability of the major lenders. Such private bank 
and internet finance can significantly reduce the transaction costs and information 
asymmetry. Large and medium lenders will probably experience a gradual outflow of 
depositors if they do not respond to competitive pressure from smaller banks willing 
to offer higher deposit rates to win retail clients and from innovative Internet financing 
platforms offered by the likes of Alibaba and Tencent (Wei, 2015).  
 
In summary, a more flexible entry mechanism is pushing the banking sector to launch 
more financial products in order to compete with private and foreign banks to attract 
customers and market share. At the same time, it incentivizes banks to diversify their 
portfolios in order to look for new profit growth opportunity so that they can move 
away from the traditional model under which the net interest margin was shrinking.   
 
2.4.2  Internal-bank Motivations 
 
Insufficient liquidity due to resource misallocation  
 
Over the last two decades, the total assets of the Chinese banking sector have grown 
rapidly, increasing over nine-fold from 2003 to 2016 (CBRC, 2017). However, this 
rapid growth has brought with it the problem of financial frictions and capital 
misallocation (Lai et al., 2016), where banks put most of their focus on excessive 
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expanding of the loan scale and lavish local branches, thus causing their left with 
insufficient liquidity.  
 
 
Source: Author’s creation according to the People’s Bank of China  
Figure 2.10 Excess reserves in the Chinese banking sector from 2003 to 20171 
 
As can be seen from Figure 2.10, the overall level of excess reserves in the Chinese 
banks shows a downward trend with the exception that rural banks are able to maintain 
an average ratio of excess reserves over 9%. Lately, with the tempering of the US 
quantitative easing process, the lack of liquidity issue increasingly becomes a problem 
for Chinese banks and in response, managers of these banks then engage in more 
diversification activity to increase non-interest income. This to some extent redresses 
misallocation of banks’ resources and reduce the capital that is taken up by traditional 
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businesses, thus increasing banks’ liquidity level. The diversification also provides 
more financing channels for the banks. Consequently, diversification could help 
increase banks’ short-term capital stocks and make them better able to resist the 
tightening of liquidity (Pana et al., 2010), thus helping alleviate misallocation of 
capital and easing banks’ financial distress. 
 
Financial Disintermediation 
 
In an increasingly rigorous regulatory environment, banks are faced increased 
competitions resulting from the squeeze induced by more stringent capital 
requirements for traditional business (Li et al., 2014). This situation was worsened by 
the subprime mortgage crisis, which led to banks becoming more prudent in their loan 
decisions (Jun, 2012). Figure 2.11 presents the growth of non-governmental financing 
in China, and its structure; it shows the percentages of China’s direct and indirect 
financing in aggregate non-governmental funding. While in 2004 loans accounted for 
nearly 80% of the total, since then the share has gradually shrunk, reaching its lowest 
at 51.35% in 2013. During the same period, the growth rate of direct financing reached 
108.90% in 2007, and the total volume of direct financing increased nearly seven-fold, 
from 595.6 billion yuan in 2004 to 4136.9 billion yuan in 2016. The rise of direct 
financing has significantly eroded the traditional operations that generate interest 
income and has pushed Chinese banks to diversify their business.  
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Source: Author’s creation according to National Bureau of Statistics of China 
Figure 2.11 Growth of non-governmental financing and its structure from 2003 to 
2015 
 
Such financial disintermediation is mainly driven by the substantial development of 
financial markets including that of the stock market, bond market, money market, and 
gold market, where it creates the opportunity for effective and low-cost financing. The 
direct financing through financial markets competes with banks’ traditional interest-
based activities (Perera et al., 2014). In 2004 the combined market value of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges was 3705.56 trillion yuan, with the Shenzhen 
stock market occupying 1104.2 trillion yuan and the Shanghai stock market 2601.43 
yuan. At the end of 2017, the combined market value had grown to 56708.6 trillion 
yuan, an over fifteen-fold increase (see Figure 2.12).  
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Source: Author’s creation according to Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange 
Figure 2.12 Capitalisation of the Chinese stock markets 
 
Therefore, Li and Zhang (2013) suggest that the financial disintermediation in turn 
squeezes the scale of bank lending, and leads to the increases in the pressure on banks' 
traditional business. Consequently, financial disintermediation and the development 
of the capital market have promoted the transfer, sale, and securitization of loans and 
have driven banks to diversify their income stream, change their business modes, and 
expand their non-interest income. In addition, financial disintermediation promotes 
product innovation, capital settlement, asset custody, investment banking, and capital 
market-related businesses, all of which are beneficial to banks that wish to provide 
diversified investment and financing services for corporate clients.  
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In response to the fallout of the global financial crisis, China’s top economic planner, 
the National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC), launched a stimulating 
programme worth of 586 billion USD, with most of the funds being invested in large-
scale infrastructure projects and industrial restructuring (Lee, 2009). Although this 
eased the impact of the global financial crisis on China, it also raised concerns for the 
possibility of reckless lending by banks, since the process would be full of government 
interventions, which would not only distort the efficient allocation of capital but wold 
also fuel the zealous of the local governments for channelling the funds to the projects 
in their localities (Chen et al., 2017). This would create the situation in which local 
governments’ finance is over-stretched. In the real economy, it also intensifies 
manufacturing over-capacity in the industries from shipbuilding to solar energy, 
threatening occurrence of large numbers of non-performing bank loans (Wang, 2011).  
 
During the recent financial crisis and in the years leading up to it, the Chinese 
government injected significant amounts of capital into the Chinese banking market in 
order to write off substantial bad loans and thus create a more healthy level of non-
performing loans (NPLs) (Dobson and Kashyap, 2006; Tan and Floros, 2013; Fu et al., 
2015). According to the CBRC, the value of NPLs remained stable during the period 
from 2008 to 2013, fluctuating only slightly within a range from 400 to 500 billion 
CNY (see Figure 2.13). From 2014, there were signs of a rebound in NPLs, due to the 
slowdown in the macro-economy. By the end of 2014, the total value of NPLs had 
reached 842.56 billion CNY, an increase of 348.71 billion CNY on the previous year. 
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By the end of 2016, the outstanding bad loans had increased to 1.51 trillion yuan, up 
19 per cent from a year earlier. As shown in Figure 2.13, the growth rate of non-
performing loans increased from -12.81% to 50.72% over the period from 2010 to 
2016. The situation prompted the banks to search for new income possibilities, 
including non-traditional activities.  
 
 
Source: Author’s creation according to China Banking Regulatory Commissions annual reports 
Figure 2.13 Non-performing loans by Chinese banks from 2010 to 2016 
 
2.5  Conclusion 
 
The chapter provides an overview of the rise of non-interest activity in the Chinese 
banking industry against the background of China’s evolving financial reform and the 
regulatory changes thereof. Through a process of reform carried out in three waves, 
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the Chinese authorities established a modern banking system. The current Chinese 
financial system features a framework with “one bank and two commissions”.  In 
which the central bank plays a central role in setting the monetary policy while the 
main regulatory functions are charged to two regulatory commissions (Zhu and Hu, 
2019). Compared to the mature banking market, income diversification by Chinese 
banks is still at an early stage, and net interest income remains the dominant source of 
their revenues, occupying 73.4% of the overall Chinese banking income stream (China 
Banking Regulatory Commission). The proportion of non-interest income in the total 
revenue of Chinese banks remains relatively low. However, the volume of non-interest 
income is increasing rapidly (Sun et al., 2017). 
 
Changes in the income structure of China's banking industry are driven mainly by 
development of financial reforms, deepening financial disintermediation and the 
process of interest rate marketization (Li and Zhang, 2013). In addition, exchange rate 
reform and RMB internationalization have provided Chinese banks with new 
opportunities for wider engagement in international business and improved income 
structure in terms of currency exposure (Cohen, 2012). China’s opening up to private 
and foreign capital, and the increasingly stringent regulation on capital requirements, 
have increased competition for deposits and put pressure on the wider Chinese banking 
market. Consequently, they have played a significant role in driving Chinese banks to 
shift from traditional banking to non-interest activity (Borst and Lardy, 2015; Hou et 
al., 2016). 
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China’s banks is faced with enormous challenges ahead. The unfolding of financial 
reforms, tighter bank regulatory rules and economic uncertainties in the world and 
domestic economy will continue to squeeze bank profits and increase their exposure 
to risk. In the event, it is imperative that Chinese banks would have to adopt a sound 
diversification strategy and pursuit mixed business lines to deal with the challenges. 
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Chapter 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 Income Diversification and 
Bank Performance 
 
 
 
This chapter investigates the effects of 
income diversification on the performance of 
banks in China. By adopting the system-
GMM estimation, this research finds the 
different diversification impacts on 
performance for three categories of banks. By 
decomposing non-interest activities into 
different components, it finds further 
significant results. 
 
 
3 
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Chapter 3  
Income Diversification and Bank Performance 
 
Chapter 2 has described and analysed the major structural reforms undergone by the 
Chinese banking industry, as well as the dramatic developments in terms of 
macroeconomics, financial liberalization, capital restriction and internal operational 
pressures on banks. These have caused huge changes in both the banks’ income 
structure and its components, where non-interest income is increasing in amount and 
in proportion to banks’ assets and operating income. Against this background of 
structural change, chapter 3 will investigate whether income diversification in Chinese 
banks results in better earnings and overall performance.  
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3.1  Introduction 
 
Regulatory changes and banking competition in recent decades have brought about 
significant changes to the banking market, including the function of financial 
institutions and their income structure (Allen and Santomero, 2001). In this changing 
environment, banks are actively seeking new income streams and business lines, as 
opposed to the more traditional interest margin income (Casu et al., 2016). Hence, 
there has been a continual increase in banks’ non-interest activities, leading banks to 
diversify from traditional interest-bearing loans to earning income from offering a 
broad range of mixed financial products and services.  
 
However, evidence regarding the impact of income diversification on bank 
performance has been inconclusive. Some claim that diversification is beneficial to 
banks since business expansion to non-interest activities can increase banks’ market 
power and competitive advantages and can offer lower financing cost. On the other 
hand, there are opposite views that banks with more diversified portfolios are also 
likely to perform lower well than traditional institutions. Income diversification can 
also create the presence of too many business lines and disorganized management, 
offsetting benefits such as supernormal returns and competitiveness. Therefore, 
whether income diversification can bring a benefit or discount calls for more evidence.  
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Existing studies have been mostly concerned with mature markets. Only a small 
though expanding body of the literature has focused on emerging economies. Given 
their growing importance in international finance, it is desirable to consider how 
income diversification fares in a wide range of countries, including China. As the 
China is the largest emerging economy with global importance, studies on China 
would shed further light on the issue of bank diversification and its consequences.  
 
In the face of the increasingly stringent regulatory capital standards, Chinese banks are 
under pressure to seek new sources of funding. Meanwhile, market-oriented interest 
rate reform and financial disintermediation have gradually narrowed banks’ net 
interest margins, encouraging banks to diversify their income stream. Figure 3.1 
illustrates the tendency concerning Chinese banks’ shares of interest and non-interest 
incomes in total operating income for 2005 to 2016.  
 
Figure 3.1 shows the amount and share of non-interest income over total operating 
income, as well as the three underlying activities, including fee-based, trading and 
other non-interest income. Overall, there is a continually increasing tendency of total 
non-interest income in the Chinese banking industry; Figure 1 also indicates that the 
main income source of non-interest income is fee activities, which accounts for 12.04% 
of total non-interest income, while the share in 2016 was only 2.59 %. Meanwhile, the 
net operating revenue of trading and other operating income has experienced some 
fluctuations. Both suffered a decreasing tendency from 2005 to 2007, and then, they 
100 
 
dramatically increased in 2008, with the shares then becoming stable from 2008 
onward (growing annually by about 0.5% and 0.8%, respectively). 
 
 
 
Notes: Operating income = Net interest income + non-interest income 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BankScope database  
Figure 3.1 Chinese banks’ non-interest income 
 
This chapter employs a sample of 40 Chinese commercial banks, which accounts for 
79% of the total assets of the Chinese banking industry. Following the classification 
of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), this sample is classified into 
three groups: global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), domestic systemically 
important banks (D-SIBs), and other banks that are not classified by the authorities as 
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systemically important (N-SIBs). Dynamic panel data models are employed in this 
chapter to assess banking groups’ performance in relation to diversification. The 
discovered evidence suggests that in the Chinese banking industry, income 
diversification is generally nonprofitable, but the performance effects vary among G-
SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs. G-SIBs exhibit the strongest income diversification 
benefits, while the performance response of D-SIBs is non-significant. The N-SIBs, 
however, have a significant diversification discount.  
 
Generally speaking, there are three main factors that undermine the robustness and 
clarity of previous research in this field. First, many studies refer to a time period 
before 2005 (e.g. Berger et al., 2010a; Li and Zhang, 2013). However, it was not until 
2005 that the Chinese regulatory authorities launched the pilot program allowing 
cooperation among financial institutions, which increased the complexity and 
diversification of banks’ income streams. In practice, therefore, the process of income 
diversification by Chinese banks began in 2005, while the non-interest income before 
that date was mainly from the fee-based business derived from interest income. 
Moreover, as Lou (2008) points out, before 2005 non-interest income occupied only a 
very small proportion of operating income, hence the relationship between non-interest 
income and banks’ performance or risk indicators might not have been in evidence, 
but would be fully generated only from the expansion of interest income. For these 
reasons, the results of studies that take into account the period before 2005 must be 
questionable in terms of their accuracy and robustness. 
 
102 
 
Secondly, most of the existing research in this field uses the pooled OLS estimator, 
especially in the Chinese case (e.g. Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Baele et al., 2007; Gamra 
and Plihon, 2011). However, those studies have noted a potential endogeneity problem, 
that is, a possible two-way correlation where risky banks might be more likely to 
expand their diversification to an extreme level and several factors such as business 
opportunities and competition levels might affect both dependent and independent 
variables (e.g. Acharya et al., 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Baele et al., 2007). 
Therefore, the use of OLS estimation might allow the introduction of bias, so that it is 
necessary to control for the endogeneity problems in relation to the diversification 
process and its conseques. Therefore, this study adopts a dynamic model and compares 
the results to check whether outcomes differ among several performance indicators. 
To construct a dynamic model system, GMM (SYS-GMM) for example is used as the 
econometric model, as it can also solve the endogeneity problem associated with OLS. 
 
Finally, unlike the interest activities, banks’ non-interest activities are not subject to 
capital restrictions. Consequently, in an environment with tight capital restrictions, 
banks have an incentive to develop non-interest businesses that do not use banks’ 
capital. In other words, the diversification strategy is highly dependent on the capital 
restrictions. However, this factor is largely neglected by the current literature that seeks 
to estimate the relationship between Chinese banks’ performance and income 
diversification, which might mean that the results in those studies are subject to bias. 
To solve this problem, we categorize the banking industry into three groups, i.e. G-
SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs, based on the banks’ systemic importance.  
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In more detail, the Chinese banking regulatory authorities impose different capital 
restrictions on different types of banks, according to the categories of systemic 
importance. In 2012, China’s Banking Regulatory Commission published the 
Administrative Measures on the Capital of Commercial Banks (Trial), which regulates 
the minimum levels of the core tier-one capital ratio, the tier-one capital ratio and the 
capital adequacy ratio for G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs. According to this provision, 
the minimum level of core tier-one capital is set at 5%, and the capital adequacy ratio 
is set at 8%. D-SIBs are required to have an additional 1% risk-weighted assets, which 
should be satisfied by the core tier-one capital ratio. However, for G-SIBs, the 
requirement follows the Basel Committee, which stipulates a minimum 8% core tier-
one capital ratio and an 11.5% capital adequacy ratio. Investigation of the 
diversification effects that takes account of this categorization can offer a new 
perspective and full consideration of the financial environment and financial 
restriction in China. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related 
literature. Section 3.3 presents details of the data sample, variables and methodology. 
Section 3.4 reports the empirical estimation and results. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2  Related Literature  
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Diversification strategy, originally proposed by Ansoff (1957), is a fluid concept with 
no fixed definition in the literature. While for some researchers, diversification 
indicates the horizontal boundaries in terms of products, services and markets (Elsas 
et al., 2010), others refer to the methods used to achieve the goals of business growth 
and risk reduction (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). In this paper, we define diversification 
as the process of conglomeration by mixing business lines within an institution. 
Diversification can be achieved through geographic diversification, international 
diversification and income diversification (Mulwa et al., 2015). This chapter is mainly 
concerned with income diversification, which involves the behaviour whereby banks 
seek new sources and types of revenue other than traditional interest-bearing loans.  
 
Traditional theory arguing for the benefits of diversification is based on the potential 
that banks may gain benefits through the portfolio effect and economies of scope (Casu 
et al., 2016). Given that non-interest incomes are not perfectly related to revenues from 
traditional financial services, diversification can reduce variations in banks’ returns 
and profits. Banks also can benefit from economies of scope since non-interest 
activities are largely based on the branch infrastructure and electronic banking system; 
they share the initial cost of their traditional business, leading to increased economic 
scope and benefiting banks (Jagtiani et al., 1995). 
 
Diversification as a strategy may help banks gain access to market power and release 
market competition (Barney, 2002). Such competition may in turn bring about 
efficiency and innovation in the banking industry (Morgan and Samolyk, 2003; 
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Landskroner et al. 2005; Lepetit et al., 2008). For banks, a diversified business could 
help them gain competitive advantages in other financial markets and access to market 
power owing to cheap capital funding. When banks expand their businesses to non-
interest activities, they could increase their market power and competitive advantages 
since the process would offer better investment opportunities and lower financing cost 
owing to the portfolio effect and economies of scales. Diversified banks can 
concentrate funds and invest in less competitive markets to control market prices and 
prevent potential competitors from entering the industry (Palich et al., 2000).  
 
Diversified banks can also obtain rich information from their mixed business lines. 
The use of the information can help banks overcome information asymmetry when 
providing traditional lending and improve risk management (Diamond, 1984; 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Stein, 2002; Elsas, 2005; 
Drake et al., 2009 and Elsas et al., 2010). As banks gain superior informational 
resources (Massa and Rehman, 2008) and superior technological resources (Miller, 
2004) from diversification, the incorporation of such resources would increase their 
competitive advantage and capability in other financial activities.  
 
However, income diversification might also lead to the presence of too many business 
lines and to disorganized management, thus creating inefficiency in the internal capital 
market (De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2010). Moreover, in a deregulated banking system, 
especially in the case of emerging market countries, resource allocation could be 
affected by the agency problem, such that higher profitability projects could not claim 
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advantageous resources. In the long term, such inefficiency and misallocation could 
harm the interest of banks.  
 
Empirically, early research tends to be based on simulation exercises (e.g., Boyd et al. 
1993, Kwan and Laderman 1999, Lown et al. 2000 and Allen and Jagtiani 2000) or on 
the stock market to determine the effects of diversification (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1994; 
Comment and Jarrell 1995 and Baele et al., 2007). Recently, the accounting approach 
has become the main method that researchers use to identify the effects of 
diversification on performance. Relying on balance-sheet data, this approach classifies 
diversification levels by the proportion of non-interest income.  
 
Empirical evidence has been mixed. Landskroner et al. (2005) show that gains from 
diversification exist. As the scope of banking activities increases, there is a strong 
positive relation between risk-adjusted performance and asset allocation. Chiorazzo et 
al. (2008) provide positive evidence suggesting that diversification can improve the 
trade-off between risk and income for Italian banks. Köhler (2014, 2015) finds that 
banks’ earnings are more stable and profitable if they diversify into non-interest 
income. Similar results are also reported by Al-Obaidan (2008), Mergaerts and Vander 
(2016) and Nguyen et al. (2016).  
 
However, further literature indicates it is uncertain whether banks can gain a 
performance improvement from diversification. Jagtiani et al. (1995) provide 
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empirical evidence from the US banking industry showing that non-interest activities 
have little or no impact on bank costs. Boyd and Runkle (1993) show that larger and 
diversified banks employ more financial leverage and earn lower profits. DeYoung 
and Roland (2001) construct a ‘degree of total leverage’ framework and find that 
diversification has a negative impact on performance, which is echoed in Esho et al. 
(2005). Stiroh (2004) utilizes a sample of consolidated financial holding companies 
for the period from 1997 to 2004 and finds that an increase in non-interest income does 
not lead to higher equity returns. 
 
Most of the existing research in the field concerns banks in mature markets. A small 
but expanding literature has recently emerged to focus on emerging market economies. 
This body of research generally reports different outcomes than those from mature 
markets. Khanna and Yafeh (2005) suggest that diversification in emerging market 
banks leads to only a small discount or premium. Claessens et al. (2001) compare the 
listed financial groups from the US, Japan and eight East Asian countries, and they 
find that the level of diversification in East Asian countries is higher and that they 
maintain a relatively low diversification disadvantage. In their study of seven emerging 
markets, Lins and Servaes (2002) find a low value discount and further propose that 
ownership concentration is significantly positively related to the value discount. Sanya 
and Wolfe (2011) suggest that revenue diversification can also be beneficial to banks 
in developing countries. 
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The literature focusing on diversification in Chinese banks is limited because 
diversification is a fairly recent development in China. As in other markets, results 
from this limited body of literature are mixed. Studies such as Deng and Li (2006), 
Chi et al. (2006), Zhou and Wang (2008), and Lou (2008) all find some evidence that 
diversification may improve banks’ performance, but the benefits are often mitigated 
or even offset by the late development of the move toward diversification and the 
general lack of skills among bank staff. In the early sample years of these studies (1999 
– 2006), Chinese banks were actually highly specialized. It was only in 2005 that the 
Chinese regulatory authorities started to pilot a program allowing Chinese banks to 
engage in non-traditional businesses. Thus, in their sample period, non-interest income 
accounted for only a small proportion of their total income. Meanwhile, at the time, 
Chinese banks faced a situation in which the proportion of non-interest income was 
too low to offer significant benefits, while at the same time, less professional 
management and lacking experience meant that the cost of non-interest activities was 
high, which reduced net profits (Lou, 2008). 
 
3.3  Variables, Data and Methodology 
 
3.3.1  Variables  
 
All the variables in this research are used at a yearly frequency. The definitions of each 
variable are as follows: 
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1). Performance Measurements  
 
Following Berger and Bouwman (2013), we evaluate banks’ profitability by using the 
pre-tax returns on both total assets and equity:  
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡/(
(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡+𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡−1)
2
)            (3.1) 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡/(
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
2
)            (3.2) 
 
where 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 and 𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 refer to return on assets, return on equity and net 
income after tax for bank i in the period t respectively.  
 
2). Risk-Adjusted Performance Measurements 
 
Following Stiroh (2004) and Sanya and Wolfe (2011), we construct risk-adjusted 
returns on both assets and equities. They are the ratios of ROA and ROE for a given 
year to the standard deviation of ROA and ROE over the sample period: 
 
𝑅𝐴𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡/𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖              (3.3) 
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𝑅𝐴𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡/𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖              (3.4) 
 
where  𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡  and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 refer to the pre-tax return on equity and total assets for 
bank i in the period t respectively. 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖 and 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 refer to the standard deviation 
of the pre-tax return on equity and on total assets respectively. 
 
3). Income Diversification 
 
The BankScope database divides operating income into interest and non-interest 
income. Interest income is sourced from the interest on advantages and investment 
activities, while all other income is classified as non-interest income. Following Stiroh 
and Rumble (2006), this paper further divides non-interest income into three 
components: income from trading in foreign exchange and fiduciary activity; fee and 
commission income from clearing, settlement and other financial services; and other 
non-interest income.  
 
The most commonly employed measure of diversification in the literature is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). In this measure, income diversification is defined 
as the sum of the square of proportion of individual income sources over total operating 
income within a bank as follows: 
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𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 1 − ∑ (𝑥𝑖,𝑡)
2𝑛
𝑖=1                        (3.5)  
    
where n is the number of income categories groups and 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 measures the category i 
in period t.. As income can be sourced from interest and non-interest activities, the 
HHI 2can be described as:  
 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = 1- [(INT / TOR)2 +(FEE / TOR)2 + (TRA / TOR)2 + (OTH/ TOR)2]  (3.6) 
 
where INT is gross interest revenue. According to Elsas et al. (2010), the use of INT 
can avoid distortions caused by the profitability of a bank’s interest-based business. 
However, Bankscope and banks’ annual reports do not supply sufficient data on the 
total income from trading, fees and other activities. As the direct expense for such 
activities ranges from 5 to 15 percent, we follow Elsas in calculating the net income 
from such activities. Thus, in the above HHI measure, TOR describes the total 
operating revenue; COM refers to the ratio of net fee and commission income to total 
operating income; TRA is the ratio of net trading income to total operating income, 
and OTH indicates the ratio of net other operating income to total operating income. 
The HHI ranges from zero (no diversification) to 0.75 (fully diversification). TOR 
describes the total operating revenue, which is the sum of the absolute values of INT, 
FEE, TRAD and OTH.  
                           
2 For the sake of consistency, in this thesis the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is expressed in 
percentage. 
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4). Other Variables  
 
NIM: Net interest margin indicates the net interest revenue over total earning assets. 
This is intended to describe interest-based activity (Lepetit et al., 2008; Busch and 
Kick, 2009; Köhler, 2014). 
 
LTA: To assess the correlation between diversification and banks’ lending business, 
we use the loans-to-assets ratio (LTA) to measure the level of loan investment at the 
individual bank level (Stiroh, 2004; Cornett et al., 2010; Calmès and Théoret, 2014).  
 
NON: This indicates the ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets. On the one hand, 
it reflects the efficiency of banks’ cost management, where poor cost management is 
likely to cause lower bank performance. On the other hand, Busch and Kick (2009) 
maintain that higher investment can improve the monitoring of borrowers and result 
in better personnel training ability. Thus, it can reduce the potential loss and improve 
the capacity to expand non-interest activities. 
 
3.3.2  Data Sample 
 
In investigating the impact of income diversification on bank performance, we employ 
a dynamic panel data model. Yearly panel data are employed, with 40 Chinese banks. 
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All individual bank-level variables are taken from BankScope and individual banks’ 
own annual reports. The sample period runs from 2005 to 2016. Following the BIS 
definition and Chinese regulator classification, we divide the sample into three groups, 
namely, G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs, to reflect possible effects of size, managerial 
efficiency and capital restriction.  
 
The criteria for classification as systemically important banks reflect banks’ specific 
characteristics, which also have a large impact on the effects of banks’ diversification. 
First, banks classed as G-, D-, and N-SIBs are of significantly different sizes. In 2017, 
G-SIBs possessed average total assets of 3,406 billion USD, while the average assets 
of D-SIBs and N-SIBs were 808 and 128 billion USD, respectively. Therefore, there 
are huge gaps between the three groups in terms of business scale.  In larger banks 
the more extensive non-interest business shares the initial cost of traditional business, 
and non-interest activities can continue to grow as long as they generate fee income. 
Moreover, as suggested by Gurbuz et al. (2013), large-sized banks generally have 
better information technology, human capital management and risk management. 
Therefore, such business expansion could improve the overall productivity and cause 
technology spillover within the banking system (Canals, 1994; Acharya et al., 2002; 
Mercieca et al., 2007).  
 
Secondly, in the Chinese banking sector the three groups follow significantly different 
diversification strategies. For G-SIBs, the diversification process is largely influenced 
by government intervention.  Banks in this category are responsible for piloting 
114 
 
China's financial reform, and lead the industry in terms of the scale and expansion of 
non-interest activities. In contrast, because D-SIBs operate nationally, and are chiefly 
concerned with competing with G-SIBs to attract customers and deposits to their 
interest business lines, banks in this group tend to be less diversified. Meanwhile, the 
much smaller N-SIBs face capital restrictions and have weak risk-taking capability. 
Consequently, banks in this group engage in much lower levels of non-interest 
business than do G-SIBs and D-SIBs.  
 
Thirdly, the three banking categories face different levels of capital regulations.  In 
general, banks in the N-SIBs group must maintain a minimum 8% of the capital 
adequacy ratio, while for D-SIBs the minimum is 11.5% and G-SIBs are required to 
hold an additional 1% risk-weighted assets. As suggested by Danila (2013), regulatory 
restrictions could impact on banks’ traditional activities, as they change the banks’ risk 
preference and willingness to fund loans. Specifically, in order to keep deposit 
resources fully invested and allocated, banks tend to allow a larger proportion of 
higher-risk credit. Such a policy changes banks’ portfolio structure and reduces the 
quality of assets, making banks and financial systems subject to greater volatility, and 
causing instability. If managers can originate loans of one default risk efficiently, they 
will be minimum-cost originators of loans across a spectrum of default risks. This 
ability to originate loans competitively means that banks will sell the loans for which 
they possess no comparative advantage in financing. However, such restrictions offer 
non-interest activities a comparative advantage, as non-interest objectives have a low 
reserves requirement. Consequently, capital adequacy rules encourage banks to extend 
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their sources of non-interest income. Based on the theory of Flannery (1989) showed 
that compared with the traditional activities, non-interest activities are less likely to be 
affected by capital restrictions. Hence the different capital restriction requirements 
would make banks within the three categories maintain different non-interest 
expansion strategies and might lead to different results in terms of the diversification 
effects.  
 
Finally, owing to the differences in the ownership structure, the three banking 
categories, i.e. G-SIBs D-SIBs and N-SIBs, have different internal governance 
mechanisms and face varying degrees of government intervention, all of which 
contribute to creating different diversification effects. For example, all four G-SIBs 
are state-owned banks, while D-SIBs are national joint-stock banks and N-SIBs are 
city and rural commercial banks controlled by local governments.  
 
For the reasons stated above, in the following empirical chapters the main sample 
includes 40 Chinese commercial banks, occupying 79% of total assets of the Chinese 
banking industry. The banks are divided into three groups: global systemically 
important banks (G-SIBs), domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs), and other 
banks, which are deemed as systemically important (N-SIBs). Drawing from Basel III 
and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), Table 3.1 lists the banks in 
the sample. 
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Table 3.1 List of the banks in three categories  
No. Global Systemically Important Banks 
Total Assets ( 
million USD) 
Number of 
employees 
(thousand) 
1 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 4,006,242 453 
2 China Construction Bank  3,397,688 353 
3 Agricultural Bank of China  3,233,212 487 
4 Bank of China 2,989,653 311 
  Domestic Systemically Important Banks     
5 Bank of Communications  1,388,023 91 
6 Industrial Bank  985,448 62 
7 China Merchants Bank 967,141 73 
8 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 942,509 54 
9 China Minsheng Bank 906,396 58 
10 China CITIC Bank 871,935 57 
11 China Everbright Bank 627,840 44 
12 Hua Xia Bank 385,301 43 
13 Ping An Bank 199,682 14 
  Non-Systemically Important Banks     
14 Bank of Beijing 357,793 15 
15 China Guangfa Bank 318,342 37 
16 Bank of Shanghai 277,623 10 
17 China Zheshang Bank 236,002 13 
18 Bank of Nanjing 175,251 9 
19 Hengfeng Bank 173,893 11 
20 Bank of Ningbo 158,493 12 
21 Shengjing Bank 158,274 5 
22 China Bohai Bank 153,966 7 
23 Huishang Bank 139,459 10 
24 Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank 139,102 16 
25 Bank of Hangzhou 127,978 7 
26 Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank 123,174 6 
27 Chengdu Rural Commercial Bank 108,355 8 
28 Bank of Tianjin 107,794 7 
29 Bank of Harbin 86,654 7 
30 Bank of Changsha 72,262 6 
31 Bank of Guangzhou 67,595 4 
32 Bank of Zhengzhou 66,931 4 
33 Bank of Chengdu 66,733 6 
34 Bank of Chongqing 64,925 4 
35 Bank of Dalian 58,659 5 
36 Bank of Hebei 51,717 5 
37 Bank of Kunlun 48,763 5 
38 Bank of Qingdao 47,035 4 
39 Guangdong Shunde Rural Commercial bank 45,743 4 
40 Bank of Dongguan 40,126 4 
Source: Author’s creation according to China Banking Regulatory Commission 
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3.3.3  Methodology 
 
Existing studies, such as Stiroh and Rumble (2006), Baele et al. (2007), and Gamra 
and Plihon (2011), widely adopt pooled OLS estimation. Some studies find that 
income diversification would also impact on banking strategies, and that more risky 
banks are more likely to diversify (Acharya et al., 2006). In 1995, Berger and Ofek 
identified a diversification discount without controlling for endogeneity. However, 
subsequent papers, such as Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004), find that 
with consideration of the endogeneity problem they get an inverse result; that is, the 
result becomes positive with the same methodology. More importantly, studies such 
as Acharya et al. (2006), Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and Baele et al. (2007) also 
maintain that it is necessary to control for endogeneity, because diversification 
strategies are correlated with the banks’ business opportunities. Furthermore, a number 
of bank-specific characteristics, such as omitted management strategy variables 
(Gurbuz et al., 2013) and sensitivity of bank risk level to macroeconomic shocks 
(Berger et al., 2000), might lead to bias in the estimation and thus increase potential 
endogeneity concerns (Nisar et al., 2018). 
 
To address this endogeneity problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose taking the 
first difference in order to eliminate the fixed effect and using of difference GMM 
(DIF-GMM) for the model estimation. However, the proposed DIF-GMM method has 
the problem of weak instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1994), and it would exacerbate 
measurement error biases (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). Thus, when the instruments 
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are weakly correlated with the explanatory variables, the DIF-GMM estimation would 
become close to the OLS-biased estimation.  
 
Developed on the DIF-GMM method, Blundell and Bond (1998) introduce the system 
GMM (SYS-GMM) approach, which combines both level value and differentiation 
value in order to reduce potential biases. SYS-GMM adds the exogenous difference of 
lagged instrument variables to the level equation. Selection of proper instrumental 
variables can solve the endogeneity problem and allow effective estimation of the 
panel data. We follow this approach in adopting the two-step robust standard error 
estimation for the dynamic model.  
 
GMM was originally proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998). It entails no particular distribution assumptions and the random error terms are 
allowed to have heteroscedasticity and sequence correlation (Back and Brown, 1993; 
Harvey and Zhou, 1993). System GMM improves upon difference GMM, which 
suffered from weak instrument problems, by building a system of two equations - the 
original equation and the transformed one.  
 
In the first place, a normal dynamic regression model can be written as: 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑖,𝑡+𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡             (3.7) 
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In this thesis, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 refers to the profitability of bank i in the period t. 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is the lag 
term for profitability indicator. 𝜇𝑖 is fixed effect and 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is error term. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 covers 
bank’s diversification level and other control variables, including the ratios of net 
interest income to total earning assets, of loans to total assets, and of non-interest 
expenses to total expenses. Other potential impact factors, such as size, regulatory 
differences and the extent of moral hazard, as discussed above, can be evaluated over 
the three sub-groups.  
 
For equation (3.7), the usage of OLS will result in biased and inconsistent estimation 
because the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the residuals. In order to 
remove the bias, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed the 
first-difference transformation of (3.7) as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖.𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖.𝑡−1 = 𝛼(𝑦𝑖.𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑖.𝑡−2) + 𝛽
′(𝑋𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1) + (𝜖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1)        (3.8)  
 
Next, in equation (3.8), the control variables might not be strictly exogenous; rather, 
they might be related with the new error term, thus introducing potential endogeneity. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) introduced the lagged levels of the explanatory variables as 
instruments under the assumptions that the error term, 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 is not serially correlated 
and that the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. This dynamic panel 
estimator is referred to as difference GMM, where its moment conditions are: 
E[𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑙(𝜖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1)] = 0 for l ≥ 2; t = 3, … , T         (3.9) 
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E[𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑙(𝜖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1)] = 0 for l ≥ 2; t = 3, … , T         (3.10) 
 
However, as the difference GMM might suffer from the weak instruments problem, 
especially under the condition of small sample size, system GMM is used to augment 
the difference estimator by estimating simultaneously in both differences and levels, 
with the two equations being distinctly instrumented. The additional moment 
conditions for the regression in level are: 
 
E[(𝑦𝑖.𝑡−𝑙 − 𝑦𝑖.𝑡−𝑙−1)(𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)] = 0 for l = 1         (3.11) 
 
E[(𝑋𝑖.𝑡−𝑙 − 𝑋𝑖.𝑡−𝑙−1)(𝜇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)] = 0 for l = 1         (3.12) 
 
In order to test the reliability of estimation, this thesis employs two diagnostic tests 
commonly used with system GMM. First, the Arellano and Bond (1991) test is used 
to check for autocorrelation in the residuals AR (1) and AR (2). Then, as the 
effectiveness of SYS-GMM is largely dependent on whether the instrumental variables 
are exogenous, in order to avoid the over-identifying restrictions (Chiorazzo et al., 
2008), this study also uses the Sargan test (Sargan, 1958) to test the joint inspection of 
instrumental variables. Sargan statistics can be described as N−1(Z′Ê)(Z′Z)−1Z′Ê, 
which performs as a kind of Wald test, measuring the asymptotic chi-square 
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distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of 
moments and parameters.  
 
Specifically, in log form the model specification is: 
 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑜 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
                  (3.13) 
 
where empirical results of Eq. (3.13) are reported in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 for whole 
Chinese banking industry and in Table 3.6, Table 3.8, Table 3.10, Table 3.11, Table 
3.12 and Table 3.13 for three Chinese banking groups (G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs). 
Subscript i indicates the ith bank; t is the time period; PRO is profitability (ROA, ROE); 
the risk-adjusted profitability is represented by RAROA or RAROE; HHI is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the shares of three non-interest components over 
total income; NIM, LTA and NON are the control variables, namely the ratio of net 
interest income to total earning assets, the loans to total assets and the ratio of non-
interest expenses to total expenses respectively. 
 
3.4  Results 
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3.4.1  Income Diversification and Performance: Whole sample 
 
Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics for our pooled sample. Banks’ 
diversification level is measured by HHI, which ranges from 0.418 to 40.600. The 
mean value of HHI is 14.690, which is far lower than that of banks from mature 
markets (Elsas et al., 2010) and other emerging markets (Sanya and Wolfe, 2011). This 
result indicates that the level of diversification in Chinese banks overall is low and that 
they have a high concentration of interest earning activities. In addition, bank 
performance widely varies within the Chinese banking sector. The alternative 
measures of bank performance, i.e., ROA, ROE, RAROA and RAROE, have a mean 
value of 0.983, 17.430, 4.196 and 4.228, respectively.  
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics for Chinese banks from 2005 to 2016 
Variable definition: HHI: income diversification using Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with the 
components of interest income and three activities under non-interest income; ROA: return on assets; 
ROE: return on equities; RAROA: risk-adjusted return on assets; RAROE: risk-adjusted return on 
equity; NIM: total interest income/total interest expenses; LTA: loans/total assets; NON: non-interest 
expenses/total assets.                  
  Mean Median SD Min Max Kurtosis Skewness 
HHI 14.690 13.470 7.751 0.418 40.600 3.119 0.677 
ROA 0.983 1.050 0.332 -0.201 2.227 3.926 -0.679 
ROE 17.430 17.50 6.890 -27.92 41.780 11.780 -1.416 
ROROA 4.196 4.023 2.095 -0.509 9.922 2.733 0.376 
RAROE 4.228 4.012 2.415 -2.088 14.23 4.367 0.785 
NIM 2.769 2.775 0.582 0.701 4.544 3.627 -0.321 
LTA 45.950 47.170 9.389 14.380 69.770 3.105 -0.368 
NON 0.892 0.909 0.254 0.0330 2.173 4.713 0.187 
Table 3.3 reports the results from estimating the dynamic panel models.  
123 
 
Table 3.3 Income diversification and profitability for Chinese banks, 2005 to 2016 
This table reports the two-step SYS-GMM dynamic panel estimation results. Our dependent variables 
are return on assets (ROA), return on equities (ROE), risk-adjusted return on assets (RAROA), and 
risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE). HHI indicates income diversification by using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with the components of interest income and three activities under non-
interest income. NIM indicates total interest income/total interest expenses. LTA is loans/total assets, 
and NON is the non-interest expenses/total assets. The Sargan test checks the null hypothesis, i.e., 
that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. AR (2) denotes the Arellano-Bond test 
for the 2nd-order autocorrelation in first differences. Figures in brackets present the standard error. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
  ROA ROE RAROA RAROE 
It-1 0.437*** 0.529*** 0.577*** 0.808*** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.042) 
HHI -0.002** -0.102*** -0.047*** -0.019* 
  (0.001) (0.016) (0.003) (0.008) 
NIM 0.145*** 0.069 0.336*** 0.083 
  (0.004) (0.227) (0.080) (0.047) 
LTA -0.002*** -0.067* -0.006 -0.007 
  (0.001) (0.027) (0.006) (0.008) 
NON 0.120*** 4.356*** 0.587** 0.340 
  (0.011) (0.777) (0.201) (0.196) 
Constant 0.122* 8.625*** 0.253 1.321* 
  (2.190) (7.190) (1.410) (2.250) 
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test 1.000 1.000 0.512 0.999 
AR(2) 0.133 0.159 0.900 0.119 
Observations 419 415 419 415 
 
Accoridng to Table 3.3, first, evidence from the two-step SYS-GMM regression shows 
that lagged income diversification (HHI) is positively correlated with present bank 
performance. This result indicates an accelerator effect from diversification, where 
past performance has a positive effect on future performance. Next, we find that 
diversification is negatively associated with profitability (ROA, ROE), indicating a 
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performance decrease from income diversification. To examine the robustness of the 
result, we also investigate the likely impact on the risk-adjusted performance indicators 
of both RAROA and RAROE. Overall, for the whole sample, the results show negative 
effects of diversification on banks’ both performance and risk-adjusted performance. 
 
In general, our study echoes the work of Lepetit et al. (2008) and Mercieca et al. (2007), 
who use mature market data. According to Köhler (2015), the performance discount 
in mature banking markets mainly originates from over-diversification. However, 
income diversification in the Chinese banking sector overall is quite low. As suggested 
by Wagner (2010), a non-linear relationship exists between banks’ diversification and 
performance; at both the lower and the higher levels of diversification, banks are 
unable to optimize their performance. Hence, it is plausible that the performance 
decrease for Chinese banks is driven by under-diversification, where non-interest 
activities incur high initial costs in the early stages of diversification. Given the 
average low level of income diversification in the Chinese banking sector, banks 
require several years to absorb these initial costs; hence, we see an overall 
diversification discount in this market.  
 
In addition, at the stage of low diversification, few managers have appropriate skills 
to engage in non-interest business. Because non-interest activities have a higher level 
of relevance among different products than traditional activities, reliance on unskilled 
staff leads to losses and to a significant reduction in profitability. On the other hand, 
this implies high initial costs of training specialized workers, which would cause a 
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significant reduction in profitability. Owing to the high level of fixed expenses of non-
interest activities, the costs of non-interest income significantly increase and thus net 
profits become negative, thus causing a reduction in diversification benefits. It is also 
plausible that the Chinese banking sector is under-regulated. Managers in banks with 
abundant cash flows would invest in low profit projects, which would increase the 
moral hazard problem and thus lead to an increase in capital costs (Easley and O’hara, 
2004) and inefficient resource allocation (Fisher et al., 2002). Consequently, the value 
decrease from diversification would be accelerated.  
 
The table also reports several diagnostic test results. The results presented in the last 
four rows of Table 3.3 show that the F-statistics for all models with four performance 
indicators are significant. To check for autocorrelation, we use the Arellano-Bond test 
for autocorrelation serial correlation (AR2). Second-order autocorrelation is 
statistically nonsignificant. We employ the Sargan test to examine whether our models 
include effective instruments, and all P-values of the Sargan tests are above the 10% 
significance level, which indicates that the instruments satisfy the orthogonality 
conditions required for their employment.  
 
It is conceivable that individual components of non-interest business may perform 
differently than the overall non-interest activities. To find further evidence for 
diversification effects across different components of non-interest income, we divide 
the non-interest income into three categories, namely, fee and commissions, trading, 
and other income, and the results are reported in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4 Results for three components of non-interest income and bank performance for Chinese banks, 2005 to 2016 
This table reports the two-step SYS-GMM dynamic panel estimation results with robust errors. Our dependent variables are return on assets (ROA), return on equities (ROE), risk-
adjusted return on assets (RAROA), and risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE). It-1 refers to the lagged dependent variables by one period. COM is the ratio of net fee and 
commission incomes to total operating income; TRA is the ratio of net trading income to total operating income; OTH is the ratio of net other operating income to total operating 
income. NIM indicates total interest income/total interest expenses. LTA is loans/total assets, and NON is the non-interest expenses/total assets. The Sargan test checks the null 
hypothesis, i.e., that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. AR (2) denotes the Arellano-Bond test for the 2nd-order autocorrelation in first differences. Figures 
in brackets present the standard error. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 ROA ROE RAROA RAROE ROA ROE RAROA RAROE ROA ROE RAROA RAROE 
It-1 0.498*** 0.523*** 0.578*** 0.823*** 0.461*** 0.390*** 0.824*** 0.705*** 0.346*** 0.382*** 0.618*** 1.136*** 
 (0.028) (0.023) (0.019) (0.037) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.028) (0.040) (0.028) 
COM -0.005*** -0.180*** -0.074*** -0.037***         
 (0.001) (0.039) (0.009) (0.009)         
TRAD     0.006** 0.105*** 0.021** 0.024***     
     (0.002) (0.027) (0.007) (0.003)     
OTH         -0.099*** -0.965*** -0.092* -0.132*** 
         (0.008) (0.278) (0.042) (0.023) 
NIM 0.131*** 0.068 0.386*** 0.072 0.173*** 0.200 0.128*** -0.070* 0.160*** 0.104 0.751*** -0.940*** 
 (0.007) (0.182) (0.095) (0.070) (0.010) (0.207) (0.038) (0.030) (0.009) (0.262) (0.086) (0.224) 
LTA -0.001 -0.057** -0.004 -0.005 -0.002* -0.271*** 0.006 -0.022*** -0.007*** -0.061*** -0.002 0.016 
 (0.001) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.024) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) 
NON 0.105*** 4.373*** 0.540* 0.370 0.121*** 13.525*** 1.349*** 1.887*** 0.265*** 7.859*** 0.754* 2.174*** 
 (0.010) (0.615) (0.239) (0.212) (0.018) (0.732) (0.052) (0.146) (0.038) (0.559) (0.293) (0.531) 
Constant 0.138*** 8.226*** 0.994* 0.669 0.047 10.807*** -0.935*** 0.748*** 0.427*** 7.680*** -0.915** -0.528 
 (0.033) (1.185) (0.440) (0.406) (0.033) (1.015) (0.136) (0.199) (0.047) (0.721) (0.338) (0.430) 
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test 1.000 1.000 0.394 1.000 0.982 0.740 0.182 0.676 0.780 0.902 0.254 1.000 
AR(2) 0.201 0.158 0.957 0.111 0.250 0.253 0.191 0.123 0.143 0.159 0.744 0.144 
Observations 419 415 419 415 410 406 410 406 417 413 417 413 
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As can be seen from the table, the results show that sub-businesses under non-interest 
activities exert different effects on banks’ performance level. Fee and commissions 
and other activities show a negative effect among our four performance indicators, 
while trading activities have positive coefficients. This indicates that the 
diversification discount for the Chinese banking sector is generated mainly from 
commissions and other non-interest activities, while trading activities would lead to 
improvements in profitability.  
 
3.4.2  Income Diversification and Performance across Chinese 
Banking Groups 
 
China’s Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) 
 
Having examined the performance of the Chinese banking sector for the whole sample, 
we next examine sub-samples of Chinese banks, categorized according to their 
systemic importance. Table 3.5 below presents summary statistics for the group of 
China’s global systemically important banks. From the table, the mean of the HHI for 
G-SIBs is 23.560, which is significantly higher than that for the whole sample (14.690). 
The minimum value of the HHI as a measure for the level of diversification is 11.650, 
while the maximum is 40.190. Meanwhile, four performance measurements – ROA, 
ROE, RAROA and RAROE – have a mean value of 1.104, 15.100, 5.705 and 4.532, 
128 
 
respectively. The mean of ratio of non-interest income to total assets (NIM) is 2.804%, 
with a range from 1.049% to 3.626%. The mean loan to assets (LTA) is 50.610%, with 
a minimum of 42.980% and a maximum value of 58.960%. The mean non-interest 
expenses over total assets (NON) is 1.002%, with a minimum of 0.628% and a 
maximum value of 1.396%. There is no significant skewness in the sample. The values 
of skewness are within the acceptable and expected ranges, indicating that there is no 
evidence of the data being skewed toward either extreme.  
 
Table 3.5 Descriptive statistics for Chinese G-SIBs, 2005-2016 
Variable definition: HHI (%): income diversification using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index with 
the components of interest income and three activities under non-interest income; ROA: return on 
assets; ROE: return on equities; RAROA: risk-adjusted return on assets; RAROE: risk-adjusted 
return on equity; NIM (%): total interest income/total interest expenses. LTA (%): loans/total 
assets, NON (%): non-interest expenses/total assets.                       
  Mean Median SD Min Max Kurtosis Skewness 
HHI 23.560 23.570 5.696 11.650 40.190 3.428 0.138 
ROA 1.104 1.168 0.301 0.024 1.475 6.836 -1.705 
ROE 15.100 17.960 10.660 -27.920 23.430 11.010 -2.891 
ROROA 5.705 5.595 2.634 0.063 9.157 1.899 -0.328 
RAROE 4.532 6.326 3.736 -2.088 9.422 1.364 -0.062 
NIM 2.804 2.845 0.504 1.049 3.626 4.983 -1.032 
LTA 50.610 51.090 3.872 42.980 58.96 2.251 0.072 
NON 1.002 0.999 0.168 0.628 1.396 2.978 -0.089 
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Next, Table 3.6 reports the results from estimating the association between the income 
diversification of G-SIBs and their performance during the period 2005-20163. The 
results indicate that diversification is an important determinant of banks’ performance. 
From the SYS-GMM estimations, the coefficients of the HHI are significantly and 
positively associated with all the four performance indicators. The evidence thus 
shows that diversification has a positive impact on the largest banks in China, i.e., 
Chinese G-SIBs. This result indicates that Chinese G-SIBs can benefit from 
diversifying into non-traditional businesses. Consequently, the higher reliance on non-
interest income could make G-SIBs more profitable.  
 
The positive results of the performance effect of diversification are significant in that 
these G-SIBs are of critical importance to the Chinese banking system. The aggregate 
assets of these G-SIBs account for 49% of the total assets of all Chinese banks, and 
hence, they are the key player in the construct of China's banking industry. Their 
success bolsters the stability of the Chinese banking system and also gives a great 
boost to other banks shifting to non-traditional business.   
 
 
                           
3
 As the small sample size might result in an incidental parameters problem, this thesis also 
applies a robustness test by using dummy variables to the catalogue of the three sub-groups. The 
robustness test results are reported in the Appendix. 
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Table 3.6 Income diversification and profitability for Chinese G-SIBs, 2005 to 
2016 
Our dependent variables are return on assets (ROA), return on equities (ROE), risk-adjusted return 
on assets (RAROA), and risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE). HHI is income diversification by 
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with the components of interest income and three activities 
under non-interest income. NIM is total interest income/total interest expenses. LTA is loans/total 
assets, and NON is the non-interest expenses/total assets. The Sargan test checks the null hypothesis, 
i.e., that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. AR (2) denotes the Arellano-Bond 
test for the 2nd-order autocorrelation in first differences. Figures in brackets present the standard 
error. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  ROA ROE RAROA RAROE 
It-1 0.764*** 0.347 0.980*** 0.969*** 
  (0.075) (0.211) (0.071) (0.042) 
HHI 0.013*** 0.539*** 0.082* 0.021* 
  (0.003) (0.105) (0.041) (0.010) 
NIM 0.0583 5.716*** -0.0686 -0.491** 
  (0.031) (1.646) (0.175) (0.162) 
LTA -0.010 -0.441** -0.093 -0.093* 
  (0.009) (0.160) (0.053) (0.041) 
NON 0.221*** 0.221 1.758** 1.548* 
  (0.054) (1.622) (0.541) (0.717) 
Constant 0.102 3.975 1.473 4.287* 
  (0.270) (0.420) (0.450) (1.980) 
F-test 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test 1.000 1.000 0.998 1.000 
AR(2) 0.102 0.260 0.107 0.132 
Observations 44 42 43 42 
 
The main source of their success seems to lie in the fact that these big banks are well 
positioned to exploit the economy of scope resulting from the diversification. As 
suggested by Gurbuz et al. (2013), large-sized banks generally have better information 
technology, human capital management and risk management. Therefore, such 
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business expansion could improve the overall productivity and cause technology 
spillover within the banking system (Canals, 1994; Acharya et al., 2006; Mercieca et 
al., 2007). In addition, for these established banks, the initial cost incurred from 
shifting to non-interest business, including building, IT facilities, business reputation 
and advertisement, can also be largely shared with the traditional business.  
 
The learning-by-doing effect may also have worked for Chinese G-SIBs. 
Understandably, the initial stages of bank diversification would incur sizable operating 
losses owing to, say, unexperienced personnel who are unfamiliar with new business 
lines. However, with expansion of the diversification, such a disadvantage would be 
offset by the accumulation of more experienced staff or by the learning-by-doing effect 
(Gamra and Plihon, 2011). With this effect, banking institutions can achieve 
performance improvement through practice, self-perfection and minor innovations. 
Consequently, they can progress to reap diversification benefits as long as they have 
taken care of diversifying according to their specific characteristics, competences and 
risk levels. It is reasonable to infer that this process may have also occurred with 
Chinese G-SIBs.  
 
The regulatory difference is another key factor in Chinese G-SIBs’ performance gain 
from diversification. China’s Banking Regulatory Commission has implemented 
different levels of financial restrictions on the three groups, where the lower boundary 
of the core tier-one capital requirement is higher for G-SIBs than for the other two, at 
8%, while the lower boundary for the capital adequacy ratio is 11.5%. Such tight 
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restrictions are an important factor that explains why G-SIBs seek higher levels of 
diversification. Non-interest activities have the comparative advantage of high reserve 
requirements. Consequently, the capital adequacy rules act as an incentive for banks 
to extend their business to earn non-interest income. Further, the stricter capital 
restriction of banks’ activities would also increase banks’ effectiveness (Agoraki et al., 
2011) and change banks’ risk preference (Flannery, 1989). Consequently, a more risk-
averse, effective resources-allocation strategy and strict cost management could have 
led to income diversification benefits in Chinese G-SIBs.  
 
The results of diagnostic tests are reported in the lower panel of Table 3.6. All test 
results are satisfactory across all model specifications. The P-values of the F tests for 
the four models are close to zero, indicating the joint significance of our regressors. 
Regarding the efficiency of the GMM estimation, the results of the Sargan test are 
nonsignificant; hence, our instruments are appropriately orthogonal to the error. In 
addition, the coefficient of the AR (2) tests for the second-order serial correlation are 
nonsignificant at the 1% significance level.  
 
China’s Domestic Systemically Important Banks 
 
We now move to examine the performance effect of diversification for China’s 
domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs). Table 3.7 presents the summary 
statistics. Compared with G-SIBs, this group has a considerably lower level of 
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diversification: the mean value of the HHI for D-SIBs is 17.230, while the 
corresponding figure for G-SIBs is 23.560. Regarding the four performance indicators, 
there is no significant difference between D-SIBs and G-SIBs. The mean value of ROA, 
ROE, RAROA and RAROE is 0.952, 19.020, 4.208 and 4.976, respectively. Moreover, 
the mean non-interest expenses over total assets (NON) are lower than those for G-
SIBs, implying that the input for non-interest activities by G-SIBs, such as professional 
training and initial investment, is relatively lower than that of G-SIBs.  
 
Table 3.7 Descriptive statistics for Chinese D-SIBs, 2005 to 2016 
Variable definitions: HHI (%): income diversification using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index with 
the components of interest income and three activities under non-interest income; ROA: return on 
assets; ROE: return on equities; RAROA: risk-adjusted return on assets; RAROE: risk-adjusted 
return on equity; NIM (%): total interest income/total interest expenses. LTA (%): loans/total assets, 
NON (%): non-interest expenses/total assets.                        
  Mean Median SD Min Max Kurtosis Skewness 
HHI 17.230 15.610 7.977 4.789 40.600 2.685 0.555 
ROA 0.952 0.999 0.280 0.133 1.460 3.128 -0.673 
ROE 19.020 18.380 5.245 4.176 41.130 6.018 0.837 
ROROA 4.208 4.263 1.602 0.431 7.925 2.732 0.107 
RAROE 4.976 5.171 1.707 0.586 8.038 2.424 -0.285 
NIM 2.764 2.797 0.387 1.733 3.847 3.192 -0.336 
LTA 51.950 51.690 6.958 33.580 67.360 3.225 -0.091 
NON 0.951 0.959 0.194 0.502 1.439 2.860 -0.168 
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To ensure the robustness, we estimate two different kinds of models, one for 
profitability (ROA, ROE) and the other for risk-adjusted performance (RAROA, 
RAROE), using the two-step SYS-GMM estimator with robust standard errors 
procedures. The results for D-SIBs are displayed in Table 3.8. Similar to the case of 
G-SIBs, the HHI index of D-SIBs is positively correlated with both sets of 
performance indicators. D-SIBs can gain a performance improvement from income 
diversification. However, compared with those for G-SIBs, the coefficients for D-SIBs 
are relatively small, and all are nonsignificant. The results may be explained by the 
fact that banks in this group have a smaller size than the G-SIBs, and hence, the 
improvement from economy of scope might not be sufficiently large to offset the 
performance. For these relatively small banks, the high initial diversification cost and 
staff’s lack of experience might lead to them showing no significant performance gains 
from diversification.  
 
We also report the diagnostic test results. The F-test yields a significant P-value at the 
5% level, indicating that variables in the models are not jointly nonsignificant. 
Regarding the efficiency of GMM estimation, as all coefficients of the AR (2) and the 
Sargan tests are nonsignificant, we can conclude that the instruments used are not 
correlated with the residuals, and there is no problem of autocorrelation. Thus, the 
models are reasonable and statistically acceptable. 
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Table 3.8 Income diversification and profitability for Chinese D-SIBs, 2005 to 
2016 
Our dependent variables are return on assets (ROA), return on equities (ROE), risk-adjusted return 
on assets (RAROA), and risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE). HHI is income diversification by 
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with the components of interest income and three activities 
under non-interest income. NIM is total interest income/total interest expenses. LTA is loans/total 
assets, and NON is the non-interest expenses/total assets. The Sargan test checks the null hypothesis, 
i.e., that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. AR (2) denotes the Arellano-Bond 
test for the 2nd-order autocorrelation in first differences. Figures in brackets present the standard 
error. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  ROA ROE RAROA RAROE 
It-1 0.523*** 0.999 0.646*** 0.743*** 
  (0.056) (1.225) (0.088) (0.082) 
HHI 0.001 0.002 0.039 0.065 
  (0.002) (0.677) (0.033) (0.046) 
NIM 0.249* -1.548 0.110 -1.008 
  (0.090) (8.686) (0.532) (0.781) 
LTA -0.003 0.266 0.089 0.150* 
  (0.002) (1.017) (0.050) (0.074) 
NON 0.003 2.075 2.112 3.636 
  (0.115) (18.300) (1.245) (1.870) 
Constant -0.083 -11.560 -5.894 -8.214 
  (-0.320) (-0.160) (-1.520) (-1.460) 
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test 0.495 1.000 0.992 0.327 
AR(2) 0.573 0.434 0.568 0.172 
Observations 99 97 97 97 
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 Other Chinese Banks (N-SIBs) 
 
Table 3.9 reports the summary statistics for other Chinese banks (N-SIBs). Compared 
with banks in the G-SIBs and D-SIBs groups, N-SIBs have the lowest mean of 
diversification, at 12.390, which is much lower than that of the G-SIBs (23.560). 
Interestingly, compared with G-SIBs and D-SIBs, N-SIBs have a similar level of mean 
profitability (ROA, ROE). However, concerning risk-adjusted performance, both 
RAROA and RAROE variables are significantly lower for N-SIBs than for the other 
two groups. This result implies that Chinese N-SIBs have poor risk management. In 
addition to banks’ income diversification, we control for several other characteristics 
that might affect bank performance. The mean net interest margin (NIM) is 2.765%, 
with a minimum of 0.701% and a maximum value of 4.544%. The mean loan to assets 
(LTA) is 43.090%, with a minimum of 14.380% and a maximum value of 69.770%. 
Meanwhile, N-SIBs have the lowest ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets 
(NON), at 0.854% compared with 1.002% for G-SIBs and 0.951% for D-SIBs. This 
result indicates that staff training costs and potential losses from non-professional 
operation are lower for N-SIBs, leading to a higher probability of operational loss.   
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Table 3.9 Descriptive statistics for Chinese N-SIBs, 2005 to 2016 
Variable definitions: HHI (%): income diversification using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index with 
the components of interest income and three activities under non-interest income; ROA: return on 
assets; ROE: return on equities; RAROA: risk-adjusted return on assets; RAROE: risk-adjusted 
return on equity; and NIM (%): total interest income/total interest expenses. LTA (%): loans/total 
assets, NON (%): non-interest expenses/total assets. 
  Mean Median SD Min Max Kurtosis Skewness 
HHI 12.390 11.940 6.591 0.418 37.760 4.416 0.926 
ROA 0.975 1.040 0.350 -0.201 2.227 3.833 -0.587 
ROE 17.240 17.03 6.550 -15.700 41.780 6.105 -0.399 
ROROA 3.955 3.843 2.060 -0.509 9.922 2.863 0.418 
RAROE 3.921 3.639 2.312 -1.452 14.230 6.783 1.475 
NIM 2.765 2.752 0.649 0.701 4.544 3.158 -0.247 
LTA 43.090 42.960 9.468 14.38 69.770 2.991 -0.107 
NON 0.854 0.867 0.275 0.033 2.173 4.966 0.471 
 
Then, in Table 3.10, we report the regression results for the effect of diversification on 
four bank performance variables when adopting the two-step SYS-GMM dynamic 
panel model. We can see that for N-SIBs, shifting from traditional banking towards 
non-interest activities significantly reduces their performance in terms of both 
profitability and risk-adjusted profitability, which means that for banks with low levels, 
diversification into non-traditional income will adversely affect their returns and risk.  
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Table 3.10 Income diversification and profitability for Chinese N-SIBs, 2005 to 
2016 
Our dependent variables are return on assets (ROA), return on equities (ROE), risk-adjusted return 
on assets (RAROA), and risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE). HHI is income diversification by 
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with the components of interest income and three activities 
under non-interest income. NIM indicates total interest income/total interest expenses. LTA is 
loans/total assets, and NON is the non-interest expenses/total assets. The Sargan test checks the null 
hypothesis, i.e., that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. AR (2) denotes the 
Arellano-Bond test for the 2nd-order autocorrelation in first differences. Figures in brackets present 
the standard error. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  ROA ROE RAROA RAROE 
It-1 0.465*** 0.612*** 0.657*** 0.939*** 
  (0.032) (0.048) (0.085) (0.025) 
HHI -0.003*** -0.131*** -0.022*** -0.037*** 
  (0.001) (0.027) (0.007) (0.010) 
NIM 0.141*** 0.0363 -0.131 -0.0981 
  (0.023) (0.301) (0.110) (0.082) 
LTA -0.002 -0.088** -0.025 -0.006 
  (0.002) (0.032) (0.014) (0.007) 
NON 0.063 3.745** 1.786** 0.528* 
  (0.042) (1.285) (0.561) (0.247) 
Constant 0.366*** 11.510*** 1.148 0.476 
  (5.310) (6.940) (1.740) (0.800) 
F-test 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Sargan test 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 
AR(2) 0.161 0.567 0.838 0.813 
Observations 276 276 276 276 
For Chinese N-SIBs, non-interest income has consistently accounted for only a small 
proportion of their total operational income. Positive impacts of diversification into 
non-interest activities on their profitability, if any, could hardly be sizable. Rather, 
owing to the necessary expenses, the cost of non-interest income could be higher than 
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the possible gains, turning net performance into negative. Moreover, with a low level 
of diversification, these banks could hardly benefit from the learning-by-doing effect; 
instead, they lack a sufficient number of experienced workers to improve the 
rationality of operating decisions, which negatively affects their performance.  
 
These N-SIBs also suffer from financial deregulation. Compared with G-SIBs and D-
SIBs, N-SIBs operate under lower financial restrictions. Consequently, managers have 
less incentive to seek better business opportunities through financial innovation, which 
would in turn diminish banks’ performance owing to problems such as moral hazard. 
Agoraki et al. (2011) maintain that a more relaxed capital restriction would reduce 
banks’ effectiveness. Consequently, an ineffective and less risk-averse resource 
allocation strategy and cost management under financial deregulation could lead to an 
income diversification discount.  
 
Size also matters here. The majority of Chinese N-SIBs are small-sized banks. 
Furthermore, they invest far fewer resources in new business lines. As shown in Table 
3.8, the ratios of NON are rather diverse among G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs. While 
the average NON for the Chinese banking sector as a whole is 0.892, G-SIBs have the 
highest mean value (1.002), followed by D-SIBs (0.951) and N-SIBs scores (with only 
0.854). Thus, N-SIBs invest fewer resources into non-interest activities. As they lack 
efficient resources for shifting to new financial products and the relevant experience 
needed to manage the new product mix, it is difficult for these small banks to exploit 
economies of scope since they have limited technical capacity and since they cannot 
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provide a lower marginal cost for their financial product in order to offset the increase 
in fixed costs or inefficient risk controls (Mercieca et al., 2007).  
 
The last three rows in Table 3.10 present the diagnostic test results for the models. All 
models pass the F tests, and their construction is acceptable, with all variables not 
jointly nonsignificant. The results for both the AR (2) and Sargan tests are 
nonsignificant for all models, suggesting that we can conclude that the instruments 
used in the GMM models are reasonable and statistically acceptable. 
 
3.4.3  Effects of Diversification on Performance by Components of 
Non-interest Activities 
 
Following the arrangement of the previous section, we have also subdivided the non-
interest income into three categories, and then studied whether the three types of 
diversification have different effects on different bank groups. The results presented 
in Table 3.11 indicate that the fee-based activities have different effects for G-SIBs 
than for the banking sector as a whole; that is, there is a significant and positive effect 
on the performance of G-SIBs, rather than a diversification discount. Turning to 
trading activities, we suggest that this business line will also improve bank 
performance among G-SIBs. The only negative effect for banks in this group is 
generated from other activities, which can be explained by the high leverage nature of 
those activities, and by a lack of skilled workers.
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Table 3.11 Results for three components of non-interest income and bank performance for G-SIBs, 2005 to 2016 
This table reports the two-step SYS-GMM dynamic panel estimation results with robust errors. Our dependent variables are return on assets (ROA), return on equities (ROE), risk-
adjusted return on assets (RAROA), and risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE). It-1 refers to the lagged dependent variables by one period. COM is the ratio of net fee and 
commission incomes to total operating income; TRA is the ratio of net trading income to total operating income; OTH is the ratio of net other operating income to total operating 
income. NIM indicates total interest income/total interest expenses. LTA is loans/total assets, and NON is the non-interest expenses/total assets. The Sargan test checks the null 
hypothesis, i.e., that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. AR (2) denotes the Arellano-Bond test for the 2nd-order autocorrelation in first differences. Figures 
in brackets present the standard error. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 ROA ROE RAROA RAROE ROA ROE RAROA RAROE ROA ROE RAROA RAROE 
It-1 0.670*** 0.527*** 1.088*** 0.954*** 1.538*** 0.400 0.990*** 0.951*** 1.167*** 0.826*** 1.064*** 1.004*** 
 (0.050) (0.150) (0.019) (0.018) (0.131) (0.204) (0.109) (0.095) (0.039) (0.135) (0.041) (0.044) 
COM 0.020** 0.804*** 0.197** 0.144**         
 (0.006) (0.097) (0.072) (0.049)         
TRAD     0.036* 1.896 0.259 0.462*     
     (0.018) (2.296) (0.151) (0.216)     
OTH         -0.023** -0.756*** -0.073** -0.195*** 
         (0.007) (0.081) (0.027) (0.048) 
NIM 0.031 0.058 -0.778* -0.709*** -0.312** 6.267 1.303** 0.195 -0.247** -3.971*** -0.707*** -0.975*** 
 (0.021) (1.130) (0.355) (0.091) (0.120) (4.616) (0.443) (1.205) (0.089) (1.001) (0.151) (0.245) 
LTA -0.002 -0.353* -0.154*** -0.132*** -0.032*** -0.053 -0.166* -0.074 -0.012** -0.158 -0.096** -0.035 
 (0.007) (0.148) (0.026) (0.029) (0.004) (0.278) (0.081) (0.115) (0.004) (0.156) (0.030) (0.056) 
NON 0.288*** 7.786*** 2.623*** 2.013*** 0.647** -3.855 -2.751** 0.432 0.614*** 10.016*** 1.892*** 1.874 
 (0.053) (0.708) (0.752) (0.454) (0.234) (8.401) (0.919) (3.229) (0.183) (1.517) (0.457) (1.161) 
Constant -0.112 9.103 4.803** 5.294*** 1.250*** -3.068 7.255* 2.536 0.615*** 14.258 4.913** -0.195*** 
 (0.402) (9.448) (1.771) (0.626) (0.244) (18.252) (3.313) (5.211) (0.167) (8.949) (1.784) (0.048) 
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.087 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test 0.999 1.000 0.999 0.998 1.000 1.000 0.996 0.996 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.779 
AR(2) 0.116 0.317 0.154 0.243 0.125 0.158 0.111 0.258 0.162 1.000 0.102 0.249 
Observations 44 42 44 42 43 41 43 41 44 42 44 42 
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The results in Table 3.12 and Table 3.13 presents the effects of components of non-
interest activities on bank performance for D- and N-SIBs.   
 
Table 3.12 shows that different types of non-interest business also have different 
impacts on the performance level of D-SIB banks. Specifically, fee and commission 
activities have a negative impact on bank performance. The results for transactions and 
other sub-activities show similar signs and directions to those for G-SIBs. However, 
as the level of income diversification is quite low relative to the level of fee collection 
activities, the expansion of such business has had a negative impact on bank 
performance.  
 
As can be seen from the table, among the three components of non-interest income, 
the proportion of commissions and other non-interest activities is relatively large, 
resulting in a decline in the performance of small banks, while various types of banks 
benefit from further participation in trading activities when their performance 
improves. This finding is consistent with the previous results for medium-sized D-
SIBs. 
 
143 
 
Table 3.12 Results for three components of non-interest income and bank performance for D-SIBs, 2005 to 2016 
This table reports the two-step SYS-GMM dynamic panel estimation results with robust errors. Our dependent variables are return on assets (ROA), return on equities (ROE), risk-
adjusted return on assets (RAROA), and risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE). It-1 refers to the lagged dependent variables by one period. COM is the ratio of net fee and 
commission incomes to total operating income; TRA is the ratio of net trading income to total operating income; OTH is the ratio of net other operating income to total operating 
income. NIM indicates total interest income/total interest expenses. LTA is loans/total assets, and NON is the non-interest expenses/total assets. The Sargan test checks the null 
hypothesis, i.e., that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. AR (2) denotes the Arellano-Bond test for the 2nd-order autocorrelation in first differences. Figures 
in brackets present the standard error. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 ROA ROE RAROA RAROE ROA ROE RAROA RAROE ROA ROE RAROA RAROE 
It-1 0.810*** 0.330* 0.917*** 0.672*** 0.163 0.079 0.590*** 0.527*** 0.790*** 0.218 0.897*** 0.543*** 
 (0.063) (0.152) (0.039) (0.062) (0.448) (0.108) (0.083) (0.069) (0.048) (0.198) (0.051) (0.069) 
COM -0.011*** -0.225* -0.055*** -0.063*         
 (0.001) (0.114) (0.008) (0.027)         
TRAD     0.053* 1.644 0.304** 0.431*     
     (0.022) (0.887) (0.114) (0.191)     
OTH         -0.058** -2.157** -0.325*** -0.952* 
         (0.018) (0.744) (0.098) (0.414) 
NIM 0.068*** 2.599 0.462*** -0.024 0.426*** 2.106 -0.372 -0.271 0.064 1.928 0.149 -2.418** 
 (0.020) (1.501) (0.116) (0.473) (0.119) (2.123) (0.342) (0.489) (0.064) (1.892) (0.234) (0.915) 
LTA 0.002 -0.066 0.015* 0.023 0.006* 0.202*** 0.057* 0.117** 0.007* 0.074 0.043* 0.033 
 (0.002) (0.064) (0.007) (0.026) (0.003) (0.055) (0.028) (0.040) (0.003) (0.078) (0.019) (0.035) 
NON 0.075* 2.162 -0.061 0.801 -0.285 10.621** 2.562*** 2.819** 0.193 7.107* 0.866 5.398** 
 (0.034) (2.393) (0.185) (0.968) (0.157) (3.651) (0.529) (0.916) (0.101) (3.588) (0.444) (1.870) 
Constant -0.034 8.693 -1.042* 0.271 -0.401 -9.999* -2.676 -6.016* -0.414* 0.553 -2.601** 2.934 
 (0.102) (6.272) (0.468) (1.734) (0.436) (4.011) (1.491) (2.457) (0.188) (7.283) (0.964) (2.284) 
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test 1.000 0.334 1.000 0.923 0.939 0.656 0.861 0.967 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.978 
AR(2) 0.849 0.110 0.271 0.134 0.772 0.488 0.487 0.140 0.932 0.181 0.351 0.151 
Observations 99 97 99 97 97 95 95 95 99 97 99 93 
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Table 3.13 Results for three components of non-interest income and bank performance for N-SIBs, 2005 to 2016 
This table reports the two-step SYS-GMM dynamic panel estimation results with robust errors. Our dependent variables are return on assets (ROA), return on equities (ROE), risk-
adjusted return on assets (RAROA), and risk-adjusted return on equity (RAROE). It-1 refers to the lagged dependent variables by one period. COM is the ratio of net fee and 
commission incomes to total operating income; TRA is the ratio of net trading income to total operating income; OTH is the ratio of net other operating income to total operating 
income. NIM indicates total interest income/total interest expenses. LTA is loans/total assets, and NON is the non-interest expenses/total assets. The Sargan test checks the null 
hypothesis, i.e., that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. AR (2) denotes the Arellano-Bond test for the 2nd-order autocorrelation in first differences. Figures 
in brackets present the standard error. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 ROA ROE RAROA RAROE ROA ROE RAROA RAROE ROA ROE RAROA RAROE 
It-1 0.440*** 0.555*** 0.657*** 0.832*** 0.411*** 0.478*** 0.822*** 0.940*** 0.594*** 0.845*** 0.986*** 1.106*** 
 (0.062) (0.031) (0.085) (0.093) (0.051) (0.017) (0.063) (0.025) (0.029) (0.027) (0.053) (0.078) 
COM -0.013** -0.254*** -0.037* -0.073***         
 (0.004) (0.070) (0.018) (0.017)         
TRAD     0.010*** 0.180* 0.159** 0.135***     
     (0.003) (0.083) (0.052) (0.022)     
OTH         -0.022** -0.418** -0.222*** -0.330*** 
         (0.007) (0.138) (0.064) (0.075) 
NIM 0.140*** -0.094 0.182* -0.083 0.190*** 1.427* -0.236 -0.496*** -0.059* -2.411*** -1.203*** -1.164*** 
 (0.020) (0.494) (0.083) (0.057) (0.016) (0.671) (0.190) (0.111) (0.024) (0.601) (0.305) (0.193) 
LTA -0.004* -0.106* 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.021 0.034*** 0.012* -0.001 0.137*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 (0.002) (0.053) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.045) (0.009) (0.005) (0.001) (0.020) (0.008) (0.009) 
NON 0.040 4.932* 0.790** 0.590* 0.018 0.661 1.072*** 1.392*** 0.553*** 6.752*** 2.003*** 1.200** 
 (0.065) (2.234) (0.273) (0.266) (0.054) (1.637) (0.298) (0.277) (0.047) (0.992) (0.463) (0.442) 
Constant 0.386*** 9.772*** 0.779 0.857** 0.122 6.228* -1.145* -0.212 0.210*** -1.407 -0.218 -0.143 
 (0.099) (2.597) (0.551) (0.318) (0.092) (2.953) (0.521) (0.289) (0.038) (0.889) (0.273) (0.544) 
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan test 1.000 1.000 0.992 1.000 0.989 0.652 0.971 1.000 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR(2) 0.163 0.541 0.741 0.799 0.220 0.337 0.258 0.384 0.671 0.422 0.371 0.593 
Observations 276 276 276 276 270 270 270 270 274 274 274 274 
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We suggest that banks of different type and size receive different diversification effects 
with different components of non-interest activities. Trading activity can bring benefits 
in terms of performance improvement for the overall banking sector and for all three 
sub-groups. However, we see that the proportion of trading activities in banks’ income 
stream is still relatively low, especially for large and medium-sized banks, which are 
still paying more attention to fee-based activities. While such a diversification strategy 
can work well for G-SIBs, as they have already accumulated enough specialists and 
established a well-regulated risk management system, D-SIBs will eventually suffer a 
performance discount from too great an expansion of fee-based income. Therefore, 
rather than engaging blindly in diversification activities, banks’ managers should 
select the most appropriate diversification direction and strategy by considering their 
own situation and businesses scope. Furthermore, regulators should develop more 
detailed supervisory plans and guidance for banks’ diversification process by 
subdividing the components of non-interest business and taking into account the 
impact of different types of non-interest business on different types of banks. 
 
3.5  Conclusion 
 
This chapter examines to what extent income diversification can affect performance 
in the Chinese banking industry. Employing a dynamic SYS-GMM panel data model 
to evaluate the performance effects of income diversification, this chapter finds 
existence of a diversification discount in the Chinese banking sector as a whole, 
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suggesting that a shift from traditional banking business to mixed business lines 
negatively affects bank performance.  
 
However, structurally, the results are rather diverse. After separating the sample banks 
into three groups, we find that the largest Chinese banks, China’s global systemically 
important banks or G-SIBs, can improve their performance by using diversification. 
The next group, the domestic systemically important banks or D-SIBs, shows a 
nonsignificant performance response to the shifting to mixed business lines. The most 
important under-performer is China’s non-systemically important banks or N-SIBs. 
The key factor that drives the performance differences lies in the banks’ capability to 
reap the benefits of diversification through the learning-by-doing process. Other 
factors include size of the bank, regulatory differences and the extent of moral hazard.  
 
After decomposing non-interest activities into three components (fee-based, trading 
and other activities), it is found that, for the Chinese banking market as a whole, fee-
based and other income activities lead to a diversification discount, and that only G-
SIBs can obtain benefits from diversification towards fee and commissions. However, 
trading activities can always improve banks’ performance level, for both the entire 
Chinese banking sector and its three sub-groups. Therefore we suggest that banks’ 
managers and regulatory authorities should set different diversification strategies and 
regulatory policies based on these diversification differences, so as to ensure that both 
specific banks and the entire banking system can maintain a higher profitability level. 
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Chapter 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 Income Diversification and 
Bank Risk 
 
 
 
 
This chapter investigates to what extent 
income diversification affects the risks of 
Chinese banks. First, this research measures 
both idiosyncratic risk and financial distress 
for specific banks. Then, it adopts the first-
differenced GMM method based on the 
threshold dynamic panel model to investigate 
the income diversification effects on banks’ 
risk level. 
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Chapter 4  
Income Diversification and Bank Risk 
 
In Chapter 3, an investigation focused on the diversification-performance nexus found 
that there exists an overall harmful diversification effect in the Chinese banking market. 
The Chapter also identified that, in addition to the in-depth consideration of 
profitability, banks engaging in income diversification must give due attention to the 
key aspect of safeguarding with regard to banks’ idiosyncratic risk and banks’ financial 
distress. Chapter 4 assesses the effects of income diversification on risk among 
Chinese banks.  Using the threshold dynamic panel estimator based on the first-
differenced GMM method, we find that for the overall Chinese banking sector, results 
reveal the existence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between bank risk and income 
diversification in terms of both banks’ idiosyncratic risk and banks’ financial distress.  
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4.1  Introduction 
 
Non-interest activities have become an important source of revenue for banks in 
mature as well as emerging markets in recent decades (Stiroh, 2004; Laeven and 
Levine, 2007; Sanya and Wolfe, 2011, DeYoung and Torna, 2013 and Doumpos, et 
al., 2016). Lately, bank diversification has also gained momentum in China. With the 
gradual development of market-oriented financial reform, Chinese banks are now 
actively engaged in non-interest business, including underwriting, brokerage and 
fiduciary services (Berger, et al., 2010a; Li and Zhang, 2013, and Chen, et al., 2017). 
As a result, while the traditional lending business continues to be their main source of 
revenue, Chinese banks are steadily shifting towards a multiple-revenue structure. 
Given the growing importance of business diversification for Chinese banks, it is 
imperative to study the risk implications of such a significant development.  
 
While the prior literature has indicated diversification can be beneficial for banks, 
debates remain as to whether and how the diversification-risk nexus are affected when 
banks move into non-traditional businesses. Earlier studies find a potential risk 
reduction from increasing the proportion of non-interest income (DeYoung and 
Roland, 2001; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). However, recent research suggests that the 
inter-relatedness among banks’ non-interest products and services could mean a higher 
correlation, so a cross-selling strategy would result in excessive risk that could not be 
offset by portfolio diversification (Chen and Zeng, 2014). Moreover, non-interest 
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income may also mean other risk-enhancing factors, such as that they could be more 
volatile owing to high-financial leverage (DeYoung and Roland, 2001), that there 
could be increased asymmetric information between the bank and borrowers (Mercieca 
et al., 2007), and that it is easy for customers of non-interest activities to switch to 
another bank (Li and Zhang, 2013).  
 
This chapter aims to foster a better understanding of banks’ diversification and risk 
nexus through the case of Chinese banks. Existing studies focus mainly on mature 
markets. Few studies have focused on the diversification effect in the Chinese banking 
industry. This leaves a critical void in the literature, particularly in light of the growing 
importance of the nation’s banking industry, which has surpassed Europe to become 
the world’s second largest, following that of the US.   
 
We extend the current literature by developing an advanced methodology to address 
the particularity of China’s institutional background and data characteristics. Existing 
studies on bank diversity and risk have included very few considerations of dynamics 
in their relationship, with most adopting a static panel data model using either ordinary 
least squares regression (Berger et al., 2010b) or fixed effect estimation (Zhou, 2014). 
Nevertheless, this research shows banks’ risk characteristics can generate dynamic 
changes. Specifically, we employ the first-differenced GMM estimator of dynamic 
panel models with threshold effects. This estimator addresses the inconsistencies 
generated from the endogeneity problem, providing a non-linear view of the dynamic 
GMM (Hsiao and Zhang, 2015). The method addresses the endogeneity of both 
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regressors and transition variables that are unlikely to be achieved by employing the 
standard least squares approach (Seo and Linton, 2007). Moreover, this approach 
avoids the bias from quadratic terms that are widely used in the field; see Acharya et 
al. (2006), Gamra and Plihon (2011) and Brei and Yang (2015).  
 
Our findings show the existence of a non-linear diversification effect on banks’ 
idiosyncratic risks and the probability of banks’ financial distress and to several 
reasons. Consistent with Acharya et al. (2006), a bank’s monitoring effectiveness 
might be lower in newly entered and competitive sectors, so the diversification may 
initially lead to a poorer quality of the loan portfolio and higher potential operational 
risk. Over time, however, this diversification discount will gradually change to a 
diversification benefit. Second, the inverted U-shaped relationship may also be caused 
by the learn-by-doing effect. Learning can be a dynamic process, and banking 
institutions gradually understand specific characteristics of the business lines and the 
risk levels thereof, and thus, what proportion of non-interest income is most suitable 
to them (Gamra and Plihon, 2011). With richer experience, the benefits of 
diversification across various sources of earnings would offset the costs of increased 
complexity and the associated idiosyncratic risk.  
 
Size does matter for banks diversifying into new businesses other than traditional 
interest earning activities (Chiorazzo et al., 2008 and De Jonghe et al., 2015). Our 
sample comprises 35 Chinese commercial banks and are divided into three sub-groups: 
Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), Domestic Systemically Important 
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Banks (D-SIBs), and banks that are not classified by the authorities as systemically 
important (N-SIBs) to capture this effect.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview 
of relevant literature on bank risk and income diversification. The data on variables 
and the methodology are presented in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 outlines the model 
specification and reports the empirical results. Section 4.5 offers concluding remarks.  
 
4.2  Related Literature  
 
Theoretically, diversification of income sources can improve the stability of banks’ 
cash flows and disperse their idiosyncratic risks. Stiroh (2004) maintains that the 
traditional lending business provides a channel for banks to attract clients to their non-
interest activities, as people are more likely to seek fee-based services in the same bank. 
Wagner (2010) shows that banks are keen to adopt a strategy that uses attractive 
lending and deposit rates to improve customer stickiness and to make themselves more 
profitable through high-return non-interest income. Pennathur et al. (2012) suggest 
that combining the two business assets into a portfolio can be mutually beneficial and 
there would not be crowd-out effects between them. Given that non-interest and 
interest incomes are not perfectly correlated, a portfolio of these activities can be risk 
reducing. In addition to the portfolio effect, diversified banks can also obtain rich 
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information from their mixed business lines. Use of the information can help banks 
improve risk management (Stein, 2002; Elsas et al., 2010).  
 
However, some authors argue that fee-earning activities could be associated with 
higher risk than are interest activities, as they will increase the overall volatility of the 
portfolio (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; and Köhler, 
2014). One reason for the increase in volatility is that income from non-interest 
activities may have greater fluctuation, because it is easier for clients to switch between 
banks in these activities than in lending activities (Lepetit et al., 2008). In the face of 
cyclical fluctuation, non-interest income would decrease dramatically, while banks 
with a larger proportion of interest activities might maintain a more stable performance 
compared with more diversified banks (Köhler, 2014). Another reason is that non-
interest activities require less regulatory capital, which may lead banks to have a higher 
degree of financial leverage and, hence, may increase earnings volatility (DeYoung 
and Roland, 2001). In addition, an agency problem may also play a role here. Given 
interest conflicts with shareholders, managers have incentives to over-diversify, which 
will, in turn, harm the wider financial system because diversification makes 
institutions become more similar to each other by exposing them to the same risks, 
which may cause a joint failure (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008; Wagner, 2010). 
 
Empirical evidence on whether fee-earning activities would increase banks’ risk has 
been mixed. Chiorazzo et al. (2008) show positive evidence suggesting that 
diversification can improve the trade-off between risk and income for Italian banks. 
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Köhler (2014, 2015) finds that banks’ earnings will be more stable and profitable if 
they diversify into noninterest income. Similar results are also reported in Mergaerts 
and Vander (2016) and Nguyen et al. (2016). Recent research suggests that revenue 
diversification could also be beneficial to banks from developing countries (Sanya and 
Wolfe, 2011). 
 
Conversely, negative evidence has been found by an extensive body of research. Many 
studies focusing on US banks find that diversification fails to produce a greater 
performance. Such research includes DeYoung and Roland (2001), DeYoung and Rice 
(2004), Stiroh (2004), Stiroh and Rumble, (2006), Acharya et al. (2006), Hayden et al. 
(2007), Mercieca et al. (2007), Goddard et al. (2008), and Berger et al. (2010a, b). For 
risk implications, evidence of an adverse relationship between diversification and risk 
of American banks has been presented in, for example, Demsetz and Strahan (1997), 
and DeYoung and Roland (2001). Baele et al. (2007), analysing a panel data of banks 
during 1989-2004, find that a higher share of non-interest income positively affects 
bank’ franchise values, but increases their systematic risk. Lepetit et al. (2008) suggest 
that diversified banks present higher risk than banks mainly conducting traditional 
business, though this positive link between diversification and risk is largely a 
phenomenon of   small   banks and   driven   by   commission  activities.   
 
Another strand in the empirical literature explores the phenomenon whereby, although 
the non-interest income as a whole may lead to benefits or discount, the bank risk 
estimation varies among different activities under non-interest income. Stiroh (2004) 
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divides non-interest income into three components, namely, fee-for-service income, 
trading revenue, and other types of non-interest income, and suggests that these 
different activities could have different effects on risk. Lee et al. (2014) consider 29 
Asia-Pacific banking markets and identify that risk derives mainly from commission 
and fee activities, and that trading and other non-interest incomes could reduce banks’ 
risk level. Similarly, Meslier et al. (2014) investigate an emerging country sample from 
1999 to 2005. They estimate valuation variability of a bank’s stock returns and find 
that increasing the share of fee-based income leads to a risk increase. From the view 
of Elyasiani and Wang (2008), such fee-for-service income makes banks less 
transparent to investors and, thus, makes the task of bank supervision more difficult. 
 
Recently, researchers have started to examine whether the effect of diversification 
differs according to bank-specific characteristics, such as size and types. By using the 
GMM system, Goddard et al. (2008) suggest that a similar cross-selling strategy is not 
suitable for both large and small credit unions. With the same method, Chen and Zeng 
(2014) show that small-sized banks in the EU banking industry are restricted to 
selected market segments; thus, smaller banks may be associated with a higher risk 
exposure and higher default risk than are larger banks. Similarly, Köhler (2014) find 
that larger banks are more likely to be active in volatile and risky trading and off-
balance sheet activities, which allows them to employ a higher financial leverage than 
small banks. In addition, some studies also claim that size increase due to 
diversification could make the financial system more fragile. Small-sized banks are 
highly susceptible to the failure of large banks, which poses a high external risk for 
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the entire financial sector (Kobayashi, 2012). However, as suggested by Gurbuz et al. 
(2013), large-sized banks generally have better information technology, human capital 
management and risk management. Therefore, diversified bank with larger size could 
cause technology spillover and create advantages from the economy of scope, thus 
outperforming others within the banking industry (Mercieca et al., 2007).  
 
Mixed findings on the risk profiles of banks’ revenue diversification suggest that while 
diversification into fee-earning activities may be beneficial to some banks, it has a dark 
side since the volatile non-interest income may offset the benefits due to the portfolio 
effect (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). In this light, further empirical investigation into the 
effect of revenue diversification on bank risk would be desirable and necessary. 
 
The static panel data analysis is based on both accounting and stock market data, and 
the estimation methods used ranges from pooled OLS (Lepetit et al., 2008; Kobayashi, 
2012) to fixed effects (Bonin et al., 2005; Tabak et al., 2011) and random effects GLS 
estimation (Mergaerts and Vander, 2016). However, the approach suffers from the 
endogeneity problem because diversification strategies are correlated with banks’ 
business opportunities (Acharya et al., 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Baele et al., 
2007; Busch and Kick, 2009, Sanya and Wolfe, 2011; Köhler, 2014). In 1995, Berger 
and Ofek identified a diversification discount without controlling for endogeneity. 
Subsequent papers, however, find that with consideration of the endogeneity problem, 
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they obtain an inverse result; that is, the result becomes positive with the same 
methodology (Campa and Kedia, 2002 and Villalonga, 2004), 
 
To address endogeneity and other estimation inconsistences in the banking context, 
many studies then select to employ dynamic panel models, or the generalized methods 
of moments (GMM) estimator. Research in this strand of the literature includes Sanya 
and Wolfe (2011), Nguyen (2012), Vallascas and Keasey (2012) and Gambacorta et 
al. (2014) to name just a few. 
 
Recent studies noted the existence of a non-linear relationship between diversification 
and banks’ risk (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Gamra and Plihon, 2011). A 
common method to capture such a non-linear relationship is to include a quadratic term 
in the empirical model (Gambacorta et al., 2014; Brei and Yang, 2015). Acharya et al. 
(2006) add a risk-squared variable (𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘2) in the regression specification. Baele et al. 
(2007) introduce the square of non-interest revenue share into their empirical model. 
Importantly, these models shed light on the nonlinear nature of the banks’ 
diversification-risk nexus, but the banks’ income diversification as a process could be 
not only nonlinear but also dynamic. However, these terms are exogenously given in 
nature, and may thus be inadequate for treating the endogeneity problem. Furthermore, 
it is plausible that diversification would only start to exert its effects beyond some 
threshold levels. This finding implies that consideration of the threshold effect in a 
dynamic nonlinear model is also required.  
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4.3  Data and Methodology 
 
4.3.1  Data Sample 
 
Our chapter sample comprises an unbalanced panel of annual report data from 35 
Chinese banks over the period from 2007 to 2016. Following the Guidelines for the 
Disclosure of Global Systemic Importance Indicators of Commercial Banks issued by 
the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), these commercial banks can be 
divided into three groups: global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), domestic 
systemically important banks (D-SIBs), and other banks (N-SIBs).   
 
The reason for choosing 35 banks from 2007 to 2016 rather than 40 banks from 2005 
to 2015 as in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 is that the first-differenced GMM estimator for 
the dynamic threshold panel data model requires balanced data. Of the 40 banks used 
in those chapters, five did not exist before 2007. Therefore, in order to maximize the 
data, the observation period is reduced by two years, and the sample includes only 
those banks that were established in or before 2007.  
 
In this chapter, all balance sheet and income information used to construct the variables 
for empirical analysis are taken from Bankscope. Daily market and bank stock returns 
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are taken from DataStream International. Industry-specific and macroeconomic data 
are obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.  
 
4.3.2  Variables  
 
1) Dependent Variables (1): Idiosyncratic Risk Measures 
 
First this chapter adopts two accounting-based idiosyncratic risk indicators which are 
widely used in the empirical banking literature, namely, the ratio of loan loss 
provisions and customer loans (LLP) and the ratio of impaired loans and equity (ILE). 
As suggested by Hsieh et al. (2013), with such a traditional measure, a higher value 
indicates that the bank has higher level of risk for its loan portfolio.  
 
In order to find out which specific risk would be affected by income diversification, 
we also divided the non-systemic risk into three catalogues including credit, liquidity 
and interest rate risks. Following Valverde and Fernández (2007), we also divided 
the non-systemic risk into three categories, including credit, liquidity and interest rate 
risks. Credit risk (CREDIT) is calculated as the one-lagged ratio of loan default to 
total loans. Liquidity risk (LIQUIDITY) is the ratio of liquidity assets to short term 
funding, and interest rate risk (INTEREST) refers to the changes in the three-month 
interbank market rate. 
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2) Dependent Variables (2): Financial Distress Measures 
 
Recent studies of diversification effect also tend to take account of financial distress 
(such as DeYoung and Torna, 2013), in order to achieve a deep understanding of banks’ 
default and insolvency risk. Two commonly used measures to detect such financial 
distress are the Z-score and distance to default. The former is a popular measure of 
soundness of a bank because it combines the bank’s buffers such as capitalization with 
returns and volatility, and hence allows investigation of bank risk and stability. Studies 
employing the Z-score to measure the probability of bank insolvency and bankruptcy 
include Berger et al. (2009), Laeven and Levine (2009), Angkinand and Wihlborg 
(2010), Barry et al. (2011), and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010). Following 
Lepetit et al. (2008), the original Z-score can be extended to become the ZP-score by 
including a risk index to investigate various bankruptcy-related scenarios. 
 
The DD indicator quantifies bank distress by gauging how far a firm is from default 
and is widely used for measuring default risk (Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Hovakimian 
et al., 2012). Recently, it has also been applied to check the soundness of Chinese 
banks (Chen et al., 2010; Lv and Tang, 2014). As a risk predictor, it has been verified 
as useful by numerous studies and its predictive power with regard to bank fragility 
outperforms that of several accounting and market-based measures (Campbell et al., 
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2008; Bharath and Shumway, 2008). The DD index is generally calculated according 
to the KMV-Merton model for listed banks and Private Firm Model (PFM) separately.  
 
Both distance to default and ZP-score have an inverse correlation with financial 
distress and banks with a higher DD and ZP-score are less likely to default. Therefore, 
our study uses the opposite of DD and ZP-score to measure the risk level which would 
have the same direction with that of LLP and other risk indicators.  
 
3) Independent Variables: Measures of Income Diversification 
 
Similarly to Mercieca et al. (2007), our study measures the level of income 
diversification by constructing a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). We also divide 
the non-interest income into three categories: revenue from trading in foreign 
exchange and fiduciary activities; fee and commission income gained from clearing, 
settlement and other financial services; and other non-interest income. Our 
construction of the HHI index follows Elsas et al. (2010). Conversely, the 
diversification levels are measured respectively along the three categories of income. 
Following Köhler (2014), we also construct the diversification index by employing the 
ratio of net fee and commission income to total operating income (COM), the ratio of 
net trading income to total operating income (TRA) and the ratio of net other operating 
income to total operating income (OTH).  
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4) Control Variables  
 
LCD: This variable is the ratio of loans to customer deposits. According to Cornett et 
al. (2010), this ratio can reflect the level of banks’ liquidity. The larger the ratio is, the 
lower the level of liquidity will be. 
 
ETA: To adjust for banks’ attitude towards risk, we adopt the ratio of equity over 
assets, which describes the degree of total financial leverage and capital adequacy 
(Stiroh, 2004; Pennathur et al., 2012; Gurbuz et al., 2013). According to Busch and 
Kick (2009), a well-capitalized bank is less likely to become insolvent and more likely 
to be engaged in low-risk investment to ensure that it operates soundly.  
 
CIR: Cost-income ratio is estimated through the operating expenses relative to gross 
income which measuring banks’ cost structure (Busch and Kick, 2009).  
 
4.3.3  Methodology 
 
Prior research in the field is mostly focused in static analysis. However, banks’ income 
diversification is a long process, during which the evolvement of the diversification-
risk nexus could be dynamic and non-linear. In addition, there may exist a threshold 
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effect since it is plausible that only beyond some threshold level would diversification 
start to have a significant effect on bank risk. This finding implies that the static and 
linear method could be inadequate for capturing the risk implications of diversification. 
Rather, a dynamic threshold model would be more fitting.   
 
In this study, a GMM-type threshold model, or the first-differenced GMM estimator 
for the dynamic threshold panel data model, as proposed by Seo and Shin (2016), is 
employed. This approach has the advantage of giving a dynamic view of the 
diversification effects on bank risk while avoiding both the endogeneity problem 
usually associated with the static model and the bias from using the quadratic terms as 
proxy for the non-linear relationship. It can also overcome the problem associated with 
previous GMM-type threshold models, whereby both regressions and threshold 
variables must be exogenous (Ramírez-Rondán, 2015). 
 
The research proceeds by assuming nonlinearity in Chinese banks’ diversification-risk 
nexus for two reasons. First, Chinese banks on the whole are still in the early stages of 
diversification. When a bank first begins to engage in non-interest activities, managers 
generally lack the necessary skills and professionalism. Given the circumstances, some 
decisions may be irrational, exposing the bank to excessive risks (Deng and Li, 2006). 
Second, with under-developed governance structure, moral hazard is more likely to 
emerge, leading to inefficient allocation of resources and over-diversification (Barry 
et al., 2011). However, over time, this excess may be gradually mitigated with both 
the expanding of diversification and obtaining of better information among a bank’s 
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management. Consequently, the diversification effects can be non-linear and vary with 
the changing proportions of non-interest activities. 
 
Conventional econometric approaches to capturing such a non-linear relationship are 
to catalogue different groups with 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of non-interest income 
shares (Chiorazzo et al., 2008) or to include quadratic terms in empirical models (e.g., 
Gambacorta et al., 2014; Brei and Yang, 2015). However, use of such proxies cannot 
provide consistent results in the face of a certain threshold value. Rather, a threshold 
model would be more appropriate in that it treats the sample split value as unknown.  
 
Tong (1978) first developed the threshold auto-regression (TAR) model for use in 
time-series analysis. This method estimates the threshold variables to determine the 
threshold point and to avoid the bias generated from using a subjective approach to 
determine the critical value for each group. The static threshold model has 
subsequently been developed to cover cross-sectional and panel data (e.g., Tiao and 
Tsay, 1994; Martens et al., 1998; Hansen, 1999). The most widely used threshold 
estimation, developed by Hansen (1999), employs a framework with a panel dataset 
{𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑞𝑖𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑡: 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ t ≤ T }, where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 refers to the dependent variable, 𝑞𝑖𝑡 
is a scalar of threshold variable and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 represents the vector of all control variables 
included in the regression. In setting this model, all regressors, including the threshold 
variables, are required to be exogenous. To estimate the regression slope, Hansen 
(1999) adopts the OLS estimation with restrictions on 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and 𝑞𝑖𝑡 being time variant. 
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Research finds high-risk banks are more likely to enter into riskier industries and 
produce riskier loans (Acharya et al., 2006). This endogeneity bias proves to exist both 
in the decision to diversify and in systematic differences between different types of 
banks. Based on Hansen (2000), Caner and Hansen (2004) develop an asymptotic 
framework and employ a two-stage least square estimation to address the endogeneity 
problem. Subsequent studies have followed this two-stage least square method.  
 
However, the improvements offered by this method remain limited in that both 
regressors and threshold variables have to be exogenous (Seo and Linton, 2007; Yu, 
2012). In response, recently several studies have attempted to address this endogeneity 
problem of threshold variables by employing the dynamic threshold regression model. 
Kourtellos et al. (2016) constructed a two-stage concentrated least squares method. Yu 
and Phillips (2018) addressed the endogeneity problem by introducing the integrated 
difference kernel estimator (IDKE). Ramírez-Rondán (2015) proposed a maximum 
likelihood estimation of the threshold with slope parameters. In our study, the non-
linear effect is estimated by using the first-differenced GMM threshold dynamic panel 
model based on Seo and Shin (2016). This method provides a dynamic and non-linear 
view over the relationship between income diversification and risk. By adopting the 
two-step first-differenced GMM estimator, it overcomes the endogeneity bias and 
allows for both regressors and threshold variables to be endogenous. 
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4.4  Empirical Estimation and Results 
 
4.4.1  Estimation Steps 
 
To estimate the parameters, Seo and Shin (2016) applied a two-step GMM estimation 
procedure for the estimation of a non-linear relationship. First, for the value of a 
selected threshold variable γ, θ = (ϕ, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, δ )  is estimated through the first-
difference GMM by using the instruments suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
Second, this estimation is repeated for γ ′s belonging in a strict subset of the support 
of the threshold variable. Therefore, it is possible to calculate a different 𝜃 for each 
selected γ. Under this condition, the parameter value of γ could minimize the GMM-
type objective function; thus, 𝜃  can be defined as the two-step optimal GMM 
estimator. The GMM-threshold estimator is employed in a non-linear setting, which 
allows for endogenous regressors and endogenous threshold variables. The estimator 
overcomes the drawbacks of previous methods that fail to take into account the 
endogeneity problem leading to biased estimation. 
 
Two tests are necessary for the model. First, a Hausman type test is used to check the 
validity of the over-identifying moment conditions. Under the null hypothesis, models 
have effective instruments and avoid over-identifying restrictions. In that case, 
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instruments in the GMM models are appropriately orthogonal to the error and are 
therefore reasonable and statistically acceptable. Second, we test for linearity or 
threshold effects as a result of the presence of unidentified parameters.  
 
4.4.2  Overall Results 
 
4.4.2.1  Income Diversification and Risk: Whole Sample 
 
Table 4.1 below reports the regression results between the diversification level and 
four different bank risk measures. Coefficients of control variables appear largely 
reasonable. According to the regression results for variables with idiosyncrasy risk 
(Model 1 and Model 2), the threshold estimations are 20.166 and 12.158, respectively. 
One can see that the diversification level is positively correlated with banks’ 
idiosyncratic risk, while at the same time, higher levels of diversification are associated 
with a reduction in bank risk. 
 
In general, our study echoes the work of Gamra and Plihon (2011), who use data from 
both East Asian and Latin American markets and find that income diversification 
makes banks less stable in the early stages of engaging in mixed business lines, but 
that they become more stable with the expansion of non-interest activity.  
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Table 4.1 Income diversification and risk for Chinese banks from 2007 to 2016 
This table reports the first-differenced GMM threshold dynamic panel model developed by Seo and 
Shin (2016). Our dependent variables are loan loss provisions/customer loans (LLP), impaired loans 
/ equity (ILE), opposite distance to default (DD) and opposite Z-score. It-1 refers to the lagged one 
period of the dependent variables. HHI indicates the income diversification using Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index with the components of interest income and three activities under non-interest 
income. LCD is Loans / Customer Deposits, ETA refers to Equity / Total Assets, CIR is Cost to 
Income Ratio. J-statistic checks the null hypothesis, i.e., that the instruments used are not correlated 
with the residuals. Linearity test checks whether threshold exists. Figures in brackets present the 
standard error. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
  Idiosyncratic Risk Financial Distress 
  
ILP LLE Z-score DD 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lower Regime 
It-1 -0.457* -1.142* 1.744*** 5.049*** 
  (0.252) (0.630) (0.493) (1.931) 
HHI 0.036 0.736* 0.067 1.072*** 
  (0.025) (0.379) (0.049) (0.399) 
LCD -0.116*** 0.275 -0.010 -1.462*** 
  (0.033) (0.294) (0.028) (0.444) 
ETA 0.090*** 0.667* 0.092 0.174 
  (0.028) (0.359) (0.099) (0.199) 
CIR -0.202** 1.999 -0.486 -1.344 
  (0.098) (1.331) (0.439) (1.598) 
  Upper Regime  
It-1 1.351*** -3.607*** 1.317*** -1.727*** 
  (0.400) (0.936) (0.317) (0.405) 
HHI -0.123*** -1.032** -0.054** -0.101 
  (0.037) (0.480) (0.022) (0.237) 
LCD -0.030 1.547*** 0.111*** -0.762** 
  (0.025) (0.380) (0.041) (0.338) 
ETA 0.047*** 0.570 -0.026*** -0.853*** 
  (0.018) (0.391) (0.099) (0.181) 
CIR -0.468 1.645 -0.391 1.563 
  (0.333) (1.684) (0.365) (1.456) 
Threshold 20.166*** 23.104*** 19.048*** 21.569*** 
  (0.792) (1.580) (7.082) (1.244) 
J-statistic 0.443 0.616 0.165 0.356 
Upper Regime  0.273 0.174 0.329 0.223 
Linearity test 0.014 0.001  0.022 0.000 
Observations 315 315 315 315 
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These results can be explained from several perspectives. First, the process of 
diversification generates moral hazard problems and monitoring difficulties. 
Especially in the early stages of diversification ineffective monitoring make it difficult 
for both insiders and outsiders to observe the running of bank operations, which will 
have adverse impacts on bank risk. As the diversification in non-interest activity 
develops and hence the proportion of non-interest over total operational income 
increases, banks become more motivated to continually improve the governance and 
supervision regime to ensure that non-interest activity is not used in ways that would 
deteriorate both specific risk and financial stability (Ashraf et al., 2016).  
 
Second, expansion of non-interest activities requires employees to have special 
knowledge, and the application of relatively advanced technology. Banks can reduce 
the risks through accumulation of sufficient experience and by studying the risk 
characteristics of non-interest activities and get benefits from leveraging managerial 
skills (Iskandar-Datta and McLaughlin, 2007). Furthermore, several advanced non-
interest activities, such as securitization, can reduce possible shortfalls on payments to 
debtholders. However, such activities can be launched and supply a buffer to absorb 
losses only when banks have enough professional employees. To date, very few such 
non-interest activities have been launched in the Chinese banking sector. On the other 
hand, it is likely that, with the accumulation of experience and increased diversification, 
such advanced non-interest activities could make banks safer and more stable.  
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In this chapter, we also take account of the diversification effect on banks’ financial 
distress. Table 4.1 reports the results by using Model 3 and Model 4 with consideration 
of financial distress. We find that non-traditional banking activities have economically 
meaningful effects on the probability of bank failure, and again, the results confirm 
the inverse U-shaped relationship between diversification and bank risk. 
 
These results can be explained as follows. The calculation method for distance to 
default considers banks’ debt level and whether or not the cash flow state is healthy. 
In the early stages of expansion of non-interest activities banks incur high initial costs, 
for example for the establishment of infrastructure and electronic platforms, and for 
specialist staff training. However, according to the empirical results reported from 
chapter 3, the non-interest income cannot make the overall Chinese banking industry 
more profitable. Therefore, the results of Models 3 and 4 reflect a situation in which, 
in the early stage, the process of income diversification will not bring benefits to 
alleviate banks’ financial distress. However, with an increased level of non-interest 
activities, the initial costs can bring sustained profit and cash flow. Meanwhile, banks’ 
debt is mainly generated from deposit and other interest businesses. Hence, the mixed 
business lines strategy also plays a role in reducing bank debt and increasing the 
overall liquidity level. Therefore, once the income diversification has passed a certain 
threshold, it makes banks more stable and reduces their financial distress.  
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4.4.2.2  Income Diversification and Risk: Evidence on China’s Global, 
Domestic and Non-Systemically Important Banks 
 
Table 4.2 reports the results from estimating the association between income 
diversification on one hand, and insolvency risk and financial stress on the other for 
G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs during the period 2007-20164. The results from the GMM 
type dynamic threshold estimation indicate that diversification is an important 
determinant of banks’ risk indicators, but presents different diversification effects in 
different groups.  
 
China’s Global Systemically Important Banks 
 
According to the results reported in Table 4.2, in contrast to the results for the whole 
sample, for G-SIBs the coefficients of the HHI are significantly and negatively 
associated with both idiosyncratic risks and financial distress.  This is the case for 
both the lower and higher regimes. 
 
                           
4 As the small sample size might result in an incidental parameters problem, this thesis also 
applies a robustness test by using dummy variables to the catalogue of the three sub-groups. The 
robustness test results are reported in the Appendix. 
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However, in the upper regime the coefficients of both risk indicators are higher than 
those in the lower regime. This indicates that Chinese G-SIBs will always gain risk-
reduction benefits when diversifying into non-traditional businesses, but that after 
passing a certain threshold point of income diversification, risks will reduce even 
further, helping G-SIBs to improve their financial situation.  
 
Such diversification benefits are in line with our first empirical results, where the mean 
of HHI for G-SIBS is 25.125, which is higher than the threshold point for all four 
models in Table 4.2. Therefore we suggest that, unlike the other two groups, G-SIBs 
have already passed the threshold point from diversification discount to diversification 
benefits. However, greater diversification could lead to yet further reduction of risk.  
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Table 4.2 Income diversification and risk for Chinese G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs, 2007 to 2016 
This table reports the first-differenced GMM threshold dynamic panel model developed by Seo and Shin (2016). Our dependent variables are loan loss provisions/customer loans 
(LLP), impaired loans / equity (ILE), opposite distance to default (DD) and opposite Z-score. It-1 refers to the lagged one period of the dependent variables. HHI is the income 
diversification using Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with the components of interest income and three activities under non-interest income. LCD is Loans / Customer Deposits, 
ETA refers to Equity / Total Assets, CIR is Cost to Income Ratio. J-statistic checks the null hypothesis, i.e., that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. 
Linearity test checks whether threshold exists. Figures in brackets present the standard error. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
  G-SIBs D-SIBs N-SIBs 
  Idiosyncratic Risk Financial Distress Idiosyncratic Risk Financial Distress Idiosyncratic Risk Financial Distress 
  
ILP LLE Z-score DD ILP LLE Z-score DD ILP LLE Z-score DD 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lower Regime 
It-1 0.195*** 1.616*** 0.692*** -0.007** -0.716* 7.587*** 1.101*** 0.187 -1.253*** -1.057* 0.059 0.107 
  (0.019) (0.004) (0.058) (0.004) (0.383) (0.933) (0.236) (0.274) (0.275) (0.564) (0.291) (0.168) 
HHI -0.057*** -0.426*** -0.067*** -1.781*** 0.311*** 1.083*** 0.018** 0.047 0.330*** 0.501 0.270** 0.027* 
  (0.002) (0.013) (0.004) (0.011) (0.066) (0.318) (0.009) (0.043) (0.049) (0.328) (0.126) (0.015) 
LCD -0.059*** 2.297*** -0.027** -2.297*** -0.265*** 2.270** 0.006 0.532*** -0.182*** 0.431** -0.124** 0.057*** 
  (0.003) (0.007) (0.014) (0.015) (0.046) (1.106) (0.005) (0.05) (0.057) (0.212) (0.062) (0.02) 
ETA 0.005*** 1.717*** -0.035*** -0.793*** -0.232*** -0.503* -0.052** -0.064 0.162*** 0.354 -0.205*** 0.024 
  (0.001) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.061) (0.259) (0.025) (0.052) (0.034) (0.273) (0.030) (0.017) 
CIR 0.371*** -11.08*** -0.481*** 8.078*** 1.547*** -31.442** -0.540*** -3.806*** -0.698*** 1.973 0.260* -0.287*** 
  (0.012) (0.047) (0.082) (0.057) (0.150) (15.556) (0.079) (0.239) (0.173) (1.31) (0.150) (0.057) 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
  Upper Regime  
It-1 -0.335*** 6.945*** -0.194*** 1.624 3.035*** 0.746*** 1.108*** 4.050*** 5.742* -3.925** -0.140 -2.043*** 
  (0.061) (1.990) (0.053) (1.184) (0.682) (0.209) (0.248) (0.546) (3.045) (1.924) (0.303) (0.394) 
HHI -0.063*** -0.623 -0.157*** -2.192*** -0.143 -0.347 -0.063*** -0.253*** -1.304*** -2.066*** -0.165*** -0.030** 
  (0.005) (0.742) (0.004) (0.255) (0.091) (0.221) (0.011) (0.096) (0.477) (0.568) (0.052) (0.015) 
LCD -0.057*** 2.521*** 0.104*** -1.578** -0.241*** 0.704** -0.001 0.335*** -0.125 1.603** -0.138*** 0.028*** 
  (0.003) (0.312) (0.014) (0.613) (0.034) (0.304) (0.004) (0.037) (0.082) (0.788) (0.032) (0.009) 
ETA -0.036*** -0.945*** -0.047*** -2.325*** -0.005 0.777*** 0.028** 0.271*** 0.562*** 0.451** 0.027 0.048*** 
  (0.002) (0.350) (0.002) (0.474) (0.022) (0.222) (0.013) (0.053) (0.154) (0.18) (0.045) (0.009) 
CIR 0.610*** -8.484** -0.492*** 9.019** 1.262*** -5.661*** -0.547*** -2.437*** 3.198* 6.605*** -0.169 0.162** 
  (0.013) (3.773) (0.054) (4.021) (0.300) (0.369) (0.177) (0.352) (1.652) (2.412) (0.168) (0.071) 
Threshold 25.638*** 27.831*** 25.652*** 29.205*** 22.901*** 22.458*** 22.951*** 22.902*** 24.691*** 26.870*** 9.218*** 15.183*** 
  (0.108) (0.018) (0.053) (0.059) (0.475) (1.255) (2.564) (0.728) (0.236) (1.155) (0.318) (0.653) 
J-statistic 0.609 0.947 0.917 0.450 0.978 0.493 0.350 0.872 0.496 0.381 0.578 0.262 
Upper Regime  0.238 0.192 0.447 0.168 0.277 0.251 0.269 0.276 0.041 0.098 0.69 0.333 
Linearity test 0.054  0.072 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.005 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.051 
Observations 36 36 36 36 81 81 81 81 198 198 198 198 
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China’s Domestic Systemically Important Banks 
 
We now move to examine the efficiency effect of diversification for China’s domestic 
systemically important banks (D-SIBs). We can see that the empirical results for D-
SIBs are similar to those for the whole sample. That is, with a lower level of 
diversification, the shift from traditional banking towards non-interest activities 
significantly increases the banks’ risk level in terms of both idiosyncratic risk and the 
probability of default. However, the results show that once D-SIBs have exceeded a 
certain threshold point, they benefit from a significant risk reduction derived from an 
increase in income diversity and a shift from interest to non-interest income. The 
results for both idiosyncratic risk and financial distress are consistent at the 1% 
significance level.  
 
Other Chinese Banks 
 
The third column of Table 4.2 reports a different result compared with those for the 
other two sub-groups. Here again, it shows an inverse U-shape, where increased 
proportion of banks’ non-lending business will lead initially to an increase in both 
idiosyncratic risk and banks’ financial distress. However, after achieving a certain 
threshold point of diversification, N-SIBs will benefit from a reduction of risk.  
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The difference in results across the three groups could reflect the different size of banks, 
from large G-SIBs to medium-sized D-SIBs and smaller N-SIBs. For G-SIBs, the 
process of diversification can make banks more stable regardless of the level of 
diversification. However, our results for D-SIBs and N-SIBs echo the work of Gamra 
and Plihon (2011), who use data from both East-Asian and Latin-American markets 
and find that income diversification makes banks less stable in the early stages of 
engaging in mixed business lines, but that they become more stable with the expansion 
of non-interest activity. These differences can be explained by the fact that medium-
sized D-SIBs and small-sized N-SIBs are still in the early stages of diversification with 
lower overall diversification level, combined with less accumulation of specialist 
expertise, weak risk management and unsound internal regulatory systems, and are 
thus ill-equipped to deal with riskier non-traditional businesses.  
 
4.4.3  Components of Non-interest Income and Risk 
 
Different components under the general heading of non-interest business may perform 
differently and, hence, may have different diversification effects (Stiroh and Rumble, 
2006; Chiorazzo et al., 2008; Roy, 2015). Brunnermeier et al. (2012) suggest that 
trading and fee-based activities may have different risk implications, as trading activity 
is often accompanied by a greater increase in the variability in profits. In contrast, the 
fee-based activity is highly correlated with traditional business (Zhou, 2014), which 
would help the banks obtain superior information. This prompts us to explore the issue 
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further by decomposing total operating income into three revenue classes and then 
investigate into the risk implications of each class. These components are fee and 
commission (Model 5), trading (Model 6), and other non-interest incomes (Model 7). 
Each of these three types of revenue is expressed as a share of total operating income. 
Regression results are reported in Table 4.3.  
 
Such positive effects on banks’ overall risk are mainly driven by the trading income. 
This result is in line with Estrella’s (2001) finding that acquisition of securities firms 
would cause highly volatile returns in the US market. According to Boot and Ratnovski 
(2012), trading activity allocates too much spare capital to trading ex-post and takes 
away too many resources from traditional business. Therefore, such resources 
misallocation towards to trading business would raise banks’ probability of failure. 
However, once a bank has exceeded the threshold level, all of those three activities 
will bring benefits due to risk reduction.  
 
The second, third and fourth columns of Table 4.3 show the regression results for G-
SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs respectively. For all three groups, the trading and other non-
interest activities exhibit an inverse U-shaped relationship with bank risk. We find that 
the risk for N-SIBs is more sensitive to the increase in trading activities in the early 
stage. At the same time, this group has the lowest threshold for trading activities. 
Hence, although the expansion of trading activities might cause more serious problems 
for N-SIBs in terms of financial distress, such activities will eventually help the banks 
to reduce their level of risk.  
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Table 4.3 Income diversification and risk for 35 Chinese banks, G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs from 2007 to 2016 
This table reports the first-differenced GMM threshold dynamic panel model developed by Seo and Shin (2016). Our dependent variable is insolvency risk using a accounting 
data based opposite Z-score. It-1 refers to the lagged one period of the dependent variables. COM is the ratio of net fee and commission income to total operating income; TRA 
is ratio of net trading income to total operating income; OTH is the ratio of net other operating income to total operating income. LCD is Loans / Customer Deposits, ETA refers 
to Equity / Total Assets, CIR is Cost to Income Ratio. J-statistic checks the null hypothesis, i.e., that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. Linearity test 
checks whether threshold exists. Figures in brackets present the standard error. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
  Whole Sample G-SIBs D-SIBs N-SIBs 
  (5) (6) (7) (5) (6) (7) (5) (6) (7) (5) (6) (7) 
  Lower Regime 
It-1 -0.097 0.923*** 1.364*** 0.274 -0.415 -3.044 0.982*** 2.701*** 1.174*** 2.834*** 1.907*** 1.779*** 
  (0.285) (0.343) (0.247) (0.260) (0.927) (2.123) (0.035) (0.669) (0.069) (0.902) (0.171) (0.145) 
COM 0.180     -0.082***     0.021     0.593**     
  (0.122)     (0.005)     (0.031)     (0.248)     
TRAD   3.138**     2.523***     2.158**     9.052***   
    (1.431)     (0.656)     (0.986)     (1.761)   
OTH     2.204**     2.545***     1.750***     1.858*** 
      (1.009)     (1.009)     (0.171)     (0.611) 
LTA -0.208*** -0.042 0.186** 0.056* 0.119* 0.831*** -0.011*** 0.418** 0.024*** 0.056 -0.016 -0.108*** 
  (0.051) (0.100) (0.090) (0.033) (0.064) (0.355) (0.004) (0.189) (0.008) (0.076) (0.018) (0.014) 
LCD -0.085** -0.048 -0.080* -0.01 -0.004 -0.011 -0.247*** -0.129*** -0.216*** -0.036 0.036 -0.037* 
  (0.036) (0.042) (0.048) (0.019) (0.054) (0.025) (0.068) (0.026) (0.008) (0.031) (0.026) (0.019) 
ETA -0.277* 0.189 -1.779*** -0.982*** -0.263 -6.603** -0.363*** 1.829** 1.038*** -0.203 -1.256*** 0.056 
  (0.154) (0.21) (0.522) (0.21) (0.37) (2.640) (0.023) (0.732) (0.162) (0.302) (0.229) (0.107) 
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
  Upper Regime  
It-1 -0.605 0.672 1.627*** 0.480 -0.180 -1.287 0.619*** 3.555*** 1.562*** 2.535*** 1.487*** 1.394*** 
  (0.418) (0.444) (0.290) (0.877) (0.953) (1.227) (0.032) (0.958) (0.054) (0.737) (0.142) (0.101) 
COM -0.461***     -0.148***     -0.154***     0.294     
  (0.118)     (0.041)     (0.009)     (0.231)     
TRAD   -0.299**     -0.340     -0.456     -0.098   
    (0.145)     (0.665)     (0.527)     (0.092)   
OTH     -1.325**     -0.842     -0.053***     -0.435*** 
      (0.550)     (0.879)     (0.013)     (0.121) 
LTA -0.164*** 0.025 -0.064 -0.044 0.241*** 0.181*** 0.018*** 0.130* 0.418*** 0.023 -0.046*** -0.046** 
  (0.041) (0.066) (0.048) (0.228) (0.073) (0.068) (0.005) (0.071) (0.112) (0.054) (0.014) (0.019) 
LCD 0.037 -0.035 -0.014 -0.012 -0.007 0.204 0.006** 0.160** 0.007 0.023 -0.009 -0.028 
  (0.037) (0.025) (0.114) (0.107) (0.054) (0.14) (0.003) (0.08) (0.018) (0.039) (0.024) (0.037) 
ETA -0.017 -0.319 0.551 -0.181 -1.380*** -2.174*** 0.290*** 2.354* 0.260 0.54*** -0.084 0.137 
  (0.213) (0.328) (1.165) (1.112) (0.428) (0.82) (0.057) (1.349) (0.166) (0.205) (0.096) (0.225) 
Threshold 6.869*** 0.437 0.633*** 13.060*** 0.670** 1.017*** 10.322*** 1.404*** 0.631*** 5.103*** 0.340*** 0.701*** 
  (0.563) (0.426) (0.200) (0.174) (0.284) (0.076) (0.260) (0.014) (0.052) (1.188) (0.059) (0.179) 
J-statistic 0.726 0.620 0.820 0.254 0.373 0.515 0.158 0.382 0.678 0.762 0.220 0.172 
Upper Regime  0.423 0.630 0.369 0.292 0.504 0.464 0.364 0.205 0.478 0.403 0.698 0.289 
Linearity test 0.001 0.065 0.000 0.093 0.032 0.095 0.051 0.623 0.036 0.062 0.079 0.000 
Observations 315 315 315 36 36 36 81 81 81 198 198 198 
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Fee-based activities exert different effects on banks’ overall risk level among the three 
groups. First, G-SIBs can always achieve benefits of risk reduction by increasing their 
fee-based activities. Moreover, when the proportion of fee and commissions achieves 
13.06%, the coefficient changes from -0.082 to -0.148, indicating that the increase of 
such activity could play an accelerator role to reduce G-SIBs’ risk and make these 
banks more and more stable. However, the results for D-SIBs are consistent with those 
for the whole sample, showing an inverse U-shape with the threshold at 10.322%. The 
regression results for N-SIBs indicate that banks in this group cannot obtain benefits 
from the expansion of fee and commissions in either the lower or upper regime.  
 
The above result can be explained by the fact that G-SIBs have skills and expertise in 
fee-based activities, since most banks started getting involved in this kind of business 
in the 1990s, being followed later by D-SIBs and finally by N-SIBs. In the case of 
banks with well-established systems and skilled workers, the expansion of this 
business can provide continuing risk-reduction benefits. 
 
Meanwhile, for D-SIBs, the sign for fee-based income in the lower regime changes 
from negative to positive. Thus there exists an inverse U-shaped relation between fee-
based income and banks’ risk indicator, with the threshold at 10.322%.  
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Next, for N-SIBs, although the expansion of fee-based income cannot reduce banks’ 
risk in either the lower or upper regime, the coefficient changes from 0.593 with 1% 
significance level in the lower regime, to 0.294 with insignificant level in the upper 
regime. We suggest that this risk-enhancement result is mainly due to an internal 
problem whereby N-SIBs are more concerned with their interest business, while with 
regard to the non-traditional business they focus more on trading and other activities 
rather than on fee-based income: this group has the lowest level of average HHI (13.39) 
among the three groups (25.12 for G-SIBs and 18.92 for D-SIBs). Moreover, among 
all non-interest activities they focus mainly on more profitable and high-leverage 
trading and other non-interest activities, whereas they do not have sufficient ability to 
deal with the risk that is generated from this kind of non-traditional activity.    
 
4.4.4  Income Diversification and Different Types of Risk 
 
Having discussed effects of different components of non-traditional income on the 
overall risk of the banks, we now investigate how income diversification affects 
different types of risk. We follow Valverde and Fernández (2007) to decompose 
overall risk faced by Chinese banks into its three components, namely, credit, liquidity 
and interest rate risk. Table 4.4 presents the estimation results for the effects of 
diversification on each of these risks, i.e., on credit risk (Model 8), liquidity risk 
(Model 9) and interest rate risk (Model 10).  
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The first column of Table 4.4 reports the results for the whole sample; it shows the 
regression outcome when employing the proxy of credit risk as the dependent variable. 
We find that income diversification can always make banks riskier in terms of credit 
risk (CREDIT). Next, the results for the liquidity risk shown in Model 9 differ from 
those for credit risk, indicating that the liquidity risk (LIQUIDITY) is significantly 
negatively correlated with income diversification in both the lower and upper 
diversification regimes. Finally, Model 10 under the whole sample presents the 
estimation results in relation to interest rate risk (INTEREST) when it is specified as 
the dependent variable.  
 
Turning to the next three columns, for G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs respectively, we 
find a consistent result in terms of the liquidity risk, which implies that diversification 
brings benefits to banks’ liquidity risk for both diversified and less diversified banks. 
This may be because, compared with traditional lending business, non-interest 
activities are less likely to be affected by the regulator’s capital restrictions, such as 
the capital adequacy requirement. Rather, an increase in non-interest activities will 
provide liquidity for banks and, therefore, reduce bank liquidity risk.  
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Table 4.4 Income diversification and risk for 35 Chinese banks from 2007 to 2016 
This table reports the first-differenced GMM threshold dynamic panel model developed by Seo and Shin (2016). Our dependent variables are loan default/total loans (CREDIT), 
liquidity assets/short term funding (LIQUIDITY), and interest rate risk calculated by interbank rate - interest rate for customer deposits; (INTEREST). It-1 refers to the lagged one 
period of the dependent variables. HHI indicates the income diversification using Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with the components of interest income and three activities under 
non-interest income. LCD is Loans / Customer Deposits, ETA refers to Equity / Total Assets, CIR is Cost to Income Ratio. J-statistic checks the null hypothesis, i.e., that the 
instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. Linearity test checks whether threshold exists. Figures in brackets present the standard error. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
  Whole Sample G-SIBs D-SIBs N-SIBs 
  CREDIT LIQUIDIT
Y 
INTERES
T 
CREDIT LIQUIDIT
Y 
INTERES
T 
CREDIT LIQUIDIT
Y 
INTERES
T 
CREDIT LIQUIDITY INTERES
T 
  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
  Lower Regime 
It-1 1.548** 1.370*** 0.595*** -1.370*** 0.399*** 0.883*** 0.319** -0.095** -1.229 -1.096*** 1.532*** 0.676 
  (0.733) (0.205) (0.189) (0.200) (0.056) (0.237) (0.143) (0.047) (0.994) (0.187) (0.410) (3.15) 
HHI 0.100*** -0.685** 0.045 0.038*** -1.360*** -0.031*** 0.034*** -0.627*** -0.245*** 0.102*** -3.201*** 0.305 
  (0.024) (0.337) (0.030) (0.004) (0.096) (0.006) (0.005) (0.14) (0.035) (0.022) (0.906) (0.437) 
LTA 0.064* -0.204 -0.109*** 0.308*** -0.198** 0.004 -0.005 0.258 0.187*** 0.076*** -0.769 -0.214** 
  (0.038) (0.603) (0.015) (0.028) (0.085) (0.033) (0.003) (0.173) (0.017) (0.011) (1.05) (0.105) 
LCD -0.063*** -1.742*** -0.059*** 0.133*** -0.913*** -0.028 0.020*** -1.450*** 0.042*** -0.031*** -0.198 0.017 
  (0.02) (0.587) (0.013) (0.016) (0.073) (0.019) (0.002) (0.113) (0.012) (0.010) (0.62) (0.108) 
ETA -0.399** 3.540** 0.03 -2.325*** 0.806* -0.500** -0.266*** 3.386*** -0.340** -0.245*** 2.270 0.756* 
  (0.200) (1.682) (0.051) (0.177) (0.481) (0.207) (0.051) (0.701) (0.151) (0.062) (1.937) (0.447) 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
  Upper Regime  
It-1 -0.072 -0.230 -0.146 -0.719*** -1.927*** -0.056*** -0.539*** -0.103*** 0.574 -0.322* 0.501** 0.252*** 
  (0.257) (0.324) (0.141) (0.083) (0.182) (0.021) (0.170) (0.036) (0.516) (0.168) (0.239) (0.09) 
HHI 0.057*** -1.072** -0.047*** -0.214*** -0.251*** -0.108*** -0.006** -1.234*** -0.077** 0.032*** -0.320 -0.044*** 
  (0.01) (0.451) (0.011) (0.019) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.059) (0.032) (0.004) (0.575) (0.007) 
LTA -0.030*** -0.399 -0.066*** 0.225*** 0.007 0.125*** -0.019*** 0.497*** 0.090*** 0.022*** -0.907** -0.042*** 
  (0.006) (0.336) (0.01) (0.013) (0.028) (0.005) (0.003) (0.069) (0.01) (0.006) (0.431) (0.006) 
LCD 0.039** 0.747 -0.059*** -0.040*** 0.038 -0.039*** 0.009 0.595*** 0.038 0.082*** -1.054*** -0.034*** 
  (0.016) (1.289) (0.013) (0.001) (0.031) (0.001) (0.005) (0.115) (0.032) (0.011) (0.32) (0.009) 
ETA 0.03 0.29 -0.177** -0.448*** -3.624*** -0.563*** 0.210*** -8.589*** 0.002 -0.218*** 6.859*** -0.298** 
  (0.067) (1.96) (0.073) (0.019) (0.104) (0.024) (0.042) (2.231) (0.284) (0.042) (2.062) (0.121) 
Thres
hold 
14.996*** 20.560*** 17.442*** 25.922*** 26.939*** 25.658*** 26.913*** 21.098*** 25.682*** 14.579*** 12.961*** 6.265*** 
  (0.813) (1.953) (0.671) (0.047) (0.061) (0.089) (0.334) (0.324) (1.549) (0.660) (0.929) (0.455) 
J-
statisti
c 
0.102 0.229 1 0.971 0.986 0.986 0.702 0.995 0.521 0.452 1 0.821 
Upper 
Regi
me  
0.505 0.269 0.403 0.403 0.344 0.442 0.145 0.343 0.188 0.376 0.466 0.873 
Linear
ity 
test 
0.095 0.004 0.084 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.033 0.007 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.097 
Obser
vation
s 
315  315 315 36 36 36 81 81 81 198 198 198 
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However, the regression results for credit and interest rate risks vary among the three 
groups. In detail, for both G-SIBs and D-SIBs, we see that there is an inversion of the 
signs for the diversification effect on credit risk between the low and high 
diversification regimes. At lower levels of diversification, income diversification will 
generate more credit risk. Once a bank has passed the threshold level, the increase of 
non-interest income will then lead to a reduction of credit risk. However, 59.7% of 
observations for G-SIBs, and 85.5% for D-SIBs, are in the lower diversification regime. 
Therefore, currently, most Chinese systemically important banks are suffering an 
increase in credit risk as a result of their relatively low level of diversification.  
 
However, the result for N-SIBs is different. In both the lower and upper regimes, the 
expansion of non-interest activities does not reduce banks’ credit risk at all. This result 
is also consistent with our previous results in section 4.4.2, as the credit risk is mainly 
created from traditional lending and fee-based activities, which are highly correlated 
with the interest income. Such low ability to deal with fee-based income and its risks 
leads to the enhancement of credit risk from income diversification.  
 
With regard to interest risk, for G-SIBs and D-SIBs we find a consistent result, where 
similar to the situation with liquidity risk, in both the lower and upper regimes 
diversification can reduce interest risk. One plausible explanation for this is that banks’ 
exposure to changes in interest rates is the result of bank asset-liability management. 
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A change in the interest rate would directly affect banks’ interest income and their 
liabilities; in particular, an increase in the interest rate would largely reduce the interest 
margin and the banks’ equity capital. Therefore, by engaging in non-interest activities 
banks can reduce their exposure to interest rate risk, especially when compared with 
banks that have a large percentage of mortgage lending business (Delong, 2001).  
 
For N-SIBs, which tend to be less diversified, an increase in the diversification level 
can increase the banks’ exposure to interest rate risk. Then, after passing a low 
threshold level (6.265), this correlation becomes negative. We suggest that this result 
is because the overall diversification level for N-SIBs is still relatively low, where the 
proportion of non-interest income occupies only 7.29% of total operating income. 
Hence, in the early stages of diversification, the increase of non-interest income will 
not have a big effect on banks’ overall interest risk.  
 
4.5  Conclusion 
 
This chapter examines to what extent income diversification affects the risks of 
Chinese banks. The majority of previous studies indicate a linear relation between 
income diversification and risk, finding either a negative correlation that suggests 
banks should diversify, or a positive correlation that suggests banks should remain 
focused on core business. However, by adopting the first-differenced GMM estimator 
for the dynamic threshold panel data model, we get results showing that in the case of 
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Chinese systemically important banks, the relation between income diversification and 
risk is not linear, and the effects of diversification vary with different sources of non-
interest activities and different measures of risk.  
 
Generally, there exists an inverse U-shaped relation between diversification level and 
risk in the Chinese banking industry. Income diversification will reduce bank risk only 
after the bank has passed a certain threshold of income diversification. This pattern of 
relationship seems to be driven mainly by the learn-by-doing effect and the mitigation 
of agency problems, which result from the expansion of non-interest activities. After 
dividing the sample into three groups based on the BIS definition and the Chinese 
regulator’s classification, we find that, for G-SIBs, diversification has a significant 
negative effect on both banks’ idiosyncratic risk and banks’ financial distress. 
However, for D-SIBs and N-SIBs, the effects again exhibit an inverse U-shape, where 
in the early stages of income diversification banks incur a discount and become less 
stable, while they become more stable after achieving a certain threshold point of 
diversification. We suggest that these differences are due to different diversification 
strategies and risk preferences, which lead to different income structures.  
 
The diversification effect on bank risk turns out to be not uniform across different 
business lines. Where there is only a low level of diversification, both trading and other 
non-interest activities will lead to increased exposure to risk; only once the bank has 
achieved a certain diversification level will these activities start to provide 
diversification benefits that will lower bank risk. With regard to the different 
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components of non-interest business, fee and commissions activities will decrease 
bank risk for G-SIBs and increase risk for N-SIBs regardless of diversification level, 
while for D-SIBs there is an inverse result, positive for banks with a lower level of 
diversification and negative for more diversified banks.  
 
We also examine the diversification effect across different types of risk. Evidence 
suggests that for G-SIBs and D-SIBs diversification can reduce credit risks only when 
the banks have passed a certain threshold point, while for N-SIBs diversification 
cannot bring any improvement for credit risk regardless of diversification level. 
Similarly, the interest rate risk will be reduced only for highly diversified G-SIBs and 
D-SIBs. Finally, diversification will always reduce the liquidity risk, for all three 
groups. However, the reduction of the liquidity risk cannot fully offset the 
enhancement of the credit and interest rate risks. Therefore, it is necessary for banks 
to cross the threshold in order to obtain the risk-reduction benefits from diversification.  
Furthermore, this implies that to fully reap the benefits of risk reduction from income 
diversification, banks need to accumulate sufficient banking human capital and to 
establish an effective supervision system.  
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Chapter 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 Income Diversification and 
Bank Efficiency 
 
 
 
This chapter examines the efficiency of the 
Chinese banking sector in relation to banks’ 
diversification operations. In a two-step 
approach, the chapter first calculates both cost 
and profit efficiency scores via stochastic 
frontier analysis using the method of within 
maximum likelihood estimation (WMLE). 
Then, the investigation employs a dynamic 
Tobit model in order to shed light on the 
diversification-efficiency nexus in the 
Chinese banking market. 
5 
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Chapter 5  
Income Diversification and Bank Efficiency 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 have explored the benefits and risks associated with Chinese banks’ 
engagement in income diversification. Another critical aspect of the effects of banks’ 
income diversification is the extent to which banks’ efficiency would be affected.  
Therefore, in order to provide a fuller picture of the consequences of banks’ 
diversification, this chapter is devoted to investigating the efficiency of the 
diversifying banks in China.  In a two-step approach, first, bank efficiency scores, 
both cost and profit, are calculated for the three main categories of Chinese banks. The 
computation is based on stochastic frontier analysis using within maximum likelihood 
estimation (WMLE). In the second step, a dynamic Tobit model is estimated to 
examine unobserved, time-invariant bank heterogeneity. Finally, the empirical 
findings are discussed with reference to the different banking groups.  
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5.1  Introduction 
 
The impact of diversification on bank efficiency has been a contentious issue in the 
literature. One school in the debate subscribes to the view that diversification is 
efficiency enhancing. Based on the portfolio theory, Meng et al. (2017) argue that 
diversification can yield separation of risks and hence is beneficial to banks’ efficiency. 
Additional channels through which diversification may enhance banks’ efficiency 
include gains accruing due to scale and scope economies (Meslier et al., 2014), tax 
reduction as a result of higher financial leverage (Elsas et al., 2010), improved 
corporate governance (Lin et al., 2012), and a reduction in asymmetric information 
between borrowers and lenders (Akhigbe and Stevenson, 2010).  
 
On the other hand, the opposing school argues that shifting from focused to diversified 
operations has a negative impact on bank efficiency. This may be caused by, for 
example, the increased correlation of internal businesses and the growing complexity 
across business lines (Elyasiani and Wang, 2012), where the presence of too many 
business lines may lead to disorganized management. Hence, more diversified banks 
can incur additional overhead costs (Elsas et al., 2010), inefficient cross-subsidization 
(Klein and Saidenberg, 2010), inefficient internal capital markets within multinational 
groups (Curi et al., 2015), and the problems related to ‘too big to fail’ status (Quaglia 
and Spendzharova, 2017). Furthermore, diversification can cause banks to have no 
power or incentive to monitor (Allen et al., 2011; Adzobu et al., 2017).  
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Ultimately, whether or not diversification can increase or reduce bank efficiency is a 
matter of empirical evidence. This chapter contributes to the debate through empirical 
investigation into the efficiency effect of diversification in the Chinese banking sector. 
As in previous chapters, the sample comprises 40 major Chinese commercial banks, 
which are divided into three sub-groups: Global Systemically Important Banks (G-
SIBs), Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs), and banks that are not 
classified by the authorities as systemically important (N-SIBs). This grouping enables 
us to examine the possible heterogeneity of efficiency effects due to bank 
diversification. 
 
Similar research in the previous literature is mostly based on analysis of financial ratios, 
and employs balance sheet and stock market data (e.g. Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Meslier et al., 2014). However, financial ratios 
suffer from several accounting biases, such that they are unlikely to offer a full account 
of the business mix and input prices (Titova, 2016) and fail to provide information 
about managerial actions (Yeboah and Asirifi, 2016) or the quality of service under 
complex business networks (LaPlante, 2015).  
 
We deploy a two-stage approach in which the first step is to obtain the efficiency scores 
through the stochastic frontier analysis. Based on within maximum likelihood 
estimation (WMLE), as developed by Chen et al. (2014), stochastic frontier analysis 
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(SFA) contains more information and more factors, which are difficult to quantify 
when using financial ratio based estimation and non-parametric approaches, such as 
data envelopment analysis (DEA). Furthermore, the SFA method employed by this 
research is particularly appropriate for the Chinese context, since issues regarding data 
availability mean that the panel data are relatively short.  My approach to SAF 
analysis, which employs the first-difference data transformation, eliminates nuisance 
parameters, thus solving the incidental parameters problem and making the estimation 
of the efficiency scores unbiased (Greene, 2005). 
  
In the next stage, we deploy the dynamic Tobit model to determine to what extent 
diversification drives Chinese banks’ efficiency. Unlike OLS and other linear 
estimation methods, the Tobit model is able to take into account the censored nature 
of the dependent variable. Since in the model in this study the efficiency scores are 
limited to between 0 and 1, the Tobit model is suitable for use in the regression on 
these variables and should yield consistent estimates that avoid the problems of bias 
and inconsistency associated with OLS (Souza and Gomes, 2015). The dependent 
variable used in the regression is assumed to be half normally distributed; hence, the 
regression errors are subject to normal distribution. Most non-censored estimates, such 
as OLS, assume that the dependent variable can take on every negative or positive real 
number. This means ignoring fractionality, which may lead to biased estimation and 
inconsistent parameters (Greene, 1980). In addition, other non-linear estimations, such 
as the fractional Probit model, are less likely to capture the dynamic effect. The 
presence of lagged dependent variables requires specification of the distribution of 
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unobserved effects in a maximum likelihood framework, which leads to inconsistent 
results in the fractional Probit model (Papke and Wooldridge, 2008). 
 
We apply the dynamic doubly censored Tobit model with a left censored bound of zero 
and a right censored bound of one to regress efficiency scores against banks’ income 
diversification (Elsas and Florysiak, 2015). Several control variables are introduced 
into the model. This modelling choice allows for bank heterogeneity, does not require 
balanced panel data and is robust to missing data in unbalanced panels.  
 
Our study is also the first to investigate the diversification effect on banks’ efficiency 
across banking groups. This yields a number of insights, as banks in the three groups 
exhibit very different characteristics in terms of capital restriction, size and 
diversification level, which could help to shed light on, for example, whether the 
diversification effect varies with bank scale.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides an overview 
of the relevant literature regarding bank efficiency and income diversification. The 
variables, data, and methodology are discussed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 outlines the 
model specification and reports the empirical results. The conclusion is presented in 
Section 5.5. 
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5.2  Literature Review 
 
Two main theoretical views regarding the effect of diversification on banks’ efficiency 
have emerged in the literature, namely, the bank-based view and the market-based 
view. Built on the theory of financial intermediation, the bank-based view maintains 
that the benefits generated by diversification stem mainly from the information 
advantages (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991; Saunders and Walter, 1994; Lepetit et al., 
2008; Elyasiani and Wang, 2012). According to Elyasiani and Wang (2012), 
information can be treated as an important input factor to influence banks’ efficiency 
in terms of customer relation consolidation and credit screening. Alternatively, with 
mixed business lines, managers are more likely to lower their personal risk by over-
diversifying their banks’ portfolios (Deng and Elyasiani, 2008). As a result, non-
interest income could result in excessive profits and bonuses to managers themselves. 
In this situation, banks would continually expand the range of non-traditional business, 
even if diversification of activities lowers the market valuation of the banking 
conglomerate (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). 
 
While banks can reap diversification benefits through operational synergies (Lin, 
2012), the attainment of these synergies relies on scale economies (Stiroh, 2000; Sanya 
and Wolfe, 2011). As argued by Drucker and Puri (2008) and Klein and Saidenberg 
(2010), the expansion of non-interest business is largely based on banks’ infrastructure, 
and a mixed business line strategy could help banks spread fixed costs and managerial 
overheads. Scale economies may also lead to operational benefits because cross-
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selling strategy companies could share the costs of monitoring, advertising and account 
maintenance, thus further reducing cost and hence improving banks’ production 
efficiency (Elyasiani and Wang, 2012).  
 
From the perspective of resource allocation, whereas focused-business companies can 
only configure resources through external capital markets, diversified companies can 
be more effective through the internal capital market (Elyasiani et al., 2016). This 
could help banks to reallocate internal resources from less-profitable sectors to more-
effective sectors. 
 
The market-based view introduces a competitive framework to explain how income 
diversification could result in efficiency improvement or discount. Several studies 
suggest that the diversification process could lead to more intense competition in the 
banking industry (e.g. Schaeck and Cihak, 2010; Ariss, 2010; Ibragimov et al., 2011; 
Beck et al., 2013). Authors such as Lepetit et al. (2008), Schaeck and Cihak (2010), 
Allen et al. (2011), Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) and Amidu and Wolfe (2013) then 
believe that a more intense competitive environment could help banks achieve more 
efficient management of operation and risk.  
 
Conversely, some researchers argue that fiercer competition could exacerbate risk. 
Vives (2011) suggests two channels for such risk enhancement. First, increased 
interbank competition could exacerbate the coordination problem and hence increase 
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banks’ frangibility. Second, managers’ risk-taking behaviour may change in the face 
of a more competitive environment. With more pressure on profits, there would be an 
increased incentive for managers to take on more excessive risk on either side of the 
bank’s balance sheet, resulting in higher fragility (Amidu and Wolfe, 2013). In 
addition, in a more-competitive banking market banks earn less informational rent 
from their relationship with borrowers and would therefore have less incentive to 
properly screen borrowers, which would further increase the risk of fragility (Allen 
and Gale, 2004; Beck et al., 2013). 
 
In empirical studies, bank efficiency can be evaluated through ratio analysis that 
employs accounting data (Cornett et al., 2006; Xu, 2011; Jiang et al., 2013; Sun et al., 
2013). However, accounting ratios are unlikely to offer a full account of the business 
mix and input prices (Havranek et al., 2016) because accounting-based efficiency 
measurements implicitly assume that all assets are equally costly to produce and that 
all locations have equal operation expenditures.  
 
Alternatively, data envelopment analysis (DEA) has been widely used in the literature 
for estimating bank efficiency (i.e. Biener et al., 2016; Aggelopoulos and 
Georgopoulos, 2017). DEA is a non-parametric tool for performance evaluation and 
benchmarking. The method empirically measures efficiency of decision-making units 
by estimating the efficiency frontiers, and can also be used for benchmarking in 
operations management. Since its introduction by Charnes et al. (1978), DEA has been 
applied to many industries, including the banking sector. In DEA, the efficiency is 
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measured against the highest observed performance instead of an average 
(Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass, 1992). As a non-parametric approach to measuring 
efficiency, the major advantage of DEA is that it does not assume a particular 
functional form/shape for the frontier; hence, it can be used when conventional cost 
and profit cannot be justified (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). However, its drawbacks 
include a lack of measurement of errors and luck factors, sensitivity to outliers, an 
inability to measure absolute efficiency, and ignoring price information (Berger and 
Mester, 1997; Fiorentino et al., 2006).  
 
More recently, researchers have increasingly used stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
to evaluate banks’ efficiency. SFA is a fully parameterized model and is now the 
mainstream parametric technique for efficiency analysis. Compared with non-
parametric methods, such as DEA, stochastic methods could be more effective and 
robust when treating noisy data (LaPlante, 2015). Due to consideration of random 
errors in the functional form, they can measure some factors that are very difficult to 
quantify, such as companies’ luck or even the influence of the weather.  
 
Originally developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977), 
SFA has been applied in a large number of efficiency studies, including studies of 
banks; see Berger and Humphrey (1997) for an extensive survey of 130 studies 
regarding the efficiency in financial institutions. Many varieties of the stochastic 
frontier model have appeared in the literature; see a major survey by Kumbhakar and 
Lovell (2003) and also Bauer (1990) and Greene (2008). The method involves 
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estimation of both cost and profit efficiency (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003). With 
regard to cost efficiency, SFA measures how far a firm is from full-cost minimization. 
In the profit efficiency analysis, the firm in question is treated as a profit-maximizer. 
Since the concept of profit efficiency takes into consideration the effects of output 
choice on costs and revenues, it is broader than that of cost efficiency. 
 
The empirical evidence regarding the effects of bank income diversification on 
efficiency has been mixed. Pasiouras et al. (2007) suggests that there is a positive effect 
on banks’ efficiency level. Such improvement in banks’ efficiency could be explained 
by the soft information provided through prolonged close interaction with clients 
(Gourlay et al., 2006). Doan et al. (2017) focuses on a cross-country case and suggests 
that banks can achieve significant profit efficiency gains through greater 
diversification of their risk exposure. In addition, a better mix of financial products 
also protects banks’ firm-specific human capital, as diversification through mergers 
and acquisition will help banks to expand the skill set of managers, which will in turn 
contribute to improving risk management and smoothing credit operations.  
 
Beccalli and Frantz (2009) employ SFA to generate estimates of cost and alternative 
profit efficiencies from 1991 to 2005. They find a marked improvement in cost 
efficiency and argue that this improvement would not have occurred in the absence of 
increases in both on- and off-balance sheet activities in EU mergers and acquisitions. 
Similar results are obtained by Doan et al. (2017), who, by adopting cross-country data, 
demonstrate that increased diversification tends to improve bank efficiency.  
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Among the research on emerging markets, Kwan (2006) analyses the cost efficiency 
of Hong Kong banks; by employing SFA, he verifies that efficiency improvement is 
mainly generated from scale economies because of the increased contribution of non-
interest income. Alhassan (2015) uses the same parametric approach to estimate both 
cost and profit efficiency of banks in Ghana, and detects efficiency improvement.  
 
However, some studies provide evidence for a diversification discount. The results of 
Wu’s (2008) investigation of 11 Taiwan banks suggest that an expansion of broad 
financial product lines would not bring an efficiency improvement but would further 
increase the losses from bad loans and erode banks’ original efficiency level. Similarly, 
Abbott et al. (2013), in their study of Australian banks over the period 1983-2001, 
observe that an increase in the number of business lines through diversified growth 
does not drive significant improvement in banks’ overall efficiency. In particular, 
banks in the very early stages of diversification and business expansion through 
mergers with other financial institutions might not achieve competitive advantages in 
the short term as they lack relevant competence. Several studies support this view (e.g. 
Barth et al., 2013; Alhassan and Tetteh, 2017), confirming that for banks, especially 
in the early stages of diversification, lack of experience causes inefficiency.  This 
would be especially so in the case of emerging countries. 
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Research has also found that bank size is relevant to the effect of income 
diversification on efficiency. Empirical evidence from the US and Europe markets, 
which accounts for the bulk of the current research in the field, generally suggests that 
an increase in non-interest activities can improve efficiency through economies of 
scale (Drake et al., 2009; Elsas et al., 2010), which implies that the benefits of income 
diversification are driven by a larger bank size. In contrast, small banks emphasize 
basic banking activities with low-cost funds and high-quality investments, thus 
limiting their overall performance and efficiency. Further, evidence indicates that once 
companies have achieved a certain scale, then diminishing profitability and 
productivity would stimulate them to search for new investment opportunities (Bakke 
and Gu, 2017). Therefore, a diversification strategy is more likely to be adopted by 
larger companies with diminishing value.  
 
However, using a sample of Ukraine banks, Mertens and Urga (2001) find that small 
commercial banks have more efficient performance in terms of cost compared with 
large-sized banks, and thus detect diseconomies of scale in the banking sector. 
Similarly, in their investigation of the US bank holding companies, Akhigbe and 
Stevenson (2010) find that the benefits from scale economies are not sufficient to 
improve banks’ efficiency, but generate an efficiency discount. 
 
Research that examines the effect of income diversification on Chinese banks is just 
emerging. Zhang (2003) investigates Chinese listed commercial banks and finds that 
banks’ profitability is highly correlated with diversification levels, with a positive sign. 
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Meanwhile, banks’ operational risk has a non-significant but negative correlation with 
diversification. Xia and Huang (2017) further suggest that the risk-reduction effect is 
mainly generated from portfolio diversification.  
 
Chi et al. (2006) apply DEA to balance sheet data from 14 Chinese banks and find that 
more diversified banks with higher levels of non-interest activities could gain large 
improvements in their efficiency scores. Using the same efficiency estimation 
approach as Chi et al. (2006), Chen and Chen (2015) expand the sample to city banks 
in China and find a diversification premium, driven mainly by the accumulation of 
professionals and technological spillover effects from other business lines.  
 
Wei and Liu (2007) introduce the entropy index to evaluate the diversification level in 
the Chinese banking sector and find a very small positive diversification effect on 
banks’ efficiency. Xia and Huang (2017) detect a less-significant efficiency premium 
and present evidence that the increased management and operational costs greatly 
decrease the efficiency improvement obtained from a cross-selling strategy. Similar 
results are reported in Liu and Ji’s (2014) study of 45 Chinese banks during the period 
from 2008 to 2012. By employing the DEA approach, Liu and Ji (2014) find that the 
expansion of non-interest activities causes devaluation of banks’ efficiency, driven 
mainly by risk enhancement and increased management cost.  
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5.3  Variables, Data and Methodology 
 
5.3.1  Variables  
 
Measures of Banks’ Efficiency. Two efficiency scores are used in this chapter, namely 
scores for cost efficiency and for profit efficiency. Both are calculated through 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) deploying the within maximum likelihood 
estimation (WMLE) method. Each efficiency score ranges from 0 to 1, indicating least 
to highest efficiency. A commercial bank with an efficiency score of 0.7 is 70% as 
efficient as the best-performing banks in the sample year.  
 
The banking literature includes two main perspectives on the role of commercial banks 
and the components of inputs and outputs used to estimate efficiency score.  The 
production approach suggests that production units use physical inputs such as capital 
and labour to supply service to customers to achieve outputs such as taking customer 
deposits and issuing loans. On the other hand, the intermediation approach treats 
commercial banks as intermediaries, whose function is to gather funds from the public 
and transfer these into profitable assets and projects. Owing to issues regarding data 
availability, this study follows Dong et al. (2016) in choosing the intermediation 
approach to estimate the efficiency level. This is because the information required 
under the production approach, such as the number of accounts held by the bank, is 
204 
 
not publicly available, whereas the intermediation approach requires accounting-based 
information that can be found in public annual banking reports.  
 
Therefore, this thesis uses two inputs (𝑥𝑖𝑡) prices, namely the price of total physical 
capital (TC), which is measured by the ratio of other operating expenses to the book 
value of fixed assets; and the price of total borrowed funds (TF), which is measured 
by the ratio of total interest expenses on borrowed funds to total borrowed funds. The 
outputs (𝑦𝑖𝑡) can be broken down into total loans (TL), other earning assets (OEA), 
and non-interest income (LA). The total cost used in the model includes both interest 
and operating expenses, including interest expenses, employee benefits, employee 
salaries and other operating costs.  
 
To solve the omitted variables problem of the sample of banks, this study introduces 
three control variables. Following Dong et al. (2014), we use the total equity capital 
(z) of the specific banks as a quasi-fixed input in the banking cost function in order to 
control for banks’ insolvency risk and different risk preferences. In addition, time trend 
(T) is used to account for the effects of technical progress, such as the learning-by-
doing effect and technical spillover, over time.  
 
Measures of Income Diversification. Following Amidu and Wolfe (2013), Gurbuz et 
al. (2013) and Meslier et al. (2014), we adopt the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) 
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as the indicator of diversification. It is commonly used in similar research and is 
calculated as: 
 
DIV = 1- [(INT / TOR)2 +(FEE / TOR)2 + (TRA / TOR)2 + (OTH/ TOR)2]   (5.1) 
 
where INT is the gross interest revenue, TOR is the total operating revenue, COM 
refers to the ratio of net fee and commission income to total operating income, TRA is 
the ratio of net trading income to total operating income, and OTH indicates the ratio 
of net other operating income to total operating income.  
 
The investigation of diversification activity considers three types of income, namely, 
fee and commission income, trading income and other income. Following Köhler 
(2014), we use the corresponding indexes as proxies. These are the ratio of net fee and 
commission income to total operating income (COM), ratio of net trading income to 
total operating income (TRA), and ratio of net other operating income to total 
operating income (OTH).  
 
Measures of Competitiveness. The Lerner index is adopted as the indicator of the level 
of competitiveness of the banking sector. The Lerner index is defined as the difference 
between a bank’s price and the marginal cost divided by the price. The price is 
estimated by the average price of bank production as the ratio of total revenue to total 
assets (Tan et al., 2017), that is: 
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Lerner = (p − MC)/p               (5.2) 
 
The higher the index is, the more market power and competitiveness the bank in 
question possesses. The marginal cost is the key input for estimating the Lerner index, 
and it can be calculated by taking the first derivative of the dependent variables in the 
translog equation. Specifically, following Tan et al. (2017), the marginal cost is 
estimated on the basis of a translog cost function with signal output (total assets). 
Because of the data restriction of the labour process, we select two input prices, namely 
price of capital and price of funds. Also, we use a fixed net-put (equity) and technical 
changes (using a time trend as a proxy).  
 
Other Variables. The other variables include the following:  
 
NIM: This is the net interest margin, indicating the net interest revenue over total 
earning assets. It is intended to describe the interest-based activities (Lepetit et al., 
2008; Busch and Kick, 2009; Köhler, 2014). 
 
ETA: To adjust for banks’ attitude toward efficiency, we adopt the ratio of equity to 
assets, which describes the degree of total financial leverage and capital adequacy 
(Stiroh, 2004; Pennathur et al., 2012; Gurbuz et al., 2013).  
207 
 
 
CIR: The cost-income ratio is estimated through the operating expenses relative to 
gross income, which measures banks’ cost structure (Busch and Kick, 2009).  
 
5.3.2  Data Sample 
 
Our sample comprises an unbalanced panel of 40 Chinese commercial banks from 
2005 to 2016, with annual data drawn mainly from BankScope and banks’ annual 
reports. The sample accounts for 79% of total assets of the Chinese banking industry. 
Drawing from Basel III and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), the 
banks are divided into three groups: global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), 
domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs), and other banks that are not 
classified by the authorities as systemically important (N-SIBs).  
 
5.3.3  Methodology 
 
5.3.3.1  Investigation Strategy: Estimation of the Efficiency Scores  
 
We adopt a two-stage strategy to investigate the relationship between bank efficiency 
and bank diversification in China. First, we estimate the efficiency of the banks. This 
is achieved by using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to evaluate banks’ efficiency 
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scores. Employing a set of statistical techniques for economic modelling of firm 
behaviour, the SFA explicitly recognizes the existence of firm inefficiency. Its 
theoretical underpinning can be traced back to Hicks (1935), who claimed that in 
addition to seeking profit maximization, monopolists may have other motivations that 
lead to sub-optimality of production. This argumentation has opened a path for 
research on producers who behave in a less than optimal manner when seeking profit 
maximization or cost minimization.  Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van den 
Broeck (1977) were among the first to apply the theory to empirical estimation of 
producers’ conduct in the presence of firm inefficiency. The empirical research was 
initially focused on the production function, and then expanded to the cost function. 
Subsequently, the research has extended from economics to financial studies (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003; Cavallo and Rossi, 2002; Kraft 
et al., 2006; Fenn et al., 2008; Kao and Liu, 2009; Feng and Zhang, 2012; Dong et al., 
2014; Dong et al., 2016). 
 
For illustration, we start with the production frontier model, which is the empirical 
departure point for SFA. The production frontier model in log form can be presented 
as: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽
`𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,                (5.3) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜈𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 .         
 
209 
 
where i = 1, . . . , N indexes firms and t = 1, . . . , T indexes time periods. In Eq (5.3),  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the observed scalar output of the producer i at time t; 𝑥𝑖𝑡 represents the vector 
of N production inputs used by producer i (e.g. labour and capital); 𝛽 is a vector of 
technology parameters to be estimated, so that f(𝑥𝑖𝑡, β) is known as the production 
frontier since it indicates the frontier of maximal output for a given set of inputs xi. In 
addition, 𝛼𝑖captures the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of time-invariant effects 
(of incidental parameters), and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 indicates the error term. This error term is a 
compound one consisting of two components: 𝜈𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡. Here, {𝜈𝑖𝑡} is the noise 
component capturing the effects of random shocks affecting the production process. 
This component introduces stochasticity into the model. The {- uit} component 
contains non-negative errors representing unobserved inefficiency, which is the salient 
feature of SFA. To elaborate, let TEi denote the i-th firm’s technical efficiency, 
measured by the ratio of observed output to maximum feasible output. TEi = 1 means 
firm i obtains the maximum feasible output, while TEi < 1 indicates that the firm 
achieves less than its maximum feasible output. So, we have TEi ≤ 1. Further, if we 
let TEi = -ui, then in exponential form, we have exp TEi= exp {-ui}, where ui ≥ 0, given 
TEi ≤ 1. Plugging exp {-ui} into Eq. (5.1), and recall that it is in log form, we have:  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽
`𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡              (5.4) 
 
This sheds further light on Eq. (5.3), showing that Eq. (5.4) is actually an error-
component model.  
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Whereas we employ the production frontier model for illustration of the modelling 
setup and methodology, SFA also examines cost efficiency (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2003) and has been applied to other areas of economics and banking analysis. For 
functional forms, in addition to the common use of natural logarithms, other forms 
such as translog functions are also modelled. Depending on the modelling specification, 
appropriate elements are selected for the cost or profit frontier of xi.  The (ui) 
component of the composed error can also be production, revenue, profit, or cost 
inefficiency.  
 
Given that the research interest of this chapter is bank efficiency in China, we specify 
stochastic frontier analysis in terms of both profit and cost efficiency (See Eqs. 5.28 – 
5.31). The underlying model is similar to that of the production frontier model. Some 
revisions are made so that the examination addresses both the profit frontier and the 
cost frontier function. In these models, it is the banks rather than corporate producers 
that are the profit-maximizers or cost-minimizers. The outputs are the observed total 
cost or profits of the bank i at time t.  
 
Estimation of SFA may be conducted via Greene’s (2005) true fixed-effects approach. 
However, that approach suffers from the incidental parameters problem, whereby the 
variance parameters are more likely to be affected under the short-panel condition 
(Greene, 2005). Belotti and Ilardi (2012) suggest that this may be improved if the panel 
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length is sufficiently large, 15 or greater. However, since the number of time periods 
in the data sample is only 12, Greene’s model is not suitable for the estimation, due to 
the limited data. Instead, we adopt the method of within maximum likelihood 
estimation (WMLE) introduced by Chen et al. (2014) based on fixed-effects estimation. 
More specifically, Chen et al.’s (2014) estimation is based on the within-transformed 
model using the maximum likelihood method. This procedure does not suffer from the 
‘incidental parameters’ problem because within-transformation removes the incidental 
parameters and the firm effects are fixed, such that: 
 
?̃?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧?̅?                  (5.5) 
 
where for each panel i and any variable (z), the individual mean (𝑧?̅?) is subtracted from 
the observed value in period t (𝑧𝑖𝑡) which can be defined as 𝑧?̅? =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑡 .Therefore, 
deviations from the means (?̃?𝑖𝑡) can be used in the model. The resulting formulation is 
free of 𝛼𝑖; specifically, ?̃?𝑖 = 0. Thus, the fixed-effects stochastic frontier model with 
within transformation is of the form: 
 
?̃?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
`?̃?𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀?̃?𝑡,                 (5.6) 
 
𝜀?̃?𝑡 = 𝜈𝑖𝑡 − ?̃?𝑖𝑡 ,                  (5.7) 
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𝜈𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷 𝒩(0, σ𝑣
2),                 (5.8) 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷 ℱu(σ𝑢
2), i = 1, … , n, t = 1 … , T,           (5.9) 
 
where error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 indicates the difference between the idiosyncratic error term 𝜈𝑖𝑡 
and inefficiency component 𝑢𝑖𝑡 . 𝜈𝑖𝑡  and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  are independently distributed. The 
inefficiency term 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is distributed according to ℱu  with a specific non-normal 
distribution, and we assume that it is half-normal, whereas 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is normally distributed. 
Let λ =
𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
 and 𝜎2 = 𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑣
2. Then, the density of the composed error should be:  
 
f(ε) =
2
𝜎
𝜑 (
𝜀
𝜎
) 𝜙 (−
𝜆𝜀
𝜎
)              (5.10) 
 
The distribution of equation (5.10) is a member of the skewed normal family 
introduced by Azzalini (1985), which suggests that the Closed Skew Normal (CSN) 
distribution is suitable in the stochastic frontier context. The distribution of the 
composed error can be written as: 
 
𝜖𝑖𝑡~𝐶𝑆𝑁1,1(0, 𝜎
2, −
𝜆
𝜎
, 0,1)              (5.11) 
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The density of 𝐶𝑆𝑁𝑝,𝑞 distribution includes a p-dimensional pdf and a q-dimensional 
cdf of a normal distribution. With panel data, the distribution of T-dimensional vector 
(𝜖𝑖 = (𝜖𝑖1, … , 𝜖𝑖𝑇)
`) can be rewritten as: 
 
𝜖𝑖~𝐶𝑆𝑁𝑇,𝑇(0𝑇 , 𝜎
2𝐼𝑇 , −
𝜆
𝜎
𝐼𝑇 , 0𝑇 , 𝐼𝑇)            (5.12) 
 
where I is the identity matrix, in which the vector includes the mean of errors, i.e. 𝜖?̅? =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑡  and 𝜖?̃?
∗ = (𝜖?̃?1, … , 𝜖?̃?,𝑇−1)
`,  which indicates the vector of the first T − 1 
deviations from the mean (𝜖?̃?
∗). The likelihood function is parameterized in terms of 𝛽, 
𝜆 = 𝜎𝑢/𝜎𝑣  and 𝜎
2 = 𝜎𝑢
2+𝜎𝑣
2 , where the incidental parameters problem is avoided 
and inefficiency is allowed to be time-varying. By adopting the point estimator of 
Battese and Coelli (1988), the composed error can be written as: 
 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?
`𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖                    (5.13) 
 
In equation (5. 13), the value of ?̂?𝑖 can be estimated through the method proposed by 
Chen et al. (2014), where 
 
?̂?𝑖
𝑀 = ?̅?𝑖 − ?̂?
`?̅?𝑖 + √
2
𝜋
?̂?𝑢                     (5.14) 
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where ?̂?` and ?̂?𝑢 are the within maximum likelihood estimation (WMLE) estimates. 
Then, based on Battese and Coelli (1988), the efficiency term can be calculated as: 
 
EFF𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸(exp (−𝑢𝑖𝑡)|𝜖𝑖𝑡)                    (5.15) 
 
5.3.3.2 Dynamic Doubly Censored Tobit Model 
 
In the second step, we employ the limited dependent variable model to investigate the 
effects of diversification on bank efficiency, since each set of the efficiency scores is 
limited to values between 0 and 1. Furthermore, in the model used here, the distribution 
of the dependent variable is expected to be half normal rather than normal, and the 
error terms cannot meet the assumption of a normal distribution. Thus, non-censored 
estimates such as OLS will be biased and inappropriate for estimation, since in OLS, 
the dependent variable can take on a negative or positive real value. The consequences 
of ignoring fractionality may result in biased estimation and inconsistent parameter 
estimates (Greene, 1980). Therefore, we set up the dynamic doubly censored Tobit 
model with a left censored bound of zero and a right censored bound of one to regress 
bank-level efficiency scores against banks’ income diversification and several control 
variables.  
 
The dynamic Tobit estimation was developed by Elsas and Florysiak (2015), based on 
Loudermilk (2007). With this estimator, the distribution of the unobserved fixed 
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effects is assumed to be conditional on the initial value of the dependent variable and 
the time averages of the exogenous explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2005). In 
essence, this modelling strategy allows for firm heterogeneity. An additional important 
feature of this approach is that, unlike the dynamic Tobit model of Loudermilk (2007), 
the approach by Elsas and Florysiak (2015) does not require balanced panel data and 
is robust to missing data in unbalanced panels.  
 
The Elsas and Florysiak (2015) dynamic Tobit model is suitable for unbalanced 
dynamic panel data with a fractional dependent variable (DPF estimator) and can 
capture fixed effects in estimating the unobserved, time-invariant firm heterogeneity. 
In this approach, the DPF estimator is a doubly censored Tobit estimator employing a 
latent variable specification to estimate the fractional nature of the dependent variable. 
The specification includes corner observations at 0 and 1, with a lagged dependent 
variable. In its general form, we have:  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝑔(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1)𝜌 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡,                   (5.16) 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡|(𝑧𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑖0, 𝑐𝑖)~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2).                  (5.17) 
 
The observable doubly censored dependent variable with two possible corner 
outcomes is as follows: 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 =
0         𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 0
     𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗        𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  < 1
1        𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ≥ 1
           (5.18) 
 
where 𝑧𝑖𝑡 refers to strictly exogenous regressors, 𝑐𝑖 indicates the unobserved effect, 
and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is a normally distributed error term; 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is the unobserved latent variable, 
which is set equal to zero when it is below zero and to one when it is greater than one. 
The joint density of (𝑦𝑖1, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑇) given (𝑦𝑖0, 𝑧𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖) is given by: 
 
𝑓(𝑦𝑖1, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑇|𝑦𝑖0, 𝑧𝑖, 𝑐𝑖) = ∑ 𝑓𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 (𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖; 𝜃)        (5.19) 
 
As the density of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = (𝑦𝑖1, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑇) given (𝑦𝑖0, 𝑧𝑖, 𝑐𝑖), to proceed with the estimation 
it is necessary to specify the density of 𝑐𝑖 given (𝑦𝑖0, 𝑧𝑖, 𝑐𝑖). Elsas and Florysiak’s DPF 
estimator specifies a conditional distribution for unobserved heterogeneity 𝑐𝑖 based 
on Loudermilk (2007). The unobserved fixed-effects distribution is assumed to be: 
 
𝑐𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑦𝑖0 + 𝑧?̅?𝑡
` 𝛼2 + 𝜀𝑖              (5.20) 
 
where the error term 𝜀𝑖 is normally distributed, and 𝑧?̅?,𝑡
`  is the time-series average of 
𝑧𝑖𝑡. Unlike the Tobit estimation developed by Loudermilk (2007), rather than including 
the term 𝑧𝑖𝑡, the DPF estimator assumes that the fixed effects distribution depends on 
time-series averages of the exogenous variables; hence, it does not require the fixed 
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effects to depend on a balanced panel. The substitution for 𝑐𝑖is produced by: 
 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0|𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑧?̅?𝑡
` , 𝑦𝑖0, 𝛼𝑖)           
= Φ(
−?̅?𝑖𝑡
` 𝛾−𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1𝜌−𝛼0−𝛼1𝑦𝑖0−𝛼2?̅?𝑖
`−𝛼𝑖
𝜎𝑢
)                  (5.21) 
 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑧?̅?𝑡
` , 𝑦𝑖0, 𝛼𝑖)           
= Φ(
?̅?𝑖𝑡
` 𝛾+𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1𝜌+𝛼0+𝛼1𝑦𝑖0+𝛼2?̅?𝑖
`+𝛼𝑖−1
𝜎𝑢
)                 (5.22) 
 
and  
 
𝜕𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡≤𝑦|𝑤𝑖𝑡,?̅?𝑖𝑡
` ,𝑦𝑖0,𝛼𝑖)
𝜕𝑦
           
=
1
𝜎𝑢
𝜙(
𝑦𝑖𝑡−?̅?𝑖𝑡
` 𝛾−𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1𝜌−𝛼0−𝛼1𝑦𝑖0−𝛼2?̅?𝑖
`−𝛼𝑖
𝜎𝑢
)                (5.23) 
 
Therefore, the log-likelihood function can be estimated by integrating the density of 
(𝑦𝑖1, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑇) given (𝑦𝑖0, 𝑧𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖) against the distribution of 𝛼𝑖: 
 
𝐿 = ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑖=1 {∫[∏ 𝑓𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 (𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑧?̅?𝑡
` , 𝑦𝑖0, 𝛼𝑖; 𝜃) ]
1
𝜎𝑎
𝜙(
𝑎
𝜎𝑎
)𝑑𝑎}         (5.24) 
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After iterated expectations, defining 
 
Φ̂1 = Φ((−𝑤𝑖𝑡𝛽 − 𝛼0 − 𝛼1𝑦𝑖0 − 𝛼2𝑧?̅?
`)/𝜎𝑢) ,  Φ̂2 = Φ((1 − 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝛽 − 𝛼0 − 𝛼1𝑦𝑖0 −
𝛼2𝑧?̅?
`)/𝜎𝑢), ?̂?1 = 𝜙((−𝑤𝑖𝑡𝛽 − 𝛼0 − 𝛼1𝑦𝑖0 − 𝛼2𝑧?̅?
`)/𝜎𝑢), ?̂?2 = 𝜙((1 − 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝛽 − 𝛼0 −
𝛼1𝑦𝑖0 − 𝛼2𝑧?̅?
`)/𝜎𝑢) and 𝜎𝑣 = 𝜎𝑢 + 𝜎𝑎.             (5.25) 
 
The conditional mean function can be described as: 
 
𝑟(𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑧?̅?𝑡
` , 𝑦𝑖0; 𝜃)  
= Φ (
𝑤𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑦𝑖0 + 𝛼2𝑧?̅?
` − 1
𝜎𝑣
) + (𝑤𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑦𝑖0 + 𝛼2𝑧?̅?
`)[Φ̂2 − Φ̂1] 
+𝜎𝑣[Φ̂1 − Φ̂2],                 (5.26) 
 
and estimation of average partial effects is given by: 
 
𝜕𝑟(𝑤𝑖𝑡,?̅?𝑖
`,𝑦𝑖0;𝜃)
𝜕𝑤𝑗
|𝜃=?̂?  
=
1
𝑁
∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 {1 + [
1−𝜎𝑣
𝜎𝑣
] ?̂?2 − [
1−𝜎𝑣
𝜎𝑣
](𝑤𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑦𝑖0 + 𝛼2𝑧?̅?
`)(?̂?2 − ?̂?1)}  (5.27) 
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As the distribution of 𝑐𝑖 is specified in terms of observables and a normally distributed 
error term, partial effects on 𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0|𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖) and 𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑤𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖) can then be 
computed.  
 
5.4  Empirical Estimation 
 
5.4.1  Estimating Efficiency Scores for Chinese Banks  
 
5.4.1.1  Specification for the Empirical Model of Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
 
We first establish the specification for SFA, and considering the relatively short panel 
length of the data for Chinese banks, we apply the analysis with the method of within 
maximum likelihood estimation (WMLE). In the estimation, the cost and profit 
frontier models are expressed in Eqs 5.28 and 5.29 (our empirical cost and profit 
frontier models are shown in Eqs 5.30 and 5.31): 
 
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑊𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡; 𝛽) + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  i = 1, … I,   t = 1, … T     (5.28) 
 
𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑊𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡; 𝛽) + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡   i = 1, … I,   t = 1, … T        (5.29) 
 
220 
 
where following Lensink and Meesters (2014), the functional form of 
𝑓(𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑊𝑖𝑡, 𝑍𝑖𝑡; 𝛽) is estimated by translog form. 𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 and 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 refer to the observed 
total cost and profits before tax for bank i at time t; 𝑌𝑖𝑡 and 𝑊𝑖𝑡 represent the vectors 
of output and input prices for a specific bank; 𝑍𝑖𝑡 refers to a vector of control variables, 
and β is a vector of technology parameters. In SFA, the error term can be disentangled 
into two elements: 𝜈𝑖𝑡  is the measurement error and random effects, which are 
assumed to follow a normal distribution, i.e. 𝑣𝑖𝑡~iid 𝑁(0 , 𝜎𝑣
2) ; and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is the 
inefficiency term, which is assumed to follow a half-normal distribution, i.e. 
𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑁
+(0,𝜎𝑣
2). 𝑤𝑖𝑡  is the effect of unobserved factors, which follows a truncated 
normal distribution with zero mean and constant variance. Because it is necessary to 
ensure that all dependent variables are positive, we follow Dong et al. (2016) and 
delete all observations of the profit variable with a negative sign.  
 
SFA uses a parametric approach, which requires specification of the functional form 
of the production function and the distribution of its error terms. According to the 
duality theorem, the cost function must be linearly homogeneous in input prices, 
whereas continuity requires that the second-order parameters must be symmetric. 
Hence, we scale the total costs and input price by one price, 𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡, to impose a linear 
homogeneity restriction on the model (Dong et al., 2016). In addition, there are 
standard symmetry restrictions, where 𝛾𝑗𝑘 = 𝛾𝑘𝑗 and 𝛽𝑛𝑚 = 𝛽𝑚𝑛.  Thus we specify 
the cost function as: 
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ln (
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑡
) = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡 +
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
3
𝑛=1
3
𝑚=1
3
𝑚=1 𝛾1𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡/
𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑡) +
1
2
𝛾2𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡/𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑡)
2 +
1
2
∑ 𝜓𝑚𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡(𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡/𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑡) +
3
𝑚=1 𝜙1𝑙𝑛Z𝑖𝑡 +
1
2
𝜙2𝑙𝑛Z
2
𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛Z𝑖𝑡
3
𝑚=1 + 𝜉𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡/𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑡)𝑙𝑛Z𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃1𝑇 +
1
2
𝜙2𝑇
2 +
∑ 𝑘𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑇
3
𝑚=1 + 𝜌𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡/𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑡)𝑇 + 𝜂𝑙𝑛Z𝑖𝑡𝑇 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡      (5.30) 
 
As we utilise fixed-effect estimation, in this equation, 𝛼𝑖  is the unobserved 
“heterogeneity” of utility i, which is treated as fixed; the dependent variable of the cost 
function ln(𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡) refers to logarithm of total cost, including labour, interest, and other 
costs; 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡 indicates the logarithm of the output of a specific bank; 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡 indicates 
the logarithm of input price of a specific bank; 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖𝑡  refers to the environmental 
variable, which is the logarithm of total equity of a specific bank; and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is the 
inefficiency term, with an explicit function of environmental variables that impact each 
bank’s best performance.  
 
With regards to profit efficiency, we utilise an alternative measure, which is calculated 
using a translog functional model similar to that used for the cost efficiency. Instead 
of total cost, we use the logarithm of profit before tax ln(𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡), along with the same 
independent variables as used in the cost function. Hence, we specify the profit 
function as: 
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ln(𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡 +
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
3
𝑛=1
3
𝑚=1
3
𝑚=1
∑ 𝛾𝑗
2
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡 +
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑡 +
2
𝑘=1
2
𝑗=1
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝜓𝑚𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡 +
2
𝑗=1
3
𝑚=1 𝜙1𝑙𝑛Z𝑖𝑡 +
1
2
𝜙2𝑙𝑛Z
2
𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛Z𝑖𝑡
3
𝑚=1 +
∑ 𝜉𝐽𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛Z𝑖𝑡
2
𝑗=1 + 𝜃1𝑇 +
1
2
𝜙2𝑇
2 + ∑ 𝑘𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑇
3
𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝜌𝐽𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑇
2
𝑗=1 +
𝜂𝑙𝑛Z𝑖𝑡𝑇 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑡               (5.31)
       
5.4.1.2  Empirical Results of SFA 
 
Table 5.1 presents the estimation results of the cost and profit frontier models using 
maximum likelihood techniques. As my main interest here is to estimate the 
diversification effects, we do not discuss the estimated coefficients on other variables 
of the frontiers in detail. However, stochastic frontier analysis fulfils the theoretical 
requirements for a valid cost function. More specifically, the tests in terms of the 
monotonicity of the cost function are satisfied, as the estimates for ∂ ln(TC) / ∂ln (𝑄𝑖) 
and ∂ ln(TC) / ∂ln (𝑊𝑖) are all positive, thus indicating that the cost function is non-
decreasing in outputs and input prices.  
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Table 5.1 Parameter estimates of the cost and profit frontiers 
Cost frontier      Profit frontier      
Variables Coefficient Standard error Variables Coefficient Standard error 
lny1 0.486** 0.201 lny1 0.178 0.203 
lny2 0.390* 0.230 lny2 -0.435* 0.231 
lny3 0.449** 0.212 lny3 0.899*** 0.185 
0.5*(lny1)^2 0.157*** 0.021 0.5*(lny1)^2 0.192*** 0.020 
lny1*lny2 -0.333*** 0.018 lny1*lny2 -0.271*** 0.009 
lny1*lny3 0.114** 0.048 lny1*lny3 0.021* 0.011 
0.5*(lny2)^2 0.24*** 0.023 0.5*(lny2)^2 0.385*** 0.017 
lny2*lny3 -0.005 0.023 lny2*lny3 -0.075*** 0.011 
0.5*(lny3)^2 -0.041 0.032 0.5*(lny3)^2 -0.004 0.016 
ln(w1/w2) 1.083*** 0.155 lnw1 1.392*** 0.398 
      lnw2 -0.599*** 0.172 
0.5*(ln(w1/w2))^2 0.039** 0.017 0.5*(lnw1)^2 0.068 0.058 
      lnw1*lnw2 -0.076** 0.031 
      0.5*(lnw2)^2 0.051*** 0.019 
lny1*ln(w1/w2) -0.070*** 0.021 lny1*lnw1 -0.142*** 0.044 
      lny1*lnw2 0.069** 0.027 
lny2*ln(w1/w2) -0.004 0.022 lny2*lnw1 -0.114** 0.051 
      lny2*lnw2 -0.009 0.023 
lny3*ln(w1/w2) 0.037* 0.019 lny3*lnw1 0.091** 0.037 
      lny3*lnw2 0.021 0.018 
lnz -0.896*** 0.168 lnz -0.176 0.316 
0.5*(lnz)^2 -0.037 0.023 0.5*(lnz)^2 -0.032 0.032 
lnz*lny1 0.072*** 0.026 lnz*lny1 0.064*** 0.020 
lnz*lny2 0.106*** 0.025 lnz*lny2 -0.030** 0.012 
lnz*lny3 -0.096*** 0.014 lnz*lny3 0.038*** 0.010 
lnz*ln(w1/w2) 0.039* 0.023 lnz*lnw1 0.159*** 0.060 
      lnz*lnw2 -0.072** 0.031 
T 0.283*** 0.036 T 0.219*** 0.070 
0.5*(T^2) 0.001 0.002 0.5*(T^2) 0.003 0.003 
T*ln(w1/w2) 0.005 0.004 T*lnw1 0.006 0.008 
      T*lnw2 0.008* 0.004 
T*lny1 -0.024*** 0.004 T*lny1 -0.020 0.015 
T*lny2 -0.021*** 0.006 T*lny2 0.001 0.011 
T*lny3 0.005 0.005 T*lny3 -0.005 0.005 
T*lnz 0.029*** 0.007 T*lnz 0.016 0.021 
Constant 2.536*** 0.658 Constant 1.788*** 0.598 
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The yearly mean efficiency estimations from 2005 to 2016 for the full sample and 
three sub-groups, namely, G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs, are plotted in Figures 5.1 and 
5.2.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Yearly mean cost efficiency for the whole sample and three sub-groups 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Yearly mean profit efficiency for the whole sample and three sub-groups 
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It can be observed that the average of both cost and profit efficiency scores exhibit an 
increasing tendency from 2005 to 2008 and then begin to decline, reaching the lowest 
point in 2010. Subsequently, the efficiency of Chinese commercial banks improves 
steadily, to achieve a relatively high point in 2015. The three sub-groups each follow 
a similar trend to that of the overall banking sector, exhibiting a general increase from 
2005 to 2008 and then a decrease, reaching the lowest point in 2010, and then starting 
to rise once again. In more detail, in 2005, D-SIBs were the most efficient bank group 
in the Chinese banking market; however, their efficiency decreased dramatically after 
2006. G-SIBs generally maintained a cost efficiency score midway between those of 
the other two groups. It seems that the efficiency of those banks does not benefit 
greatly from their scale of assets or scope of business.  
 
5.4.2  Determination of Diversification Effects on Cost and Profit 
Efficiency 
 
We apply an estimator designed to be unbiased in the context of unbalanced dynamic 
panel data, with a fractional dependent variable to regress the efficiency scores on the 
diversification level. This is within the family of censored regression models. The 
particular functional form we adopt is the dynamic Tobit model, as against the Probit 
model. The dynamic Tobit model is extensively discussed in Hu (2002), Wooldridge 
(2005) and Li and Zheng (2008). According to Wooldridge (2005), the dynamic Tobit 
model is described as: 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥[0, 𝒛𝑖𝑡𝜸 + 𝒈(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1)𝝆 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡]  
𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, … . . 𝑦𝑖0, 𝒛𝑖, 𝑐𝑖~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0, 𝛿𝑢
2)          (5.32) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is observed response variable of interest on the ith agent in time period t 
which depends on the explanatory variables 𝒛𝑖𝑡, the lags of the dependent variable 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1and the unobserved individual heterogeneity 𝑐𝑖. 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error terms, which are 
assumed to be i.i.d. normally distributed conditional on (𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 … . . 𝑦𝑖,0, {𝒛𝑖𝑡}𝑡=2
𝑇 , 𝑐𝑖).   
 
In a dynamic panel Tobit model, researchers often take the following form (Hu, 2002): 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1𝜆 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡              
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ , 0}                    
𝜖𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,     𝑖 = 1, … … 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … … 𝑇        (5.33) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is latent dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is first lag of the observed dependent 
variable, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of exogenous variables, β are the regression coefficients, λ is 
the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. Further, the component 𝑎𝑖 is 
unobserved individual effect and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error terms. In the panel data Tobit model, 
the variable of 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ 𝜆  introduces the dynamics into the system. For our research 
interests, we have: 
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𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + (𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡, 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡, 𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 , 𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡)′𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡     (5.34) 
 
Empirical results which are estimated by Eq. (5.34) are reported in Table 5.2 and Table 
5.3 for whole sample and in Table 5.4, Table 5.5, Table 5.6, Table 5.7, Table 5.8 and 
Table 5.9 for three Chinese banking groups (G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs). In this 
dynamic panel Tobit model, the dependant variables are 𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 which is represented 
by two different measurements of banks’ efficiency, namely, cost and profit efficiency. 
In addition to the lagged dependent variables in the model, the vector of exogenous 
variables contains 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡, 𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡; where 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the variable 
of our main interest, which captures the level of diversification, represented 
respectively by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the shares of three non-interest 
components over total income;𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the Lerner index; 𝑁𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of net 
interest revenue to total earning assets; 𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of equity over total assets; 
and 𝐶𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the cost-to-income ratio.  
 
5.4.2.1 Income Diversification and Efficiency: Whole Sample 
 
Having estimated the efficiency scores, we next apply the dynamic Tobit model with 
the DPF estimator to investigate their determinants. In addition to the above input price 
and output variables, a number of variables are included to explain the efficiency 
scores. Table 5.2 presents the results for the Chinese banking industry as a whole. 
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Table 5.2 Income diversification and banks' efficiency for the whole sample, 
2005 to 2016 
This table reports the results of the dynamic Tobit estimation. Our dependent variables are cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency, which are estimated via stochastic frontier analysis. .I( t-1) refers 
to the dependent variables lagged by one period. HHI indicates income diversification using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index with the components of interest income and three component 
activities under non-interest income. Lerner indicates the Lerner index calculated by (bank price - 
marginal cost)/bank price, NIM indicates net interest revenue over total earning assets, ETA refers 
to equity / total assets, and CIR indicates the cost-income ratio. Figures in brackets are standard 
errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
I_(t-1) 0.518*** 0.828*** 
  (0.051) (0.03) 
HHI -0.143** -0.072** 
  (0.059) (0.031) 
Lerner -0.276*** -0.001 
  (0.048) (0.033) 
NIM 2.135*** 0.003 
  (0.698) (0.451) 
ETA 0.662*** 0.593*** 
  (0.231) (0.163) 
CIR -0.041 0.044 
  (0.051) (0.032) 
Constant 0.460*** 0.121*** 
  (0.064) (0.036) 
Log likelihood 579.193 614.549 
LR test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Observations 413 413 
 
As can be seen from the table, both the cost and profit efficiency exhibit a consistent 
sign, with negative coefficients at the 1% significance level. This outcome is consistent 
with Cheng (2015), who finds that income diversification could decrease both cost and 
profit efficiency in the Chinese banking sector. A plausible explanation for this effect 
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is that the overall level of operational ability in the Chinese banking sector is low and 
the internal capital market is inefficient. As a result, internal reallocation of resources 
may have led to over-investment or under-investment, which would increase the costs 
of coordination and management, leading to inefficiency.  
 
One of the control variables employed is the Lerner index, which measures a bank’s 
level of market power. In the estimation results, both the cost and profit efficiency 
scores have a negative correlation with the Lerner index, indicating that the higher the 
market power of the bank is, the less efficient the bank will become. This result is 
consistent with the notion that banks tend to pursue a ‘quiet life’; that is, banks with 
higher monopoly power seem to allow costs to rise as a consequence of slack 
management. When market power prevails, managers may pursue objectives other 
than profit maximization, and they do not have incentives to work hard to keep costs 
under control, a situation that leads to a reduction in cost efficiency (Koetter et al., 
2008; Delis and Tsionas, 2009; Ariss, 2010).   
 
It is conceivable that components of the non-interest business may perform differently 
than the overall non-interest activities. To find further evidence for diversification 
effects across different components of non-interest income, we divide the non-interest 
income into three categories, namely, fee and commissions, trading, and other income; 
the results are reported in Table 5.3.  
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Table 5.3 Results for three components of non-interest income and bank efficiency 
for Chinese banks, 2005 to 2016 
This table reports the results of the dynamic Tobit estimation. Our dependent variables are cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency, which are estimated via stochastic frontier analysis. It-1 refers to the 
dependent variables lagged by one period. COM is the ratio of net fee and commission incomes to 
total operating income; TRA is the ratio of net trading income to total operating income; OTH is the 
ratio of net other operating income to total operating income. Lerner is the Lerner index calculated 
as (bank price - marginal cost)/bank price, NIM is the net interest revenue over total earning assets, 
ETA refers to equity over total assets, and CIR indicates the cost-income ratio. Figures in brackets 
are standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
I_(t-1) 0.484*** 0.822*** 0.522*** 0.823*** 0.516 0.827*** 
  (0.043) (0.031) (0.059) (0.029) (0.404) (0.028) 
COM -0.454*** -0.152***         
  (0.083) (0.054)         
TRAD     0.471** 0.136     
      (0.185) (0.114)     
Other         -2.234** -0.091 
          (1.078) (0.196) 
Lerner -0.288*** -0.003 -0.302*** -0.024 -0.327 -0.02 
  (0.046) (0.032) (0.047) (0.03) (0.435) (0.03) 
NIM 1.982*** 0.075 3.323*** 0.539 2.352 0.423 
  (0.621) (0.436) (0.672) (0.408) (3.105) (0.417) 
ETA 0.781*** 0.594*** 0.551** 0.308** 0.307 0.358 
  (0.216) (0.161) (0.229) (0.145) (1.184) (0.142) 
CIR -0.076 0.04 -0.011 0.037 -0.055 0.039 
  (0.049) (0.032) (0.049) (0.03) (0.344) (0.03) 
Constant 0.506*** 0.125*** 0.401*** 0.123*** 0.397 0.120*** 
  (0.056) (0.036) (0.063) (0.033) (0.688) (0.033) 
Log 
likelihood 
586.916 615.78 564.058 706.621 405.880 719.503 
LR test (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 413 413 404 404 411 411 
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As can be seen from Table 5.3, all lagged dependent variables exert a significant and 
positive effect on the current efficiency level. In particular, the results indicate that 
Chinese banks could reap efficiency advantages from a shift towards trading activities. 
However, both the fee-based and other activities could bring an efficiency discount in 
the process of income diversification. 
 
5.4.2.2 Income Diversification and Efficiency across Banking Groups 
 
Several studies claim that the strength of the relationship between income 
diversification and banks’ efficiency could be greatly affected by bank business scale. 
Specifically, large banks should have a higher share of non-interest income and a better 
cost management capacity, whereas at the same time, given the agency problem, 
managing organized chaos would lead to a reduction in operational efficiency. To 
investigate whether the diversification effect on banks’ efficiency varies with bank 
size, we test the effects across the three groups: G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs. 5 
 
China’s Global Systemically Important Banks 
 
                           
5
 As the small sample size might result in an incidental parameters problem, this thesis also 
applies a robustness test by using dummy variables to catalogue the three sub-groups. The 
robustness test results are reported in the Appendix. 
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Table 5.4 reports the results of estimating the dynamic Tobit model with the DPF 
estimator with particular reference to G-SIBs.  
 
Table 5.4 Income diversification and banks' efficiency for Chinese G-SIBs, 2005 
to 2016 
This table reports the results of the dynamic Tobit estimation. Our dependent variables are cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency, which are estimated via stochastic frontier analysis. It-1 refers to the 
dependent variables lagged by one period. HHI indicates income diversification using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index with the components of interest income and three component activities under non-
interest income. Lerner indicates the Lerner index calculated as (bank price - marginal cost)/bank 
price, NIM indicates net interest revenue over total earning assets, ETA refers to equity over total 
assets, and CIR indicates the cost-income ratio. Figures in brackets are standard errors. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
I_(t-1) 0.984*** 0.797*** 
  (0.035) (0.04) 
HHI -0.613*** -0.236*** 
  (0.055) (0.051) 
Lerner -0.642*** -0.453*** 
  (0.069) (0.07) 
NIM 1.227 -1.730*** 
  (0.802) (0.675) 
ETA 4.200*** 2.213*** 
  (0.391) (0.336) 
CIR -0.001 -0.401*** 
  (0.069) (0.067) 
Constant 0.142** 0.490*** 
  (0.061) (0.067) 
Log likelihood 365.275 236.676 
LR test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Observations 42 42 
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The findings show that banks’ income diversification has significant and negative 
effects on both cost and profit efficiency of G-SIBs, thus providing evidence that 
diversified banks incur an efficiency discount compared with banks that focus on 
traditional sources of interest income. The coefficient on cost efficiency is -0.613, 
whereas that on profit efficiency is -0.236, both significant at the 1% level. This result 
indicates that higher income diversification would lead to greater discounts to cost 
efficiency than to profit efficiency.  
 
In addition, the Lerner index also exhibits a negative effect on banks’ efficiency level, 
which is consistent with the results for the whole sample. Meanwhile, for this sub-
group, ETA maintains a significant positive coefficient correlated with the banks’ 
efficiency; thus, the capital adequacy in G-SIBs is helpful to improve their efficiency. 
 
China’s Domestic Systemically Important Banks 
 
We now move to examine the efficiency effect of diversification for China’s domestic 
systemically important banks (D-SIBs). Table 5.5 reports the results. 
 
Next, we examine the regression results for other variables. First, a significantly 
negative Lerner index indicates that a higher level of monopoly power for a specific 
bank could be related to lower efficiency. For D-SIBs, we obtain a greater coefficient 
on the Lerner index, indicating that for smaller-sized banks, the negative influence 
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from a higher monopoly power would be smoothed compared with the situation for G-
SIBs, such that they experience lower discounts with increased monopoly power. 
Secondly, the equity-to-assets ratio, which measures the financial leverage, exerts a 
positive effect on banks’ efficiency. 
 
Table 5.5 Income diversification and banks' efficiency for Chinese D-SIBs from 
2005 to 2015 
This table reports the results of the dynamic Tobit estimation. Our dependent variables are cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency, which are estimated via stochastic frontier analysis. It-1 refers to the 
dependent variables lagged by one period. HHI indicates income diversification using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index with the components of interest income and three component activities under non-
interest income. Lerner indicates the Lerner index calculated as (bank price - marginal cost)/bank 
price, NIM indicates net interest revenue over total earning assets, ETA refers to equity over total 
assets, and CIR indicates the cost-income ratio. Figures in brackets are standard errors. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
I_(t-1) 0.842*** 1.003*** 
  (0.025) (0.016) 
HHI -0.162*** -0.105*** 
  (0.056) (0.045) 
Lerner -0.278*** -0.086*** 
  (0.037) (0.029) 
NIM 1.705** -2.938*** 
  (0.837) (0.663) 
ETA 0.899*** 1.179*** 
  (0.3) (0.247) 
CIR -0.045 -0.01 
  (0.06) (0.05) 
Constant 0.199*** 0.074** 
  (0.046) (0.033) 
Log likelihood 380.025 211.442 
LR test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Observations 97 97 
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Other Chinese Banks 
Table 5.6 reports the results for other Chinese banks.  
Table 5.6 Income diversification and banks' efficiency for Chinese N-SIBs, 2005 
to 2016 
This table reports the results of the dynamic Tobit estimation. Our dependent variables are cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency, which are estimated via stochastic frontier analysis. It-1 refers to the 
dependent variables lagged by one period. HHI indicates income diversification using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index with the components of interest income and three component activities under non-
interest income. Lerner indicates the Lerner index calculated as (bank price - marginal cost)/bank 
price, NIM indicates net interest revenue over total earning assets, ETA refers to equity over total 
assets, and CIR indicates the cost-income ratio. Figures in brackets are standard errors. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Cost efficiency Profit efficiency 
I_(t-1) 0.523*** 0.454* 
  (0.100) (0.241) 
HHI 0.019 0.009 
  (0.102) (0.157) 
Lerner -0.299*** -0.045 
  (0.104) (0.16) 
NIM 4.507*** 5.657** 
  (1.337) (2.633) 
ETA 0.123 0.01 
  (0.459) (0.835) 
CIR -0.044 0.042 
  (0.096) (0.126) 
Constant 0.437*** 0.394 
  (0.115) (0.251) 
Log likelihood 49.290 1365.163 
LR test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Observations 274 274 
As can be seen from the table, these results differ from those for the other two sub-
groups. Here, the findings indicate a significant relationship between the 
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diversification index (HHI) and efficiency scores of Chinese N-SIBs. This suggests 
that small banks may possess operational advantages that yield higher efficiency, with 
risk management and project management ensuring efficiency when there is an 
increase in high-technology requirements and highly leveraged non-interest products 
(Girardone et al., 2004; Kumbhakar and Wang, 2007). 
 
As reported in Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, the results reveal a diversification discount to 
banks’ efficiency, which eventually becomes a benefit, across the three categories of 
G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs. It is plausible that the differences in results across the 
three groups are due to bank size, from large G-SIBs to medium-sized D-SIBs and 
smaller N-SIBs.  
 
5.4.2.3 Effects of Diversification on Efficiency with Components of Non-interest 
Activities 
 
We also examine the effects of different types of non-interest activities on the 
efficiency of Chinese banks.  The results for G-SIBs are reported in Table 5.7. For 
trading income, we find positive coefficients, where an increase in scale of trading 
income would improve banks’ efficiency level. However, commissions and other 
activities present negative coefficients for both cost and profit efficiency scores at the 
1% significance level, indicating that a higher reliance on fee-based and other income 
is associated with a decrease in banks’ efficiency.  
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Table 5.7 Results for three components of non-interest income and bank efficiency 
for G-SIBs from 2005 to 2016 
This table reports the results of the dynamic Tobit estimation. Our dependent variables are cost and 
profit efficiency, which are estimated via stochastic frontier analysis. It-1 refers to the dependent 
variables lagged by one period. COM is the ratio of net fee and commission income to total operating 
income; TRA is the ratio of net trading income to total operating income; OTH is the ratio of net 
other operating income to total operating income. Lerner indicates the Lerner index calculated as 
(bank price - marginal cost)/bank price, NIM indicates net interest revenue over total earning assets, 
ETA refers to equity over total assets, and CIR indicates the cost-income ratio. Figures in brackets 
are standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
I_(t-1) 0.811*** 0.643*** 1.099*** 1.051*** 0.927*** 0.758*** 
  (0.021) (0.032) (0.068) (0.052) (0.029) (0.03) 
COM -1.321*** -1.085***         
  (0.072) (0.113)         
TRAD     1.663** 1.341***     
      (0.738) (0.52)     
Other         -1.193*** -1.415*** 
          (0.306) (0.19) 
Lerner -0.701*** -0.274*** -1.155*** -1.125*** -0.736*** -0.302*** 
  (0.046) (0.043) (0.138) (0.031) (0.07) (0.042) 
NIM 0.391 -4.141*** 7.303*** 0.844 1.794** -3.794*** 
  (0.498) (0.585) (1.38) (0.573) (0.838) (0.55) 
ETA 1.825*** 1.901*** 0.938 0.111 3.511*** 3.044*** 
  (0.165) (0.198) (0.683) (0.248) (0.432) (0.282) 
CIR -0.757*** -0.649*** -0.289* 0.328*** 0.009 -0.072 
  (0.05) (0.057) (0.169) (0.056) (0.085) (0.05) 
Constant 0.753*** 0.795*** 0.249* 0.263*** 0.12* 0.306*** 
  (0.047) (0.061) (0.149) (0.07) (0.066) (0.044) 
Log 
likelihood 
859.121  478.811 200.631 164.166 462.949 620.381 
LR test 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 
Observation
s 
42 42 41 41 42 42 
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Table 5.8 presents the results for D-SIBs. As can be seen from the table, non-interest 
business components exert different effects on banks’ efficiency scores.  
 
Table 5.8 Results for three components of non-interest income and bank 
efficiency for Chinese D-SIBs from 2005 to 2016 
This table reports the results of the dynamic Tobit estimation. Our dependent variables are cost and 
profit efficiency, which are estimated via stochastic frontier analysis. It-1 refers to the dependent 
variables lagged by one period. COM is the ratio of net fee and commission income to total operating 
income; TRA is the ratio of net trading income to total operating income; OTH is the ratio of net 
other operating income to total operating income. Lerner indicates the Lerner index calculated as 
(bank price - marginal cost)/bank price, NIM indicates net interest revenue over total earning assets, 
ETA refers to equity over total assets, and CIR indicates the cost-income ratio. Figures in brackets 
are standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
I_(t-1) 0.953*** 1.001*** 0.959*** 1.005*** 0.964*** 1.023*** 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
COM -0.293*** -0.158**         
  (0.084) (0.072)         
TRAD     2.038*** 1.272***     
      (0.464) (0.381)     
Other         -0.143 -1.215*** 
          (0.413) (0.338) 
Lerner -0.239*** -0.094*** -0.348*** -0.16*** -0.269*** -0.109*** 
  (0.034) (0.028) (0.038) (0.031) (0.033) (0.027) 
NIM 2.171*** -2.861*** 3.046*** -2.355*** 2.703*** -2.893*** 
  (0.769) (0.657) (0.778) (0.65) (0.772) (0.64) 
ETA 0.846*** 1.104*** 0.176 0.691*** 0.395* 1.039*** 
  (0.252) (0.231) (0.221) (0.19) (0.229) (0.195) 
CIR -0.003 -0.012 0.041 0.010 0.040 0.048 
  (0.057) (0.05) (0.056) (0.048) (0.059) (0.05) 
Constant 0.046 0.076** 0.041 0.076** 0.02 0.042 
  (0.039) (0.033) (0.039) (0.033) (0.039) (0.033) 
Log 
likelihood 
662.498 494.027 650.344 490.229 656.521 498.018 
LR test  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observatio
ns 
97 97 95 95 97 97 
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Specifically, fee and commissions and other activities have a negative effect on both 
cost and profit efficiency. The results for all three sub-activities exhibit a similar sign 
and direction as those for G-SIBs. 
Table 5.9 Results for three components of non-interest income and bank efficiency 
for Chinese NSIBs from 2005 to 2016 
This table reports the results of the dynamic Tobit estimation. Our dependent variables are cost and 
profit efficiency, which are estimated via stochastic frontier analysis. It-1 refers to the dependent 
variables lagged by one period. COM is the ratio of net fee and commission income to total operating 
income; TRA is the ratio of net trading income to total operating income; OTH is the ratio of net 
other operating income to total operating income. Lerner indicates the Lerner index calculated as 
(bank price - marginal cost)/bank price, NIM indicates net interest revenue over total earning assets, 
ETA refers to equity over total assets, and CIR indicates the cost-income ratio. Figures in brackets 
are standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
Cost 
efficiency 
Profit 
efficiency 
I_(t-1) 0.374*** 0.380*** 0.375*** 0.382*** 0.376*** 0.413*** 
  (0.053) (0.057) (0.049) (0.058) (0.051) (0.064) 
COM -0.321** -0.214***         
  (0.138) (0.078)         
TRAD     0.270* 0.052     
      (0.153) (0.121)     
Other         0.334 0.028 
          (0.31) (0.132) 
Lerner -0.230*** -0.009 -0.232*** -0.008 -0.230*** -0.011 
  (0.061) (0.037) (0.05) (0.039) (0.055) (0.043) 
NIM 2.200*** 0.295 2.137*** 0.638 2.772*** 0.504 
  (0.675) (0.442) (0.581) (0.455) (0.662) (0.508) 
ETA 0.477* 0.300* 0.486** 0.219 0.374* 0.325* 
  (0.247) (0.156) (0.206) (0.161) (0.225) (0.184) 
CIR -0.043 0.001 -0.062 0.001 -0.045 -0.012 
  (0.051) (0.032) (0.042) (0.033) (0.047) (0.036) 
Constant 0.583*** 0.562*** 0.574*** 0.545*** 0.556*** 0.524*** 
  (0.064) (0.059) (0.054) (0.06) (0.059) (0.067) 
Log 
likelihood 
315.665  486.478 351.333 473.868 386.568 257.604 
LR test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observation
s 
274 274 268 268 272 272 
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Table 5.9 presents the effects of three components of non-interest activities on bank 
efficiency for N-SIBs. 
 
By comparing Table 5.9 with Tables 5.7 and 5.8 it can be seen that, among the three 
components of non-interest income, a larger share of commission and other non-
interest activities leads to a decrease in efficiency for smaller banks, whereas they 
would gain efficiency improvement when further engaging in trading activities. This 
finding is consistent with the previous results for large-sized G-SIBs and medium-
sized D-SIBs. 
 
5.4.3  Discussion of the Results 
 
Evidence regarding the diversification effect on bank efficiency in China indicates that 
while diversification yields a discount to the efficiency of the overall Chinese banking 
sector, the negative effects are mainly concentrated among the G-SIBs and D-SIBS. 
For N-SIBs, which are relatively small banks, no significant evidence for such an 
adverse effect is found.  
 
The difference in the results among the three groups seems to be associated with bank 
size and the related issues. As organizations become more complex owing to an 
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increased number of correlated business lines generated from non-interest activities, 
monitoring becomes more difficult and thus monitoring costs increase (Laeven and 
Levine, 2009). Moreover, bureaucratic problems are more pronounced in large banks, 
and this can lead to less-efficient operating outcomes. 
 
The inefficiencies are further related to the additional overhead costs, inefficient cross-
subsidization and moral hazard problems (Klein and Saidenberg, 2010). In particular, 
when large banks - especially systemically important banks – become ever larger, they 
will be perceived to be TBTF (too big to fail), and regulatory authorities will provide 
those banks facing serious trouble with rescue packages (Brewer and Jagtiani, 2013). 
This will create a situation in which managers have incentives to accentuate moral 
hazard and therefore operate such banks in an inefficient manner. The TBTF problem 
is prevalent in China, and the Chinese authorities would routinely intervene to support 
large-sized, and invariably state-owned, banks. As a result, large banks in China would 
be burdened with the moral hazard problem and, as elsewhere, have incentives to 
expand high-risk but more-profitable projects, causing increased risk and inefficiency 
of resource allocation (Hellmann et al., 2000). 
 
Furthermore, larger banks may find it more difficult to avoid information asymmetry 
and the associated problems. According to De Jonghe et al. (2015), large banks can 
obtain diversification benefits only if the information environment and institutional 
setting allow their stakeholders to exercise proper discipline and when there are no 
incentives to abuse conflicts of interest that lead to inefficiency. In the Chinese context, 
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information asymmetry is strong in large-sized state-owned banks, but less strong in 
medium-sized joint-stock banks, and weakest in the smaller-sized city banks and rural 
banks. Therefore, it will be more difficult for the large-sized banks to monitor the 
expansion of business lines, and easier for smaller banks within the N-SIBs sub-group 
to monitor the non-interest activities. Hence, smaller banks are able to achieve 
efficiency with increased levels of diversification. 
 
The structure of banks’ business mode also matters. With regard to the relation 
between the diversification index and efficiency scores, it has been demonstrated that 
larger banks (G- and D-SIBs) receive a diversification discount when the 
diversification index increases. Looking deeper into the effects of component non-
interest activities, this result could be driven by a large proportion of fee-based and 
other non-interest income, which negatively affect efficiency, whereas income from 
trading activity has a positive effect on efficiency.  
 
It is more revealing to consider the diversification effects from a perspective that 
combines the banking groups and component non-interest activities. According to the 
statistics in this study, G-SIBs have the highest levels of incomes from both fee and 
commissions (11.1%) and other income (1.4%), followed by D-SIBs (8.1% and 0.9%, 
respectively), with N-SIBs having the lowest level of incomes from these components 
(4.3% and 0.8%, respectively). However, at the same time, N-SIBs hold the highest 
proportion of trading income in their total non-interest income and a greater balance 
between trading and fee-based incomes. It follows that the efficiency discount that the 
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larger banks in China receive could be induced by the fact that they are more likely to 
diversify towards low-efficiency fee-based activities rather than high-efficiency 
trading activities, whereas smaller banks are able to maintain more efficient and 
balanced diversification strategies. Consequently, G-SIBs suffer from high levels of 
inefficiency, and D-SIBs also experience a reduction in efficiency, albeit to a lesser 
extent, whereas N-SIBs benefit from higher efficiency.  
 
The different effects of diversification on efficiency across bank groups may also be 
related to the threshold effects of diversification on the level of risk to which banks are 
exposed. In Chapter 4, we assess the effects of income diversification on risk among 
Chinese systemically important banks using a threshold model. The results reveal the 
existence of inverse U-shaped relationships between bank risk and fee-based activity, 
and between bank risk and trading activity, indicating that there is a threshold point 
for both of those activities: below the threshold, banks will become less stable, whereas 
once the banks mature to pass the threshold, they will benefit from increased stability. 
Compared with fee-based activity, trading activity has a much lower threshold point, 
where banks can achieve risk reduction with only 0.265% of trading income, rather 
than 13.899% for fee-based income. In Chapter 4, we also find that the positive effect 
on banks’ overall risk after passing the threshold point is mainly driven by the trading 
income rather than fee-based income, whereas other activities continue to bring 
enhanced risk in both the lower and upper regimes.  
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The fee-based income in the majority of G- and D-SIBs is below the threshold point 
(with mean values of 10.84% and 7.4%). Then, any increase in fee-based activities by 
G- and D-SIBs could bring higher risk, in addition to inefficiency. However, the 
smaller N-SIBs maintain lower levels of both fee-based and other income, whereas the 
proportion of trading income is greater. For them, this business structure compensates 
for the diversification discount generated from the high-volatility of fee-based income 
in the early stages of their development of diversification. From these results, one can 
expect that the efficiency of Chinese banks would not increase until after the scale of 
fee-based income for large banks has expanded to pass a certain threshold.  
 
5.5  Conclusion 
 
Using a two-step approach, this chapter examines the efficiency implications of 
Chinese banks’ shift towards a greater share of non-traditional income in their total 
income. First, efficiency scores of Chinese banks, both cost and profit, are calculated 
via stochastic frontier analysis using the method of within maximum likelihood 
estimation (WMLE). The analysis is applied to the whole Chinese banking sector as 
well as to three sub-groups, i.e. global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), 
domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) and other banks (N-SIBs). The 
results show that in the sample period from 2005 to 2016, the average of both cost and 
profit efficiency scores first exhibited an increasing tendency from 2005 to 2008 and 
then began to decline, reaching the lowest point in 2010. Subsequently, the efficiency 
of Chinese banks improved steadily, to achieve a relatively high point after the global 
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financial crisis. The three sub-groups each followed a similar trend to that of the 
overall banking sector. 
 
In the second step, the investigation employs a dynamic Tobit model to examine the 
unobserved time-invariant bank heterogeneity. We find that for the overall Chinese 
banking sector, income diversification has an efficiency-destroying effect. However, 
the effects vary across the banking groups. For Chinese G-SIBs, diversification has a 
significant harmful effect on both cost and profit efficiency. For D-SIBs, the effects 
are similar, but the discount is less. For N-SIBs, diversification has a positive effect on 
their efficiency level. The differences in empirical results could be explained by the 
additional overhead cost, inefficient cross-subsidization and moral hazard problems. 
 
After decomposing non-interest activities into three components (fee-based, trading 
and other activities), it is found that the diversification discount is generated from fee-
based and other income activities, whereas trading activity can improve banks’ 
efficiency level. The result is shaped by banks’ internal business structure, as larger 
banks have an incentive to expand highly volatile and less-effective fee and other non-
interest incomes, but smaller banks are more likely to diversify towards less risky and 
more effective trading activity. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter summarizes the main research 
findings and the implications of the study, and 
suggests avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 6  
Conclusion 
 
6.1  Main Findings 
 
Profound changes in the business modes of the global banking industry have 
transformed the banks’ income structure over the past four decades. As a result, while 
the interest margin remains the principal source of income for banks, non-interest 
income has increased its importance in banks’ total revenue.  Amid the global trend 
of income diversification, Chinese banks lately have also become active in pursing 
business diversification which has raised significance of non-traditional income in 
their revenue structure.   
 
Shifting to non-traditional business to earn fee-based income represents a major 
challenge for banks. Whether the shift is beneficial has sparked off fresh interest in the 
literature and a lively debate that centres on the merits and pitfalls of such 
diversification. The current thesis contributes to this debate by investigating income 
diversification in the Chinese banking industry as a case of study particularly for bank 
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diversification in emerging market economies which have been too often overlooked 
in the existing literature.   
 
We consider the diversification effects in three aspects, namely the effect on banks’ 
profits, risk exposure and efficiency scores. In the study, the overall Chinese banking 
sector is classified into three sub-groups, namely global systemically important, 
domestic systemically important, and non-systemically important banks. The grouping 
is to reflect the complexity of the Chinese banking industry which is fast rising to 
become the largest one of the world. By providing a comprehensive yet well-structured 
study, this thesis offers to improve our understanding of the desirability of and main 
diversification effects on banks. 
 
In Chapter 2, we introduce the background to the rise and development of income 
diversification in China. A multitude of factors have acted as the driving forces behind 
the change. These primarily include regulatory changes, growing completions in the 
banking environment and unfolding of the financial reforms in China. Consequently, 
non-traditional and fee-based income has become a substantial part of Chinese banks’ 
total revenue. 
 
The following chapters then move to examine the effects of the income diversification 
process on Chinese banks. The first of them, i.e. Chapter 3 examines to what extent 
income diversification would affect the profitability of Chinese banks, which is a first 
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step in analysing the performance of the Chinese banking industry in the age of bank 
diversification. Employing a dynamic SYS-GMM panel data model to evaluate the 
performance effects of income diversification, this chapter finds that for the Chinese 
banking sector as a whole there exists a diversification discount, suggesting that a shift 
from traditional banking business to mixed business lines negatively affects bank 
performance.  
 
However, structurally, the results are rather diverse. After separating the sample banks 
into three sub-groups, we find that the largest Chinese banks, China’s global 
systemically important banks or G-SIBs, can gain positive improvements in their 
performance through diversification. The next group, the domestic systemically 
important banks or D-SIBs, shows a non-significant performance response to the 
shifting to diversified business. The significant under-performer is the group of 
China’s non-systemically important banks or N-SIBs. The key factor that drives the 
performance differences lies in the banks’ capability to reap the benefits of 
diversification through the learning-by-doing process. Other factors include size of the 
bank, regulatory differences and other factors such as moral hazard.  
 
Chapter 4 puts the focus onto the issue of financial stability, and examines to what 
extent income diversification affects risk exposure of Chinese banks. Previous 
research indicates a linear relation between income diversification and risk, finding 
either a negative correlation that suggests banks should diversify, or a positive 
correlation that indicates banks should remain focused on core business. However, by 
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adopting the first-differenced GMM estimator for the dynamic threshold panel data 
model, we unearth the evidence showing that in the Chinese case, the relation is not 
monotonously linear. Rather, the effects of diversification vary with time, sources of 
non-interest activities and measures of risk. 
 
For the whole sample, there exists an inverse U-shaped relation between 
diversification level and risk. Income diversification will reduce bank risk only after 
the bank has passed a certain threshold of income diversification. This pattern of the 
relation seems to be driven mainly by the learn-by-doing effect in relation to the 
expansion of non-interest activities. After dividing the whole sample into three sub-
groups, we find that, for G-SIBs which has a dominant position in the Chinese banking 
industry, business diversification has a significantly negative effect on the banks’ both 
idiosyncratic risk and financial distress. However, for D-SIBs and N-SIBs, the relation 
exhibits an inverse U-shape, where in the early diversification stages the banks incur 
a discount and become less stable, but they become more stable after achieving a 
certain threshold level of diversification. It is plausible that these differences reflect 
the learning by doing effect and others such as different diversification strategies and 
risk preferences.  
 
Results further reveal that, across different business lines, the diversification effects 
on bank risk are not uniform. Decomposing the revenue from non-traditional activities 
further into three sub-classes i.e. fee-based income, income from trading activity and 
other non-interest income, we find that where there is only a low level of 
251 
 
diversification, both trading and other non-interest activities will lead to increased 
exposure to risk; only once the bank has achieved a certain diversification level will 
these activities start to provide diversification benefits that will lower bank risk. 
Activities that generate fee-based income will decrease bank risk for G-SIBs and 
increase risk for N-SIBs regardless of their diversification levels, while for D-SIBs 
there is an inverse result, positive for banks with a lower level of diversification and 
negative for more diversified banks.  
 
We also examine the diversification effect across different types of risk. Evidence 
suggests that for G-SIBs and D-SIBs business diversification can reduce credit risks 
only when the banks have passed a certain threshold point, while for N-SIBs 
diversification cannot bring any improvement for credit risk regardless of 
diversification level. Similarly, the interest rate risk will be reduced only for highly 
diversified G-SIBs and D-SIBs. Finally, diversification will always reduce the 
liquidity risk, for all three banking groups. However, the reduction of the liquidity risk 
cannot fully offset the enhancement of the credit and interest rate risks. Therefore, it 
is necessary for banks to go beyond the threshold in order to obtain the risk-reduction 
benefits from diversification.  This implies that to fully reap the benefits of risk 
reduction from income diversification, banks need to accumulate sufficient banking 
human capital and to establish an effective supervision system.  
 
The objective of Chapter 5 is to analyse the efficiency implications of Chinese banks’ 
shift to greater income diversification. To do so, we deploy a two-step approach. First, 
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efficiency scores, both cost and profit, are calculated by stochastic frontier analysis 
using the method of within maximum likelihood estimation (WMLE). The stochastic 
frontier analysis is applied respectively to three sub-groups of Chinese banks. The 
evidence obtained indicates that during the sample period from 2005 to 2016, the 
average of both cost and profit efficiency scores exhibited an increasing tendency from 
2005 to 2008 for the whole sample and then began to decline, reaching its nadir in 
2010. Subsequently, the efficiency of Chinese banks improved steadily, to achieve a 
relatively high point after the global financial crisis. The three sub-groups each 
followed a similar trend to that of the overall banking sector. 
 
In the second step, our investigation employs a dynamic Tobit model to examine the 
unobserved, time-invariant bank heterogeneity. We find that for the overall Chinese 
banking sector, income diversification has an efficiency-destroying effect. However, 
the effects vary across the banking groups. For Chinese G-SIBs, diversification has a 
significant harmful effect on both cost and profit efficiency. For D-SIBs, the effects 
are similar, but the discount is less. For N-SIBs, diversification has a positive effect on 
the efficiency level. The differences in empirical results could be explained by the 
additional overhead cost, inefficient cross-subsidization and moral hazard problems. 
 
Further decomposing non-interest activities into three components, i.e. fee-based, 
trading and other activities, it is found that the diversification discount is generated 
from fee-based and other income activities, whereas trading activities can improve 
banks’ efficiency level. The result is shaped by banks’ internal business structure, as 
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larger banks have an incentive to expand fee and other non-interest incomes which are 
highly volatile and less effective, but smaller banks are more likely to diversify 
towards less risky and more effective trading activities. 
 
6.2  Implications of the Research 
 
Implications flowing from this thesis have been multiple. The first of them concerns 
the development prospects of banks’ diversifying into non-traditional activities. Our 
research shows that expansion of non-interest activities is beneficial for G-SIBs, the 
most important banks of the Chinese banking system. The performance enhancement 
can be attributed to the facts that they have accumulated huge assets, resources, 
technology, and human talent necessary to carry out financial innovations. Chinese D-
SIBs are on the borderline, showing some sign of performance improvement, though 
not strongly significant. With further development of their non-interest business, they 
can be expected to learn to commend more innovative financial tools and develop 
better management skills. This implies that they have the potential to grow the 
diversification further. While N-SIBs show no gains in profitability in the sample 
period, their efficiency scores are shown to have improved steadily. With this, 
conducting of non-traditional business in the future can become profitable for them. 
All these indicates that business diversification by Chinese banks has the room to grow 
and develop in future.  
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Against this background, it is sensible for managers of G-SIBs to adopt a business 
expansion strategy that highlights efficiency enhancement because their efficiency 
scores are low. This can be achieved through using their institutional strength 
including extensive network of sub-branches to expand fee and commission activity. 
For small and medium-sized banks, i.e. D-SIBS and N-SIBs the sensible business 
strategy should focus on providing services through their close ties with customers and 
gradually develop non-interest financial services to reap the benefits of efficiency 
enhancement from the process. Structurally, given the fact that income from trading 
activity has played a particularly positive role in promoting banks’ profitability and 
efficiency, managers of G-SIBs and D-SIBs  should take steps to focus on trading 
business.   
 
For the regulator, our research suggests a structured approach to supervision and 
regulation over Chinese banks’ conducting of non-traditional business. The existing 
Chinese regulation over mixed banking business is modelled on the America’s 
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, which is rather restrictive on income 
diversification. This should be reformed and it is necessary and desirable for the 
Chinese regulator to relax restrictions on banks’ engagement in non-traditional 
business. The key area of reform action is to allow an enabling regulatory framework 
that releases banks from the existing legal constraints on their development of non-
interest business. 
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Within this framework, the regulatory priority should be given to oversee the 
development of potential systemic risk that banks’ shift to non-interest business may 
cause. The research shows that wide engagement of banks in income diversification 
would heighten the systemic risk. For one thing, as a result of business diversification, 
many banks are now doing very similar business. Their product structure thus becomes 
isomorphic, which makes them vulnerable to common shocks. For another, long-term 
business expansion consumes large amounts of capital, while banks’ exposure to credit 
risk, interest risk and shadow banking risk would be on the rise, which reduce the 
banks to vulnerability further. In addition, relative to the income from traditional 
business, non-interest income is often instable. Then, with the growth of business 
diversification, the instability of non-interest income will also grow and the income 
instability can be transmitted from one bank to other banks. These would amplify the 
eventuality of systemic risks and the regulator should be wary of this and put the 
eventuality high in its monitoring radar. This is especially so for some high-leveraged 
and risky non-interest business requires.  
  
On top of close supervision of systemic risk, the thesis suggests a structural approach 
to Chinese regulator’s monitoring of financial stress and risk exposure of different 
banking groups. The inverse U-shaped relation between return and risk in the 
diversified business implies that some Chinese banks would initially have low 
performance with heightened risk and only after having passed some threshold would 
the situation becomes better. This threshold effect needs to be taken into consideration 
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by the regulator in their policy design for supervising the banks, especially over the 
small and medium sized banks. 
 
For the risk file of individual banks, the research has proved that engaging in non-
interest businesses will reduce the risk exposure of G-SIBs. But this finding does not 
relieve G-SIBs from being put under sound supervision and regulation. Rather, 
considering that G-SIBs’ efficiency scores are lowered by business diversification, the 
regulator should focus their supervision on the efficiency level of G-SIBs. For N-SIBs, 
evidence shows that they would see an increase in their risk exposure, so for these 
banks the regulator’s main concern should be the dynamics of their risk exposure in 
relation to diversified business.  
 
For particular types of risk, it is shown that income diversification can reduce liquidity 
risk for all three banking groups. But for credit risk and interest risk, while G-SIBs and 
D-SIBs can manage to reduce their exposure, there is no evidence that this would also 
be true for N-SIBs. Given this, the regulator should be particularly watchful for the 
levels of credit and interest risks of N-SIBs. They are relatively small by asset size, 
but are numerous in numbers and have an extensive customer base.  Potential failure 
of these banks could have far-reaching social repercussions.   
 
6.3  Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
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This thesis attempts to investigate ongoing concerns in understanding the relations 
between banking diversification in China and its consequences amid the global trend 
of banks’ shifting to non-traditional businesses. By offering a case study of income 
diversification of Chinese banks, this study brings closer to a better understanding of 
the effects of income diversification on profits, risks and efficiency in the Chinese 
bank industry and hence contributes to the long debate on the desirability and 
repercussions of banking diversification in recent decades. To advance the knowledge 
further in the field, it is sound and meaningful that the results and contributions of the 
thesis could be considered in the light of its limitations, which also provides the new 
avenues that could be explored in future studies. The limitations of the current study 
can be grouped as follows: 
 
First, limitations due to the availability problem of raw data. This can be illustrated by 
the data problems when adopting the threshold dynamic panel estimator based on the 
first-differenced GMM method. The study applies this method in order to estimate the 
diversification-risk relation but is constrained by the severe data availability problem. 
But the methodology requires a balanced data set to satisfy the first difference process, 
which cannot be satisfied by raw data in China. In the empirical exercises in this thesis, 
we collate data of a sample of 40 Chinese commercial banks and the sample period 
chosen runs from 2005 to 2016. But in this sample period five of the banks did not 
exist before 2007. This leads the empirical study to reducing the observations by two 
years to begin in 2007, making the actual sample size relatively small.  
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With the passage of time, we expect the sample period in future can be extended, which 
dynamic threshold estimation. In that case, an augmented sample size will contribute 
to the accuracy of test results, and thus provide more accurate estimation.  
 
Second, methods for dealing with missing values of data or incomplete data in the 
regression analysis. In response to the challenge posed by missing values of data or 
incomplete data, researchers have proposed several methods to estimating the 
regression model with missing or incomplete data (Abrevaya and Donald, 2017). One 
approach is to deploy the simulated moment of method that imputes the missing values 
conditional on the other available data (McFadden, 1989). Also known as the method 
of simulated moments, this method is a structural technique that generates simulated 
data from the economic model, and then matches their moments with those computed 
from the available data. Alternatively, one may use the indirect inference method 
(Smith, 1993; Gouriéroux et al., 1993). Using an auxiliary model whose parameters 
are to be estimated from either observed or simulated data, this approach chooses the 
parameters of the economic model so that these two sets of estimates are as close as 
possible. Compared to the method of simulated moments, the indirect inference is quite 
flexible as it allows use of any of the features of sample statistics as a basis for 
comparison of moments and data. Based on indirect inference, Gouriéroux, et al. (2010) 
propose a general method that can substaintially reduce bias related to T is small and 
fixed while N is large. Indeed, their approach is generic and works well for any values 
of N and T (Gouriéroux et al., 2010). This is particularly useful to explore these 
methods in future research as the Chinese market is less transparent than other mature 
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one, and researchers often can have only relatively short panel data, which may cause 
biased estimation in the traditional GMM model.  
 
Third, other types of diversification. This research has only considered one type, albeit 
the major one, of banking diversification, i.e. the income diversification. Future 
research should be extended to consider the development of some other types of 
diversification, for example geographical diversification, by Chinese banks. Currently, 
because of data availability, and that financial statements of regional branches are not 
available, research on other types of diversification is impracticable.  When this 
improves and with increased availability and improved transparency of banking data 
in China, future research should make a wider coverage of examination of banking 
diversification.  
 
Finally, alternative research strategy. Empirical analysis is not the only way to study 
diversification effects. In the Chinese banking sector, each bank has its own 
characteristics including institutional history, development courses, and relations with 
government and other institutions. These traits will a bearing on banks’ diversification 
strategies and business performance. As such, future research can be advanced further 
to adopt a wide range of methods and modelling strategies, including case studies, in 
order to shed further lights on the effects of business diversification in the Chinese 
banking industry.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 Income diversification and banks' performance for G-SIBs, D-SIBs and 
N-SIBs by adopting dummy variables, 2005-2016 
This table reports the two-step SYS-GMM dynamic panel estimation results with robust errors.  Our 
dependent variables is return on assets (ROA). ROA (t-1) refers to the lagged dependent variables by 
one period. HHI_Dummy_GSIBs, HHI_Dummy_DSIBs and HHI_Dummy_NSIBs indicate three 
interaction terms by using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index multiply three dummy variables to 
catalogue G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs. NIM indicates total interest income/total interest expenses. 
LTA is loans/total assets, and NON is the non-interest expenses/total assets. The Sargan test checks 
the null hypothesis, i.e., that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. AR (2) denotes 
the Arellano-Bond test for the 2nd-order autocorrelation in first differences. Figures in brackets 
present the standard error. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.   
  ROA 
ROA (t-1) 0.452*** 
  (0.017) 
HHI_Dummy_GSIBs 0.005** 
  (0.002) 
HHI_Dummy_DSIBs 0.002 
  (0.001) 
HHI_Dummy_NSIBs -0.004*** 
  (0.001) 
NIM 0.184*** 
  (0.012) 
LTA -0.004 
  (0.001) 
NON 0.009 
  (0.031) 
Constant 0.256*** 
  (0.053) 
F-test 0.000 
Sargan test 0.390 
AR(2) 0.123 
Observations 408 
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Table A2 Income diversification and banks' performance for G-SIBs, D-SIBs and 
N-SIBs by adopting dummy variables, 2005-2016 
This table reports the two-step SYS-GMM dynamic panel estimation results with robust errors.  Our 
dependent variables is return on assets (ROA). ROA (t-1) refers to the lagged dependent variables by 
one period. COM_Dummy_GSIBs, COM_Dummy_DSIBs, COM_Dummy_NSIBs, 
TRAD_Dummy_GSIBs, TRAD_Dummy_DSIBs, TRAD_Dummy_NSIBs, OTH_Dummy_GSIBs, 
OTH_Dummy_DSIBs and OTH_Dummy_NSIBs indicate nine interaction terms by using the fee 
and commissions, trading income and other income multiply three dummy variables to catalogue G-
SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs. NIM indicates total interest income/total interest expenses. LTA is 
loans/total assets, and NON is the non-interest expenses/total assets. The Sargan test checks the null 
hypothesis, i.e., that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals. AR (2) denotes the 
Arellano-Bond test for the 2nd-order autocorrelation in first differences. Figures in brackets present 
the standard error. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.                                                                                                                                                                         
  
Fee and 
Commissions 
Trading Activities Other Activities 
  
  ROA   
ROA (t-1) 0.442*** 0.336*** 0.709***   
  (0.016) (0.073) (0.028)   
COM_Dummy_GSIBs 0.012**       
  (0.006)       
COM_Dummy_DSIBs -0.011**       
  (0.006)       
COM_Dummy_NSIBs -0.020***       
  (0.003)       
TRAD_Dummy_GSIBs   0.365***     
    (0.136)     
TRAD_Dummy_DSIBs   0.052*     
    (0.030)     
TRAD_Dummy_NSIBs   0.036**     
    (0.016)     
OTH_Dummy_GSIBs     -0.023   
      (0.019)   
OTH_Dummy_DSIBs     -0.064***   
      (0.013)   
OTH_Dummy_NSIBs     -0.035***   
      (0.007)   
NIM 0.165*** 0.304*** -0.043***   
  (0.013) (0.063) (0.015)   
LTA -0.005*** -0.003 0.001   
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)   
NON 0.096** -0.069 0.447***   
  (0.042) (0.093) (0.034)   
Constant 0.342*** -0.005 0.050   
  (0.041) (0.138) (0.044)   
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Sargan test 0.450 0.992 1.000   
AR(2) 0.114 0.301 0.875   
Observations 408 399 406   
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Table A3 Income diversification and banks' efficiency for G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-
SIBs by adopting dummy variables, 2005-2016 
This table reports the results from Dynamic Tobit estimation. Our dependent variables are cost 
efficiency, which are estimated by stochastic frontier analysis. Cost_Effeiciny (t-1) refers to the 
lagged dependent variables by one period. HHI_Dummy_GSIBs, HHI_Dummy_DSIBs and 
HHI_Dummy_NSIBs indicate three interaction terms by using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
multiply three dummy variables to catalogue G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs. Lerner indicates the 
Lerner index, NIM indicates net interest revenue over total earning assets, ETA refers to equity / total 
assets, CIR indicates the cost-income ratio. Figures in brackets present the standard error. ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
  Cost efficiency 
Cost_Effeiciny (t-1) 0.689*** 
  (0.164) 
HHI_Dummy_GSIBs -0.191** 
  (0.086) 
HHI_Dummy_DSIBs -0.313*** 
  (0.107) 
HHI_Dummy_NSIBs 0.001 
  (0.093) 
Lerner -0.472*** 
  (0.078) 
NIM 3.880*** 
  (0.876) 
ETA 0.011 
  (0.356) 
CIR -0.139*** 
  (0.049) 
Constant 0.455*** 
  (0.175) 
Log likelihood 12.464 
LR test (p-value) 0.000 
Observations 402 
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Table A4 Income diversification and banks' efficiency for G-SIBs, D-SIBs and N-
SIBs by adopting dummy variables, 2005-2016 
Dynamic Tobit estimation. Our dependent variables are cost efficiency, which are estimated by 
stochastic frontier analysis. Cost_Effeiciny (t-1) refers to the lagged dependent variables by one 
period. COM_Dummy_GSIBs, COM_Dummy_DSIBs, COM_Dummy_NSIBs, 
TRAD_Dummy_GSIBs, TRAD_Dummy_DSIBs, TRAD_Dummy_NSIBs, OTH_Dummy_GSIBs,  
OTH_Dummy_DSIBs and OTH_Dummy_NSIBs indicate nine interaction terms by using the fee 
and commissions, trading income and other income multiply three dummy variables to catalogue G-
SIBs, D-SIBs and N-SIBs. . Lerner indicates the Lerner index, NIM indicates net interest revenue 
over total earning assets, ETA refers to equity / total assets, CIR indicates the cost-income ratio. 
Figures in brackets present the standard error. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively.  
  
Fee and 
Commissions 
Trading Activities Other Activities 
  
  Cost efficiency   
Cost_Effeiciny (t-1) 0.454*** 0.695*** 0.498***   
  (0.042) (0.148) (0.054)   
COM_Dummy_GSIBs -0.562***       
  (0.107)       
COM_Dummy_DSIBs -0.332***       
  (0.108)       
COM_Dummy_NSIBs -0.587***       
  (0.105)       
TRAD_Dummy_GSIBs   0.074     
    (3.265)     
TRAD_Dummy_DSIBs   1.377***     
    (0.468)     
TRAD_Dummy_NSIBs   0.558**     
    (0.234)     
OTH_Dummy_GSIBs     -0.281**   
      (0.119)   
OTH_Dummy_DSIBs     -0.063   
      (0.903)   
OTH_Dummy_NSIBs     0.466**   
      (0.205)   
Lerner -0.294*** -0.331*** -0.297***   
  (0.043) (0.057) (0.051)   
NIM 1.938** 3.751*** 3.254***   
  (0.597) (0.725) (0.670)   
ETA 0.896*** 0.762** 0.564**   
  (0.202) (0.349) (0.235)   
CIR -0.075* -0.020 -0.011   
  (0.045) (0.055) (0.049)   
Constant 0.529*** 0.245* 0.424***   
  (0.051) (0.146) (0.060)   
Log likelihood 589.446 338.381 561.330   
LR test (p-value) 0.000 0.034 0.000   
Observations 402 393 391   
 
